Can the Internet Empower People?

Empirical Studies on Transparency, Accountability, and 

Open-Mindedness by Weyand, Christian
 
 
 
 
Can the Internet Empower People? 
Empirical Studies on Transparency, Accountability, and  
Open-Mindedness 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation 
zur 
Erlangung des Doktorgrades 
der 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der 
Universität zu Köln 
 
2014 
 
vorgelegt 
von 
 
Dipl.-Soz. Christian Weyand 
 
aus 
 
Dernbach 
 
  
 
 
 
Referent:   Prof. Dr. Hans-Jürgen Andreß 
Korreferent:   Prof. Dr. Achim Goerres 
Tag der Promotion:  19.05.2014 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Ich danke meinen 
Betreuern, 
Kollegen, 
Eltern 
und Freunden, 
die mich während dieser Arbeit 
begleitet, unterstützt und inspiriert haben. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction 
1. Thematic Introduction ................................................................................................................. 6 
2. Definitions and Theoretical Framework ................................................................................. 12 
2.1. Definitions of the Research Objects ................................................................................ 12 
2.2. Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................................... 13 
3. Extended Summaries .................................................................................................................. 17 
3.1. Paper 1: Can the Internet Promote Political Accountability? ...................................... 18 
3.2. Paper 2: Why German Political Elites Support Governmental Transparency .......... 21 
3.3. Paper 3: Online and Open-Minded. ................................................................................ 24 
4. Integration into the Literature ................................................................................................... 26 
4.1. The Integration into Disciplines....................................................................................... 26 
4.2. Research Perspectives on Internet Politics ..................................................................... 29 
4.3. The Integration into Scholarly Discourses ..................................................................... 31 
5. Conclusions from this Dissertation .......................................................................................... 34 
References ........................................................................................................................................ 37 
 
Paper 1: Can the Internet Promote Political Accountability? Evidence 
from a Laboratory Experiment 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 47 
2. Internet Diffusion, Information Availability, and Political Accountability ........................ 50 
3. Fire-Alarm Accountability Mechanism .................................................................................... 52 
4. Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 55 
4.1. Rationale for a Laboratory Experiment .......................................................................... 56 
4.2. Organization ........................................................................................................................ 56 
4.3. The Game ............................................................................................................................ 57 
4.4. Relation to Theory and Existing Experimental Research............................................. 59 
4.5. Treatments and Predictions .............................................................................................. 60 
5. Results ........................................................................................................................................... 63 
6. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 70 
References ........................................................................................................................................ 71 
Appendix .......................................................................................................................................... 74 
 
 
 
Paper 2: Why German Political Elites Support Governmental 
Transparency. Self-Interest, Anticipation of Voters’ Preferences or 
Socialization? 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 81 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework ...................................................................... 84 
2.1. The Role of Information in the Policy Process ............................................................. 84 
2.2. Self-Interest ......................................................................................................................... 86 
2.3. Anticipation of Voter Preferences ................................................................................... 87 
2.4. Elite Socialization ............................................................................................................... 89 
2.5. The Complementation of Motivations ............................................................................ 91 
3. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................... 92 
3.1. Dependent Variable: Support for Governmental Transparency ................................. 93 
3.2. Independent Variables ....................................................................................................... 94 
3.3. Analysis and Models ........................................................................................................... 96 
4. Results ........................................................................................................................................... 98 
4.1. Descriptive Results ............................................................................................................. 98 
4.2. Multiple Regression Results ............................................................................................ 100 
5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 106 
References ...................................................................................................................................... 108 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................................ 112 
 
Paper 3: Online and Open-Minded. Cross-Country and Panel Analyses 
of the Impact of Internet Usage on Liberal Attitudes 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 115 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Argument ....................................................................... 117 
2.1. The Concept of Liberalism ............................................................................................. 117 
2.2. Media Effects Theories: How Media Affect People ................................................... 118 
2.3. Why Internet Effects are Different ................................................................................ 121 
3. Research Strategy ...................................................................................................................... 127 
4. Cross-Country Evidence from the World Values Survey ................................................... 129 
5. Panel Analyses with the LISS Data ........................................................................................ 138 
6. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 142 
References ...................................................................................................................................... 143 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................................ 147 
 
 
6 
 
Introduction 
1. Thematic Introduction 
The last two decades have seen an extensive development and diffusion of new information and 
communication technology (ICT) like broadband internet connections, mobile (online) 
computing and data storage in the cloud. This technological progress has substantially changed 
how media are produced and used, how people communicate, and how they process information. 
Because of the large scope of these changes, this dissertation integrates insights from four 
different academic disciplines: political science, sociology, communication studies, and 
economics. The most central mechanism and a common assumption across all three papers is 
that internet diffusion increases information availability or – vice versa – reduces information 
asymmetries between different political or social agents. In this dissertation I investigate how 
these changes are relevant for the political sphere, that is, how internet technologies affect 
citizens, politicians and the relationship between both. The particular questions answered in the 
papers are: Does internet diffusion increase political accountability? Why do politicians support 
governmental transparency? Does internet usage make people more open-minded? Since all 
research questions ask whether the internet can increase a certain desirable outcome, the 
dissertation has a strong normative relevance that can be summarized in a single question: Does 
the internet empower people? 
A dissertation in the social sciences aims to explain a social or political phenomenon that could 
not be satisfactorily explained yet. It should contribute to the existing scientific literature in a 
unique way, but also be of some practical relevance beyond mere knowledge acquisition. The 
famous sociologist Robert K. Merton (1960) acknowledges the difficulty of formulating a 
meaningful research question and suggests researchers to develop their approach to the research 
question in three steps: First, stating in the originating question what one wants to know and what 
the motivation behind this question is; second, providing the rationale of the question, an argument 
about why a particular question is relevant and worth being answered; third, specifying the question 
by turning the general originating question into more specific and testable questions. This 
approach has proven worthwhile and will also provide an outline for the following introduction. 
The originating motivation to examine the impacts of internet technology in this dissertation 
stems from its enormous diffusion within the last decade and the way it innovated 
communication and information processes. Table 1 shows that internet penetration, the 
proportion of individuals in a country who use the internet, is increasing worldwide 
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(International Telecommunications Union 2013). In the year 2000, only three countries had a 
penetration (slightly) higher than 0.5 – the Falkland Islands, Norway, and Canada. Only 54 
countries had a penetration rate higher than 0.1. In 2012, the Scandinavian countries, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have penetration rates close to 1, in 85 countries more than 
half of the population uses the internet, and 169 countries have a penetration rate above 0.1. 
About 0.4 of the world population used the internet within the last three months. 
Table 1: Internet Penetration Worldwide 
  2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Mean 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.25 0.29 0.35 0.42 
SD 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.29 
        
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Q25 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.13 
Median 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.41 
Q75 0.11 0.21 0.30 0.40 0.47 0.55 0.65 
Max 0.59 0.79 0.84 0.90 0.93 0.96 0.97 
Source: International Telecommunications Union (2013); 228 countries. Values indicate the proportion of 
individuals who used the internet from any location in the last three months. 
The internet’s importance for searching information becomes apparent by looking at Google. In 
2012, the most popular search engine on the internet handled about 100 billion search queries a 
month (Sullivan 2012). Wikipedia, the biggest encyclopedia in the world, has about 4.4 million 
articles in the English language and consists of more than 60 times as many words as the 
Encyclopedia Britannica, the next largest English-language encyclopedia (Wikipedia 2014c). 
Looking at the numbers of Facebook, the biggest social network on the internet, the same 
dimensions can be found for communication: In the third quarter of 2013, Facebook reported to 
have 1.19 billion monthly active users (728 million of them are active daily) (Facebook 2013). 
This extraordinary high usage (about one sixth of the world population) is not restricted to 
economically developed countries. In June 2013, there were 87 countries in the world with more 
than one million monthly active users (Allfacebook 2013). Even small countries like Kyrgyzstan 
or Togo have more than 100.000 active users; for the latter these users represent more than half 
of the internet-using population. Not surprisingly, researchers’ interest in the internet has also 
increased substantially. Since around the year 2000, the number of newly published scholarly 
articles on political communication whose subject matter is the internet has exceeded the number 
of all articles studying television, radio and newspaper together (Chadwick and Howard 2009a). 
The role of ICT in numerous recent political events has also drawn increasing attention from 
researchers and the media. It is supposed that the internet, and specifically social media, played an 
important role in the organization of the uprisings in several Arabian countries from 2011 to 
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2012, also labeled as Arab Spring (Breuer 2012; Howard et al. 2011; Wagner and Gainous 2013). 
While scholars do not agree on how exactly and to which extent the internet impacted the events, 
the sovereigns of the respective countries appear to have been less doubtful: Nearly all affected 
governments blocked certain websites and services; and Egypt’s government was the first to even 
switch off the country’s entire internet infrastructure (Markoff and Glanz 2011; for an extensive 
list of references to internet censorship during Arab Spring see Wikipedia (2014a)). Morozov 
(2009, 2011) points out that authoritarian regimes might actually use the internet to identify 
opponents and increase political repression. It seems that the communist regime in China also 
fears the internet’s potential to initiate and coordinate political protests, because King et al. 
(2013) could show that the Chinese internet censorship is mostly concerned with content calling 
for collective action and social mobilization (much more than with negative criticism of the 
state). In 2013, disclosures of mass surveillance by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) 
suggest that even in democratic countries the internet might be used in a way that violates basic 
rights. Such adverse effects of ICT will be discussed in the concluding section of this 
introduction. 
Already three years before Edward Snowden’s disclosed the NSA activities in 2013, Wikileaks 
had already hit the headlines with publishing comparably confidential material. As a 
whistleblower platform, it guarantees anonymity through sophisticated digital encryptions, so 
everybody can publish information on their servers that he or she considers as important and 
relevant for the public. In this way, for example information about war crimes in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as well as several American diplomatic cables found their way to a broader public. 
Besides the discussion of the published material, these Wikileaks publications triggered a meta-
debate about the potential benefits and harms of an unlimited informed public (Benkler 2011; 
Brian, McDermott, and Weins 2011). 
A prime example from Germany shows how the internet can increase political accountability. In 
2011, a newspaper presented first evidence that the German Minister of Defense at the time, 
Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, had violated academic standards in his doctoral thesis from 2007 
by not citing several copied passages. Only one day later, an anonymous doctoral student 
established “Guttenplag”1, a Wiki-based internet platform for collaborative work that enabled 
volunteers to document plagiarism in Guttenberg’s thesis. Within a short time, contributors of 
Guttenplag found plagiarized material in 65% of all lines of the dissertation. The frequency and 
unambiguousness of plagiarism found by Guttenplag led to the revocation of the Minister’s 
                                                          
1 The name “Guttenplag” is a combination of Guttenberg’s name and the German word for plagiarism – “Plagiat”.  
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doctoral degree only one week later. Because the public mostly agreed that Guttenberg 
deliberately plagiarized to bolster his career and reputation with the prestigious doctoral degree in 
an illicit way, he eventually had to step down from all political offices in March. Afterwards, 
Guttenplag and similar platforms continued to investigate doctoral theses of further German 
politicians. Until today, this has led to the revocation of at least nine more doctoral degrees. In 
this case, ICT allowed a small number of laymen to gather together, cooperate online, check 
citations online and inform a large audience about the misconduct within a very short time (see 
section 1 of this dissertation for an elaboration on such an accountability mechanism). It is barely 
possible to imagine the occurrence and the success of a similar endeavor offline in a university 
library. 
Regarding the examples above, the rationale, i.e. the relevance of the research questions, is 
straightforward. First, from a perspective of pure knowledge acquisition, the development and 
diffusion of digital ICT is a very recent and thus unexplored phenomenon. Indeed, one could 
compare the advent of the internet with early innovations like the telephone or television and 
question its impact on established communication theories, research on media effects, or 
information asymmetries (see section 4). However, detailed investigations of the distinct impact 
of the internet on a variety of processes, attitudes, behaviors, and institutions have just begun. 
Second, from a normative perspective, the subjects of this research – governmental transparency, 
political accountability, and citizens’ open-mindedness – all describe desirable outcomes. 
Therefore, it is relevant to investigate all possible mechanisms that might enhance these 
outcomes. That information plays a central role for achieving this goal was already hinted to by 
Robert Dahl (1989) who claims that inequality in information and knowledge is the most severe 
resource inequality that threatens democracy. He thus considers it even more substantial than 
inequalities in resources that permit violent coercion or those which stem from wealth and 
economic position. Manuel Castells (2009:3) further states that “Power is based on the control of 
communication and information, be it the macro-power of the state and media corporations or 
the micro-power of organizations of all sorts.” 
Despite this substantial diffusion of internet technologies and the importance of (political) 
information availability, one has to bear in mind that most people will use the internet first and 
foremost for commercial purposes or entertainment and not specifically for political purposes 
(Prior 2005). 80 years ago, Lippmann (1934) already recognized that the capacity of media to 
recreate politics is limited by humans’ cognitive abilities and motivation to inform themselves 
about politics, not by technical properties of the media itself. The concept “attention economy” 
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(Davenport and Beck 2001) relates to the same phenomenon in the digital age: Information is 
ubiquitous, but the attention people can pay to information is the scarce factor. A similar 
objection against any substantial impact of the internet is that if people decide to inform 
themselves about politics online, they will most likely visit an outlet of traditional media like 
popular newspapers or newscasts instead of a niche site, private blog, governmental site, or 
watchblog that covers different or more specific topics, represents an ideology different from the 
mainstream, or allows for a direct investigation of politicians’ actions (Norris 1999:89; Webster 
and Lin 2002). 
An even more basic barrier to possible positive effects of information dissemination through the 
internet is the digital divide (Norris 2001; Warschauer 2004), i.e. inequalities in physical access to 
and use of ICT. These inequalities can exist between different countries, but also between people 
with different socio-demographic characteristics within a country. As one can see in Table 1, the 
inequality in internet access is increasing over time. Moreover, Wei and Hindman (2011) show 
that the inequalities in internet usage are associated with greater political knowledge gaps than 
that of the traditional media. This implies that a digital divide has more consequences than 
inequalities in traditional media usage. 
For these reasons, the internet should certainly not be regarded as a panacea that unambiguously 
empowers people and that has exclusively positive effects on transparency, accountability or 
other desirable political and social outcomes regardless of existing circumstances. One rather has 
to specify research questions that help to exactly define under which conditions there might be a 
certain effect. My approach to specifying such questions is to scrutinize arguments explaining 
why the internet cannot have any effect (as the objections in the paragraph above), or to analyze 
inconsistencies between different theoretical argumentations. By comparing different theoretical 
approaches or developing own theories, I intend to resolve the conflict and expand the scope of 
the existing literature. Three specific questions are analyzed in the papers of this dissertation. All 
three papers are single-authored. Their titles and their unique contributions are outlined below. 
Henceforth, the papers will be addressed with the respective number (see also Table 2 and 
section 3 for details). 
 Paper 1: “Can the Internet Promote Political Accountability? Evidence from a Laboratory 
Experiment” 
 Paper 2: “Why German Political Elites Support Governmental Transparency – Self-
Interest, Anticipation of Voters’ Preferences or Socialization?” 
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 Paper 3: “Online and Open-Minded. Cross-Country and Panel Analyses of the Impact of 
Internet Usage on Liberal Attitudes” 
In paper 1 I address the claim that an increase in information availability from technical progress 
in ICT cannot lead to higher political accountability because people’s ability and motivation to 
process the information remains limited (Bimber 1998; Lippmann 1934). However, Snider (1996) 
argues theoretically that media can still have an impact on political accountability if politicians 
anticipate that citizens might potentially get informed about any wrongdoings, although their 
actual level of information does not increase. My contribution is to transfer Snider’s argument to 
the increased information availability due to the diffusion of new digital ICT and test the claim 
empirically in a laboratory experiment.  
In paper 2, I focus on the importance of politicians’ attitudes towards governmental transparency 
for the successful realization of respective policies and thus for a sufficient information flow to 
citizens. While the popularity of transparency policies among citizens has been shown empirically 
(Association of Government Accountants 2010; Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007), so far no one 
has tried to explain or measure politicians’ attitudes. The contribution is to pick up three partly 
contradicting theoretical streams – principal-agent theory, office seeking, and elite socialization – 
in order to explain elite attitudes in general and deduce their predictions concerning transparency 
preferences. With survey data from candidates for the German Bundestag 2009 I test which 
factors are most influential for politicians’ transparency support. 
In paper 3, I analyze whether internet usage increases liberal attitudes towards social and moral 
issues. The paper contributes to the literature by showing that internet effects on attitudes differ 
from those of traditional media theoretically and empirically. The paper is among the first that 
differentiates internet and television effects in a global context of 57 countries. The findings are 
also replicated with panel data from the Netherlands. 
Regarding the initial question of this dissertation whether the internet can empower people, the 
results of the papers provide mixed evidence. Paper 1 shows that politicians anticipate that their 
behavior can be monitored more easily. While they do fear electoral sanctions, they also interpret 
the monitoring opportunities as distrust in their competence and benevolence. As a result, the 
intrinsic motivation to represent citizens’ interests is partly crowded out by self-interest. This 
ambivalence in the effects of transparency can also be found in paper 2. There is a high variance 
in transparency support among politicians, with strong supporters as well as distinct opponents. 
Party membership is the best predictor for preferences. Paper 3 shows that internet usage actually 
has a liberalizing effect on social attitudes. However, the effect is weak or even non-existent in 
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conservative countries. These findings imply that the internet has the potential to empower 
people, but that obstacles, adverse effects and contextual differences have to be taken into 
account (see also section 5).  
The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows. In section 2, I give an overview of the 
theoretical framework of this dissertation and provide definitions of the key concepts. Section 3 
summarizes the three single papers. In section 4, the dissertation is integrated into scholarly 
disciplines, different research perspectives and different discourses. Section 5 provides 
conclusions from this dissertation. 
2. Definitions and Theoretical Framework 
In this dissertation I claim that the internet can increase three desirable political and social 
outcomes – political accountability, governmental transparency, and open-mindedness. Research 
on the effects of technical innovations such as the internet has to carefully explain underlying 
social mechanisms in order to avoid a technological determinist perspective. For this reason, in 
this section I will first define the three objects of interest and then explain the theoretical 
framework that links the internet with these outcomes. This section also aims to show the 
conceptual similarities between the papers. 
2.1. Definitions of the Research Objects 
The research object in paper 1 is political accountability. In a representative democracy, citizens as 
sovereigns delegate power to politicians because they lack both the time and the ability for the 
mass coordination necessary to find binding rules for the whole society. The idea of 
representation includes that politicians shape policies in the best interest of citizens (Pitkin 1967). 
Political accountability is the ability to ensure that political elites actually act in the voters’ best 
interest (Fearon 1999). Periodical elections are regarded as the primary mechanism for citizens to 
hold politicians accountable and sanction those who they are dissatisfied with. However, a main 
difficulty in holding politicians accountable is that voters lack the information necessary to 
instruct the government what to do and to judge what it has done (Manin, Przeworski, and 
Stokes 1999). 
The research object in paper 2 is governmental transparency. This is “the ability to find out what is 
going on inside a public sector organization” (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007: 308). It comprises 
information such as politicians’ individual voting behavior in parliament, perquisites of delegates, 
key figures of all kind of political and economic developments, ex ante expectations or ex post 
evaluations of policies, and details about placing and costs of public contracts. For the reasons 
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mentioned in the last paragraph, governmental transparency can be regarded as a precondition 
for political accountability. 
According to Piotrowski (2007: 91), there are five channels through which such information can 
reach the public: First, proactive dissemination by all kind of public agencies via press releases, 
provision of statistical figures, publications of historical documents or posting documents online. 
Second, requesting information that is not proactively provided by any agency but that has to be 
specifically requested by journalists or citizens. Third, whistle-blowing, the publication of 
administrative misbehavior or illegal activities. Fourth, leaks, the release of information that is not 
intended to become public to media outlets. Fifth, open meetings where information is discussed 
publicly by both political elites and representatives of media or interested citizens. 
The research objects in paper 3 are liberal attitudes, or more colloquial, as I labeled it in the title of 
the paper, open-mindedness. In this paper, the interpretation of liberalism corresponds to what 
can also be labeled as progressive, “classical liberalism” (Janda 1980), or “libertarianism” 
(Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi 1998). Regarding a two-dimensional ideology space with a socio-economic 
and a social-moral dimension (Janda 1980; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Weisberg and Rusk 1970), 
this definition of liberalism matches the latter dimension. Conversely, this means that peoples’ 
attitudes towards economic equality and the degree of governmental interventions into the 
market is not of interest here. According to a commonly used definition from social psychology, 
an attitude is the “psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with 
some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly and Chaiken 1993:1). The object of an attitude can be 
specific (such as a person or a thing) or abstract (such as in this paper, political policies, moral 
issues, or certain group of people like homosexuals). An attitude is thus considered liberal if it 
favors the acceptance of individual rights and freedom, tolerance towards diversity, and openness 
to change. It stands in contrast to conservative attitudes that favor the retention of existing social 
institutions and compliance with traditional norms and values.  
2.2. Theoretical Framework 
In the early days of wider internet diffusion in the 1990s, many researchers held strong beliefs 
about its effects on politics and democracy. The internet was considered “the great equalizer” 
(Rheingold 1991) and some anticipated the development of an “electronic democracy” 
(Browning 1996). Bimber (1998) calls those approaches that expect the internet to produce a 
resurgence of individual-level influence on government and politics “popular claims”. They have 
in common that they expect access to information and communication to become decentralized 
and, as a result, citizens to become more informed and participative and less dependent on elites 
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and political intermediaries. In its most extreme form, the populist vision includes a government 
that is instructed by well-informed citizens via electronic media. 
All too often, this kind of expectations share a technological determinist view (Karakaya Polat 
2005; Weare 2002): The internet is regarded as a “deus ex machina” (Weare 2002) that 
inextricably leads to a certain and final outcome, ignoring the fact that technology is actively 
adopted by people and within already existing social and political institutions. As Bimber 
(1998:135) states, the central theoretical problem with the populist claim is “the absence of a clear 
link between increases in information and increases in popular political action”. Thus, instead of 
putting the emphasis on the internet as a technology, Karakaya Polat (2005) suggests to examine 
the different facets of the internet – the internet as information source, as communication 
medium, and as virtual public sphere – to establish a causal link between technology and political 
outcomes which can also be addressed by established theories.  
Out of these different facets, this dissertation focuses on the internet as an information source. 
The facilitation of communication is also accounted for, but only as a means to the exchange of 
information, not as a means to political participation or as a possibility for more direct forms of 
democracy. Karakaya Polat (2005) and Weare (2002) suggest that research that praises the 
internet’s potential as an information source (as this dissertation does) have to establish two 
causal links: first, the link between internet advances and increases in information availability; 
second, the link between increased information availability and changes in certain political 
outcomes. Below, I elaborate on the causal links in this dissertation. I furthermore explain how 
the papers address proposed objections concerning the efficacy of the internet. 
The first link seems relatively indisputable. The last section already provided some vivid 
illustrations of the internet’s importance for information search. In a digital environment, 
recording, storing, searching for, and accessing political information has become much faster, 
cheaper, and independent of time and place. In short, the transaction costs of information 
acquisition are much lower. For the first time, ordinary people can become broadcasters of 
information themselves and reach potentially huge audiences via private blogs or social media 
(Weare 2002). New kinds of whistleblower platforms such as Wikileaks or the German 
Guttenplag (see section 1) can provide the public with classified information and reveal political 
misbehavior. Open government and e-governance (McDermott 2010) are a further source of 
political information and a new possibility for direct information exchange between government 
and citizens. As a result, new ICT substantially increase the available (political) information and 
can improve facilitate investigations and information flows. 
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In papers 1 and 2, the accountability relationship between citizens and politicians is characterized 
by information asymmetries concerning the policy process. The relationship is analyzed within a 
principal-agent framework (Fearon 1999; Ferejohn 1986; Miller 2005). If citizens lack 
information about politicians’ actions and decisions, this leads to moral hazard regarding the 
behavior of politicians because the information asymmetry represents an insurance against 
detection of wrongdoing and against electoral sanctions. From a principal-agent perspective, the 
second link can be established because the increased information availability by the internet (link 
1) reduces the information asymmetry and thus leads to more accountability. However, there are 
still two objections against the validity of this second link. 
First, as already outlined in the previous section, citizens’ cognitive abilities and motivation to 
inform themselves about politics might be too limited (Bimber 1998; Lippmann 1934). If “most 
people, most of the time, are able to find better things to do than participate in politics” (Walker 
1991, p. 19), an increased availability of political information will have no effect at all, because no 
one will process this information. Paper 1 addresses this objection. I show that political 
accountability does not require that all citizens are well informed about what their representatives 
are doing. Instead, it is sufficient if a small group of news intermediaries exploits the increased 
information capacities and has the potential to become better informed about potential 
wrongdoings.  
Second, principal-agent theory suggests that politicians might not support transparency policies 
to hamper the information flow to citizens 2 . Transparency policies facilitate political 
accountability and thus decrease politicians’ opportunities to enforce self-interests. Snider (2009) 
emphasizes the issue by asking in the title of his respective study, “Would you Ask Turkeys to 
Mandate Thanksgiving?”. Paper 2 addresses this objection. It compares different motivations that 
could influence politicians’ attitudes towards transparency policies. Besides self-interest, these 
motivations include the anticipation of voters’ preferences (office-seeking) (Strøm 1990) and elite 
socialization (McClosky 1964; Sullivan et al. 1993). The results show that especially the latter one 
is a strong driving force. Therefore, politicians’ policy preferences cannot be regarded as a clear 
obstacle to political accountability. 
Paper 3 analyzes the impact of internet usage on citizens’ attitudes towards social and moral 
issues. It is thus less concerned with political information, but with the general content of news 
                                                          
2 Strictly speaking, paper 2 does not address the impact of the internet. It does, however, relate to the second link, 
the connection between information availability (transparency) and accountability. The issue of governmental 
transparency recently gained a lot of importance because of new technology-driven institutions like e-governance, 
electronic petitions, or open data.  
16 
 
or entertainment programs and how issues are framed in the media. Analogous to paper 1 and 2, 
the first causal link says that the internet increases information availability. For paper 3, I further 
argue that internet content has more variety and is more liberal on average than the content of 
traditional media. This is because its technical features translate into social mechanisms that do 
not exist for traditional media (see section 3.3.).  
The second link for paper 3 is based on cultivation theory (Gerbner 1969), social learning theory 
(Bandura 1986), and agenda setting and framing theories (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). All of 
these theories propose that people are heavily influenced by the values and worldviews that are 
dominant in the media. Therefore, using the internet as a source of news and entertainment 
information leads to more liberal attitudes than consuming traditional media because the content 
is more liberal (link 1). In distinguishing between the effects of different media, this argument 
disagrees with the assumption of cultivation theory that asserts a uniform (conservative) effect of 
all kinds of media (Morgan, Shanahan, and Signorielli 2009). 
This section shows that all three papers of the dissertation refer to the internet as an information 
source. A two-step causal link between the availability of information and the respective outcome 
can be established. In paper 1 and 2, the crucial link is whether more information could really 
lead to more accountability. They both address two possible objections, the limitations of citizens 
to process more information (paper 1) and the willingness of politicians to support transparency 
policies (paper 2). Conversely, for paper 3 the crucial link is the first one – whether the internet 
really leads to more liberal content – while the second link has been often validated by different 
streams of research. This sections further points out that research on internet effects can and 
should be related to established theories (see section 4).  
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3. Extended Summaries 
This section presents extended summaries of each paper. Table 2 gives an overview over the key 
features such as the research questions, data sets, and the applied methods. 
Table 2: Overview of the Papers 
  Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3 
Title Can the Internet Promote 
Political Accountability? 
Evidence from a Laboratory 
Experiment 
Why German Political Elites 
Support Governmental 
Transparency. Self-Interest, 
Anticipation of Voters’ 
Preferences or Socialization? 
Online and Open-Minded. 
Cross-Country and Panel 
Analyses of the Impact of 
Internet Usage on Liberal 
Attitudes 
Status of 
publication 
Submitted to Journal of 
Information Technology and Politics 
Submitted to European Political 
Science Review 
Submitted to Communication 
Research 
Conferences - 5th Annual NYU-CESS 
Experiments in Political 
Science Conference, New York 
City (USA) 
- Research Seminar in Applied 
Microeconomics, Cologne 
(GER) 
- Socialbar Köln – Politische 
Partizipation in digitalen 
Netzen, Cologne (GER) 
-PhD colloquium at the 
University of Duisburg-Essen, 
Institute of Empirical Political 
Science, Prof. Achim Goerres 
- 38th Annual Conference of the 
International Association for the 
Studies of German Politics, 
London (UK) 
- 2nd Soclife Winter Workshop, 
Cologne (GER) 
- PhD colloquium at the 
University of Duisburg-Essen, 
Institute of Empirical Political 
Science, Prof. Achim Goerres 
- PhD colloquium at the 
University of Duisburg-
Essen, Institute of 
Empirical Political Science, 
Prof. Achim Goerres 
Research 
question 
Can the internet promote 
accountability although most 
people will not make use of the 
increased information 
availability? 
Why do political elites support 
governmental transparency? 
Which impact – self-interest, 
anticipation of voters' 
preferences, or socialization – is 
strongest? 
Does internet usage increase 
liberal attitudes? 
How does the impact of 
internet usage differ from 
the impact of TV 
consumption? 
How is media impact 
mediated by countries’ 
liberalism? 
Data Self-collected from a laboratory 
experiment in the “Cologne 
Laboratory for Economic 
Research” 
German Longitudinal Election 
Study 2009 (GLES) - Candidate 
Campaign Survey, Survey and 
Structural Data 
(1) World Values Survey 
Wave 5  
(2) Dutch Longitudinal 
Internet Studies for the 
Social Sciences (LISS) 
(Panel data) 
Technique of 
data analysis 
- Mann-Whitney-U test 
(continuous var.); 
- Fisher-Exact test 
(dichotomous var.); 
OLS regression with clustered 
standard errors 
(1) Random intercept 
models, random coefficient 
models, empirical Bayes 
estimation; 
(2) Fixed effects models 
Country Germany Germany (1) 57 countries from all 
over the world 
(2) The Netherlands 
Units of 
analysis 
Students (playing the role of 
politicians and citizens) 
Politicians (candidates for the 
German Bundestag 2009) 
Citizens 
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3.1. Paper 1: Can the Internet Promote Political Accountability? Evidence from a 
Laboratory Experiment 
One of the most prominent arguments against any positive effects of ICT on political 
accountability is that ordinary citizens have limited cognitive abilities and motivation to inform 
themselves about politics (Bimber 1998; Karakaya Polat 2005; Lippmann 1934). Although the 
internet increases the availability of information about politics and about politicians’ actions, 
most citizens will not be better informed at all. Some might be even less informed because the 
substitute the acquisition of political information with new entertainment opportunities of ICT 
(Prior 2005). In this paper, I address this issue and argue that ICT can still increase accountability 
via a ‘Fire-Alarm Mechanism’ (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). The claim is tested with a self-
designed game in an economic laboratory experiment. 
Political accountability has been shown to be dependent on the degree of transparency of 
politician behavior (Besley and Burgess 2002; Cuillier 2008; Olken 2007; Serra 2011). An 
accountability mechanism works if politicians have to fear that wrongdoings will be sanctioned. 
To justify this anticipation, someone has to monitor politicians’ actions and decisions and a 
sufficient number of voters have to find out about the misdemeanor. It does not require that 
everyone informs herself directly and in detail. Instead, according to Arnold (2004, p. 13) it is 
“much more important that information regularly flows to those who act as watchdogs […] and 
that they have easy ways to communicate with other citizens when they discover representatives 
doing disagreeable things.” McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) illustrate the superiority of such 
intermediated information with the analogy of a fire alarm as opposed to police patrols, pointing 
out the first one’s less centralized, less active, and less direct oversight.  
To go one step further it is enough that politicians believe that their actions might be observed 
and thus change their behavior in anticipation. In this way, politicians act more in accordance 
with citizens’ interests not only because of actual information flows to citizens but simply 
because there is a sufficiently high chance citizens could potentially get informed (Snider 1996). 
In consequence, citizens at large do not need to be actually well-informed; it is sufficient that 
politicians anticipate that citizens potentially get informed by the watchdogs  
What the internet does is decreasing the transaction costs of information acquisition and 
diffusion. Ordinary citizens likely only benefit slightly from this development directly because 
they are still limited by their high opportunity costs of information acquisition. However it 
enables watchdogs that have low opportunity costs (because information seeking is their 
profession or they might have other specific interest in doing this task), to substantially enhance 
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their information acquisition. Thus, in actuality, the internet meets the requirements outlined by 
Arnold (2004) above: It improves the information flow to and from those who act as watchdogs. 
The internet simplifies journalistic routine investigations, enlarges the circle of people who can 
act as watchdog, increases possibilities to monitor political behavior, and speeds up and eases 
information diffusion.  
From the theoretical considerations I derive four propositions in the paper: 
P1: Politicians, to a certain extent, overestimate the risk of being monitored in every kind of 
information environment. 
P2: Politicians anticipate that citizens are potentially better informed in an environment with 
higher diffusion of modern ICT. 
P3: In an information environment with higher diffusion of modern ICT, politicians act more 
in accordance with citizens’ interests. 
P4: Actual information levels among citizens do not differ between environments with and 
without modern ICT. 
Because information levels and information flows are hard to measure in an uncontrolled 
environment, I conduct a monetary incentivized experiment in the Cologne Laboratory for 
Economic Research. Based on a trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995), I design a 
simple experiment that reflects the accountability relationship between a citizen and a politician 
in different information environments. Subjects play a one-round bargaining game anonymously 
in groups of two. The citizen has to transfer an amount of money to the politician. During the 
transfer, the money is multiplied by a factor x that is either two or four. The politician now has to 
divide the money between her and the citizen but only she knows whether the figurative cake to 
divide is small (x = 2) or big (x = 4). Citizen’s best interest would be an equal split. However, 
because information is asymmetric, the citizen does not know the actual size of the cake. When 
she receives an amount equal to the size of half of the small cake, she therefore cannot 
distinguish whether she actually receives half of a small cake (representation /fair decision) or 
only a quarter of the big cake (fraud / unfair decision) (Güth, Huck, and Ockenfels 1996). The 
politician can exploit this lack of knowledge. However, the citizen has the opportunity to acquire 
information that reveals the size of the multiplier with a certain probability. If she successfully 
reveals unfair behavior, the politician is sanctioned and outcomes are swapped. The game reflects 
a situation where a politician can hide unfair behavior behind external contextual factors 
unknown to the citizen. Different treatment conditions vary the number of watchdogs 
(zero/three/six) and thus the degree of information that the citizen can receive. 
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The results of the experiment show that there is no general overestimation of information 
acquisition (as proposed in P1). In line with P2, politicians (falsely) anticipate that citizens are 
better informed in the watchdog treatments (while in line with P4, the actual information 
acquisition is about equal in all treatments). However, this anticipation does not translate into 
more fair behavior in the watchdog treatments (as proposed in P3). There is some evidence from 
further analyses that this might be due a phenomenon also known as “hidden costs of control” 
(Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Frey 1993): Agents intrinsic motivation is crowded out and they reduce 
their performance because the principals’ monitoring is interpreted as a signal of distrust or as a 
limitation of their choice autonomy 
In a further analysis, a remarkable pattern appears: On the one hand, there is no significant 
difference in anticipations between treatments among politicians who choose to act fair. On the 
other hand, among the subjects acting unfair, the estimation of information acquisition is more 
than twice as high in the watchdog treatments. There are two possible explanations: First, 
politicians play unfair and because they play unfair the possibility that watchdogs will buy 
information to reveal their decision is more salient to them. Second, politicians play unfair as a 
consequence of the expectation that their partner will acquire more information. While the 
research design is not able to evaluate those explanations, the analysis of the decision-making 
motivations supports the second possibility. In the treatment without watchdogs, fair decisions 
are motivated about equally by fairness (63%) and risk aversion (55%). In the watchdog 
treatments, however, there is a substantial difference. Only 22% of fair decisions are motivated 
by fairness but 89% by risk aversion. 
The conclusion of this paper is that on the one hand, ICT can actually increase political 
accountability, despite objections concerning citizens’ motivational and cognitive limits to 
informing themselves about politics and the small and fragmented audiences of new media. On 
the other hand, besides this expected primary impact channel, my experiment reveals an 
unexpected second channel: Higher monitoring possibilities lead to a crowding-out effect of 
politicians’ intrinsic aspiration for representing citizens’ interests. This is partly replaced by self-
interests, a phenomenon known as “hidden costs of control” in the economic literature. 
Apparently, politicians who are supposed to act in the best interest of citizens also interpret 
higher external control as distrust in their competence and benevolence and as limitation of their 
choice autonomy. In response, their motivation and performance might decrease or they might 
fall prey to moral hazard. 
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3.2. Paper 2: Why German Political Elites Support Governmental Transparency – 
Self-Interest, Anticipation of Voters’ Preferences or Socialization? 
In the second paper I analyze why political elites support governmental transparency. 
Governmental transparency – citizens’ ‘ability to find out what is going on inside a public sector 
organization (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007: 308) – is beneficial in several ways. It increases 
governmental responsiveness (Besley and Burgess 2002), civic engagement (Capuno and Garcia 
2010), citizens’ trust in government (Grimmelikhuijsen 2009), and good governance (Islam 2006). 
Although their opinion is crucial for the actual policy adoption, to my best knowledge, the 
attitudes of elites on transparency have never been analyzed. For this reason, I present three 
different possible motivations that could drive elites’ attitudes in the theoretical section. In the 
empirical analysis I draw on data of Candidates for the German Bundestag from the German 
Candidate Study (Rattinger et al. 2009). 
The first motivation, self-interest, is drawn from principal-agent theory (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 
1986). It stresses the informational advantage in the policy process that politicians enjoy over 
citizens. Politicians can exploit this advantage to enforce their own interests which might differ 
from citizens’ interests (Stiglitz 2002). This behavioral change that economists call moral hazard 
is caused by an insurance against a risk. Here the insurance is the information asymmetry that 
leads to a reduced risk of electoral sanctions for wrongdoings. In representative democracies, 
such moral hazard includes policy divergence (the deviation from citizens’ preferred policy), rent 
extraction (the exploitation of political authority for private benefits), fraud, corruption, and 
leisure shirking (bad policy outcomes as a consequence of politicians’ low effort) (Strøm, Müller, 
and Bergman 2003). According to principal-agent theory, there should be no rational reason for 
politicians to support transparency since it would lower the information asymmetry and 
consequentially decrease the possibilities to enforce their self-interest. 
The second motivation, anticipation of voter preferences, is drawn from office-seeking theory 
(Strøm 1990). From this perspective, politicians that seek office should support policies that are 
popular among the electorate to increase their chances to win or to retain office. If one assumes 
that voters are highly in favor of transparency policies (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007), 
anticipating these preferences might be considered as rational behavior for political elites as well 
because supporting such transparency policies might lead to more electoral support from voters. 
From this broader perspective of rational behavior, politicians do not gain utility by enforcing 
their self-interest, but by supporting popular policies to maximize their chances to win or to 
retain office. However, this motivation might vary dependent on how much a specific politician 
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depends on the voters’ support, and on how much her specific voters value governmental 
transparency. 
The third motivation, elite socialization, is drawn from elite theory which emphasizes the impact 
of elites’ socialization on their attitudes (Bachrach 1962; McClosky 1964; Stouffer 1955). 
According to the democratic elitism literature, political elites in general have a particularly high 
appreciation of democratic values and civil liberties – in any case higher than that of ordinary 
citizens. Since governmental transparency can certainly be considered a democratic value, elite 
theory would suggest that elites show strong support for transparency as a consequence of their 
specific elite socialization. Again, one could argue that elite socialization differs substantially 
between parties and consequently might lead to more heterogeneous elite preferences. As a 
result, socialization in left-leaning parties should lead to higher concerns about extending civil 
rights and liberties (including governmental transparency) than socialization in right-leaning 
parties that is more concerned with the conservation of the existing order. 
The three approaches outlined above provide distinct (and partly conflicting) motivations for 
politicians to support or reject governmental transparency. However, for my analysis, I do not 
assume a single explaining motivation or homogenous preferences among political elites. All 
three motivations will rarely appear in their ideal typical form: the selfish homo oeconomicus 
who abuses her power and exploits her position at the expense of the citizenry; the unprincipled 
turncoat who tells the voters what they want to hear; and the benevolent upholder of democratic 
values. Instead I suggest that there are complementary motivations for political elites to support 
or reject transparency policies and assume that politicians are influenced by all impacts. 
The empirical analysis is conducted with 790 candidates for the German Bundestag 2009. 
Candidates’ attitude towards transparency is measured with two items asking whether 
parliamentary committees should be held publicly or confidentially and whether the negotiations 
of parliamentary committees should be broadcasted live via electronic media. Since the data have 
a hierarchical structure – candidates nested in constituencies – usually multilevel analysis is an 
appropriate way to address the dependency within a common higher unit (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002; Snijders and Bosker 1999). However, since empirical tests show that the independency 
assumptions are not violated, I conduct ordinary least square estimation for reasons of parsimony 
and only adjust standard errors for within-cluster correlation (Williams 2000). 
My analysis reveals that neither principal-agent theory nor democratic elitism in its most 
canonical forms can explain politicians’ preferences. I find neither homogeneous support for 
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transparency policies nor a uniform rejection among candidates for the German Bundestag. By 
far the strongest predictor for differences in support for transparency policies is party 
membership. Since it is controlled whether a candidate is member of the German Bundestag, one 
can eliminate the possibility that this party effect is only existent because each party has a 
different share of politicians in incumbent positions. Thus it can be ruled out that party 
differences are motivated by instrumental reasons only. Although I am not able to separate the 
amount of the party effect that is due to socialization from that which is due to the anticipation 
of voter preferences, there is still evidence that both motivations exist. First, the impact of direct 
candidacy, postmaterialist values among the electorate, and closeness of the electoral race are 
existent for left-leaning candidates but not for right-leaning candidates, which speaks for the 
existence of anticipation of voters’ preferences. Second, the fact that transparency policies are not 
uniformly rejected, the nearly significant effect of left-leaning ideology on the individual level, 
and in particular the effect of individual ideology within the more left-leaning parties speaks for 
the existence of socialization effects. Furthermore, I find evidence for the existence of self-
interest motivations. The overall mediocre transparency support, the lower response rate among 
successful candidates and the higher support for a policy change that increases the information 
level of candidates themselves can be considered as such.  
There are several implications of these findings. At the moment, there is no consensus about 
governmental transparency among political elites in Germany. So far, the issue was mainly 
pushed onto the agenda by left-leaning parties. The results imply, however, that governmental 
transparency has the potential to become a major issue in the future: First, if the demand for 
transparent governmental work rises among citizens, the anticipation of voters’ preferences will 
lead to higher support among political elites. Second, if the effect of age is interpreted as a cohort 
effect (such an interpretation actually needs longitudinal data to be tested), with younger cohorts 
of elites being more supportive of transparency, proponents of transparency will slowly replace 
older and more skeptical colleagues. On the other hand, there might also be some obstacles on 
the way to transparent governments: There is (non-significant) indication that members of the 
parliament are less supportive of transparency than unsuccessful candidates. Furthermore, 
theoretical considerations by Bowler et al. (2006) (which again would require longitudinal data to 
test) suggest that candidates of parties in government are less supportive of transparency than 
candidates of the opposition. Thus, those elites that have more power to adapt transparency 
policies are less likely to do so. 
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3.3. Paper 3: Online and Open-Minded. Cross-Country and Panel Analyses of the 
Impact of Internet Usage on Liberal Attitudes 
In the third paper, I argue that internet usage can promote more liberal attitudes. Recall that in 
section 2.1., I defined liberal as what is sometimes also called progressive, or the social-moral 
dimension of liberalism that (Janda 1980) calls ‘classical liberalism’. That means the claim does 
not refer to peoples’ attitude towards economic equality and the degree of governmental 
interventions into the market, but only to their acceptance of individual rights and freedom, their 
tolerance towards diversity and their openness to change. 
Scholars from different fields argue that people’s attitudes and their perception of the world is 
strongly influenced by the information they get presented via media (Bandura 1986; Besley 2008; 
Entman 1989; Gerbner 1969; Inglehart and Baker 2000). However, besides substantial changes in 
information processing, communication, and the media environment that are associated with 
recent digital innovations, the impact of the internet on social and moral attitudes has not been 
adequately addressed so far. There are some studies on the internet’s impact on political 
participation (Norris 2002; Shah et al. 2005; Xenos and Moy 2007), voting (Tolbert and Mcneal 
2003) and democratic norms (Chu and Nevitte 2010; Nisbet, Stoycheff, and Pearce 2012). 
Closest to my analyses of the impact on liberal attitudes are Norris and Inglehart (2009) and 
Besley (2008). However, the first ones do not differentiate between internet, television and 
newspaper, but assume a uniform positive impact of media usage on liberal attitudes. The latter 
one differentiates between media, but on the one hand he analyzes their impact on the more 
abstract concept of values, on the other hand the analyses are restricted to European countries 
only. 
In the theoretical section, I first show that media effects theories, in particular cultivation theory, 
suggest that the consumption of media (especially television) leads to more conservative attitudes 
towards numerous social and more values (Gerbner et al. 1982; Morgan et al. 2009). This is 
because the high costs of production and distribution of content leads to a small number of 
broadcasters and to the commercial necessity to satisfy the needs of a large, and thus necessarily 
heterogeneous, audience. Therefore, TV messages have to be designed to disturb as few as 
possible, confirm rather than challenge existing views, and steer a ‘middle course’ (Morgan et al. 
2009:40) to serve the mainstream. Empirical evidence includes e.g. more traditional gender roles 
(Smith and Granados 2009), more stereotypes about foreigners (Mastro 2009), and less 
environmental concerns (Shanahan, Morgan, and Stenbjerre 1997) among heavy TV viewers.  
25 
 
However, second I argue that contrary; the internet has a positive impact on liberal attitudes 
because its technical features translate into social mechanisms that are not existent for traditional 
media. (1) The decentralized architecture of the internet changes the government’s ability to 
control information flows. Censorship is much more difficult. (2) The decreasing costs of 
information broadcasting leads to a) more (non-corporate) broadcasters and b) to less 
commercial pressure on professional media. (3) The possibility to state opinions anonymously 
can terminate a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann 1974). (4) The internet facilitates 
communication and exchange between very different people from diverse backgrounds. In the 
sense of the (parasocial) contact hypothesis (Allport 1954; Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes 2005) 
this can reduce prejudices. Furthermore this can create bridging social capital (Putnam 2000). (5) 
The required technical knowledge and innovation affinity to use the internet leads to a younger 
and better educated audience. Altogether this leads to a more liberal agenda and a more liberal 
framing on the internet and creates an atmosphere of higher openness and tolerance. 
To test this claim my approach involves two separate analyses. In the first one I use cross-
sectional data of 57 countries from the World Values Survey (WVS)(World Values Survey 
Association 2009). This allows testing the effect of internet usage on a large number of values 
and under very different country contexts. The dependent variables are four indices – ‘sexual and 
moral values’, ‘religious values’, ‘gender equality’, and ‘family values’, borrowed from Norris and 
Inglehart (2009). To address within country dependencies and to avoid an underestimation of 
standard errors, multi-level analysis is used (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Raudenbush and 
Bryk 2002). Despite controlling for several socio-demographic and country characteristics, the 
cross-country approach cannot completely rule out the possibility that the effects of internet exist 
only because internet users share some unobserved characteristics that are also positively 
correlated with liberal attitudes (selection effect). Therefore, in the second analysis I draw on 
panel data of the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) as a further 
analysis. A fixed effects model controls for all unobserved characteristics that are constant over 
time which substantially reduces the probability of a mere selection effect. 
The results from the WVS show that the internet has a positive effect on liberal attitudes in many 
countries. Contrary, there is rarely an effect for television and if it exists it is often negative. The 
effect is moderated by the respective society’s average liberalism. In conservative countries the 
effect is not existent or only weak, but it gets stronger the more liberal the country is. Contrary, 
for television consumption there is only a weak positive effect on liberal attitudes in liberal 
countries. In conservative societies, watching television actually has a substantial negative effect 
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on liberalism. This might be because television in conservative societies is pressured by public, 
religious, and commercial interests; pressures applicable much less on internet services. The panel 
analysis with the LISS data from the Netherlands, a very liberal context, mirrors the WVS 
findings. While there are significant positive internet effects in the fixed effects models, there are 
no significant effects for television 
This paper contributes to the literature of media effects in two ways. First, it clearly demonstrates 
that different kind of media can have different kinds of impact. In this way it disagrees with 
traditional cultivation theory that postulates a uniform negative effect on liberalism. Second, the 
paper shows that internet usage is not only beneficial to the political sphere and political 
participation, but also to a much broader social sphere and that it can increase people’s general 
open mindedness. Given that even in highly developed countries, high internet penetration rates 
are a comparably recent phenomenon, one might expect to observe more substantial internet 
effects in the future. And even in conservative countries where internet usage has no direct 
positive effect on liberal attitudes, the prospective substitution of (negative) TV effects with 
(neutral) internet effects can be considered as an indirect positive effect of the internet. 
4. Integration into the Literature 
This section integrates the dissertation into the literature. First, I will relate the papers to all 
relevant disciplines of the social sciences. Second, I will integrate them into four different existing 
perspectives concerning the causal path linking technology and politics. Third, I will integrate the 
papers into the most important scholarly discourses. 
4.1. The Integration into Disciplines 
The internet technology and information flows are ubiquitous in virtually every area of people’s 
life and have an impact on many processes, institutions, actions, and attitudes. For this reason, 
they play a crucial role in many scientific disciplines. In this dissertation, the four most relevant 
disciplines are economics, political science, sociology, and communication studies. Below, I 
elaborate on how the four most important elements of the dissertation are covered by these 
disciplines and to which papers they are related to. An overview can be found in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Elements of Study, Disciplines, and Papers 
 
To analyze the phenomenon of accountability (paper 1) and transparency (paper 2), this 
dissertation substantially draws on principal-agent theory (Arrow 1985; Spence and Zeckhauser 
1971), which is originally a theory of the discipline of economics: a principal delegates a specific task 
to an agent and rewards the agent for acting in her interest. The principal-agent relationship is 
characterized by at least partly different preferences between principal and agent and by 
asymmetric information. The agent has an informational advantage over the principal regarding 
the quality and commitment of her own actions because the principal cannot perfectly monitor 
her. Principal-agent theory suggests that in such a situation with hidden action and hidden 
information, the agent will maximize her utility by enforcing her self-interest, a situation also 
described as moral hazard. Moral hazard triggers a behavioral change because there is an 
insurance against a risk. Here the insurance is the information asymmetry that leads to a reduced 
risk of being sanctioned. Accountability is the possibility of the principal to get the agent to act in 
her best interest. It is dependent on transparency, the degree of information about the agent’s 
actions that the principal can receive. 
Furthermore, in paper 1 an economic laboratory experiment is conducted, a method that is often 
used to contest assumptions of perfect rationality (Falk and Heckman 2009; Levitt and List 
2007). In economic lab experiments, participants play an economic game. They make decisions 
that have monetary consequences. The main advantage of lab experiments is that they allow 
controlling for factors like information levels that are hard to measure in the field. For this reason 
the lab experiment is an excellent tool to simulate principal-agent relationships. 
This dissertation also draws heavily on political science. First, political science has also adopted the 
principal-agent approach of the economic literature (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Miller 2005). 
This means that paper 1 and paper 2 deal with a specific case of a principal-agent setting where 
politicians are in the role of agents. They have to act the best interest of citizens, the principals. 
Element of Study
Laboratory 
Experiment
Accountability 
/Transparency
Attitudes
(Elites/Citizens) Media Effects
Disciplines
Paper
Paper 3
Economics
Sociology
Communication Studies
Paper 1
Paper 2
Political Science
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In the political context, transparency means the ability to see what political agents are doing 
(Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007). Accountability here is the ability to ensure that political elites 
actually act in the citizens’ best interest (Fearon 1999). 
Second, paper 2 builds on findings of a branch of political science literature called democratic 
elitism (Bachrach 1962; McClosky 1964; Stouffer 1955). Democratic elitism analyses political 
elites’ attitudes towards political and social issues. It argues that because of their specific elite 
socialization, politicians have a higher appreciation of democratic values and civic liberties. 
Consequently, governmental transparency as a civil liberty should be supported by political elites. 
Because I also take into account the criticism that elites have very heterogeneous preferences 
(Fletcher 1989; Gibson and Duch 1991; Sniderman et al. 1991), I contrast motivations that stem 
from elite socialization with two other possible motivations. 
Attitudes, those of elites as well as those of citizens, are also a central concept of sociology. For this 
reason paper 2 also has a small sociological component. While explaining an individual’s attitude 
might be most related to social psychology (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), 
the phenomenon becomes a sociological one if attitudes towards socially relevant issues like 
immigration or welfare state are predicted by socio-demographic characteristics or compared 
over different countries (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Mayda 2006). Media use and the use of 
technology are further relevant sociological issues. For both reasons, paper 3 strongly relates to 
the sociological literature. 
Finally, paper 3 of this dissertation also integrates into the discipline of communication studies or, 
more specifically, the literature of media effects (Jennings and Oliver 2009). Compared to 
sociology, communication studies focus on the impact and mechanisms of media as the 
independent variable rather than on dependent variables like attitudes. Most empirical studies 
that analyze the impact of media on attitudes and values are based on cultivation theory (Gerbner 
1969). It argues that consumption of mass media – most prominently television – leads to a 
subtle “cultivation” of values and world views that are dominant in the media content. For 
instance, there is evidence that television consumption leads to more conservative gender roles 
(Signorielli 1991; Smith and Granados 2009), lower acceptance of ethnic minority groups 
(Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Mastro 2009), and fewer concerns about the environment 
(Shanahan and McComas 1997; Shanahan et al. 1997). Media effects theories identify social 
learning (Bandura 1986, 2009) as an underlying psychological mechanism. Via agenda setting and 
news framing (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Scheufele 1999), media 
can effectively have an impact on people’s attitudes. 
29 
 
The internet is a relevant element of study in all three papers and in all four disciplines. The next 
section will take a closer look on how ICT can be causally linked with political and social 
phenomena in different ways.  
4.2. Research Perspectives on Internet Politics 
Research that analyses the connection between ICT and politics or society covers a broad array 
of different topics. The Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics (Chadwick and Howard 2009b) 
provides a good overview. This variety can be explained by the very different perspectives and 
assumptions that researchers hold regarding the causal paths linking technology and politics. 
Below, Weare (2002) distinguishes two different fault lines in the scientific discourse that lead to 
four distinctive research perspectives (see Figure 1). 
The first fault line that divides the literature is delineated by the causal direction of the relation 
between technology and politics. While technological determinists expect technology to drive 
politics, advocates of a social shaping perspective assume that the existing social order and 
institutions shape the development and use of technology. Concerning developments in ICT, 
popular claims (see section 2.2.) represent the first perspective. They expect technology to 
equalize access to information, increase communication capacities, thus increase political 
participation, and as a result change the power relation between citizens and politicians. Internet 
technology is clearly causing political and social outcomes in this view. The reinforcement politics 
hypothesis (Norris 2001) in turn represents the latter perspective. Even if the internet has an 
equalizing potential, this approach assumes that it will mostly benefit elites because they have 
greater access to the technology and a greater impact on the design of institutions that regulate 
technology. In result, elites will preserve their privileges and the existing power relations are 
reinforced. 
The second fault line distinguishes between the discussed types of effects in the literature. On the 
one hand, instrumental effects describe the way in which technology enables people to attain 
their (existing) goals. On the other hand, constitutive effects describe how technology changes 
the goals themselves. An example of an instrumental effect of ICT is the possibility to increase 
voter turnout – an already desirable outcome. A constitutive effect might be that ICT lead to a 
greater demand for direct participation and thus change citizens’ preferences. 
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Figure 1: Different Research Perspectives in Internet Politics 
 
Source: Weare (2002:680) 
The upper left quadrant describes the technology-driven instrumental change perspective. It is 
the predominant causal story in the analysis of internet politics (Weare 2002). It assumes that 
exogenous changes in ICT change political processes and the ability of individuals and groups to 
attain their goals. The focus of the research agenda lies on uses of ICT and the changes in 
policies and political outcomes. Examples for this perspective are studies on political 
participation (Boulianne 2009; Garrett 2006; Norris 2002; Shah et al. 2005; Tolbert and Mcneal 
2003; Xenos and Moy 2007), effects on corruption (Andersen et al. 2011; Bertot, Jaeger, and 
Grimes 2010), or the use of social media for political action (Baumgartner and Morris 2009; 
Robertson, Vatrapu, and Medina 2010). 
The bottom left quadrant represents the perspective of a socially shaped instrumental change. 
While this approach also suggests an instrumental effect, it does consider technology to be 
endogenous, not exogenous. In this context, technology is the outcome of social and political 
processes that are purposely designed to achieve subsequent effects. Because of the different 
expected causal direction, research from the socially shaped instrumental perspective focuses on 
the design of technology and its diffusion. Examples for this perspective are studies on the 
meaningful design of e-governance (Layne and Lee 2001; OECD 2003; Zavestoki, Shulman, and 
Schlosberg 2006), analyses of differences in internet access (digital divide) (Bonfadelli 2002; 
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Norris 2001; Warschauer 2004), or the regulation and censorship of internet content (Deibert 
2009; King et al. 2013).  
According to the technology-driven constitutive change perspective (upper right quadrant), 
technology will have a constitutive change on individual goals. The internet is expected to change 
with whom we interact and how we receive and present information. As a result, ICT will change 
political socialization and how people interpret their social environment. The focus of this 
approach lies on the internet’s impact on individual values (Besley 2008) or public opinion (Best 
and Krueger 2005; Chu and Nevitte 2010; Norris and Inglehart 2009). 
The bottom right quadrant describes the socially-shaped constitutive perspective. It examines 
how ideologies or social movements change beliefs, perceptions, or goals of technology. From 
this perspective, the internet can be considered as a social movement comparable with the 
environmental movement, the women’s rights movement and the civil rights movement. The 
agenda is therefore strongly normatively driven. An example for research in this field is a study 
on how internet technology might open up policy processes and increase the demand for 
plebiscitary elements of democracy (Abramson, Arterton, and Orren 1988; Bohman 2004). 
Each of the papers of this dissertation takes a different research perspective. Paper 1 asks 
whether the internet can increase accountability. In doing so, it considers technology as the causal 
factor, and it focuses on attaining an already existing goal. By asserting an impact of technology 
on a certain political outcome, paper 1 clearly takes a technology-driven instrumental perspective. 
Paper 3 asks whether the internet can lead to more liberal values. Again, technology is regarded 
as the causal factor. However, instead of an effect on existing goals, the internet is expected to 
change the goals. In focusing on the impact on value changes, paper 3 clearly takes a technology-
driven constitutive perspective. Paper 2 asks why political elites support governmental 
transparency. In contrast to papers 1 and 3, technology is not regarded as the cause, but as the 
consequence of policy decisions. Furthermore, paper 2 concentrates on an already existing goal. 
Focusing on the design of technology-related policies, paper 2 takes a socially shaped 
instrumental perspective. 
4.3. The Integration into Scholarly Discourses 
In the preceding section, I presented the two fault lines that divide the literature concerning the 
causal link between internet and political or social outcomes. Besides this, this dissertation is not 
based on a central major discourse. This is because the papers combine aspects from different 
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disciplines and because much research on the internet is still relatively explorative. However, in 
each paper, one relevant discourse is captured “en passant”.  
Paper 1 captures one of the most important discourses in economics. On the one hand there is 
the classic ideal of economics, the homo oeconomicus, who has perfect information, always acts 
perfectly rational, and is only self-interested (Varian 1992). On the other hand, there is the 
criticism, mainly from behavioral economists and psychologists, who show that people are 
concerned about fairness and reciprocity (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999), 
tend to avoid risks (Arrow 1971; Pratt 1964), and deviate from rationality in many further ways 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1984). 
Paper 1 adds to this discussion by conducting an experiment that analyses participants’ decisions 
under differing information levels. Classical game theory would predict fairer behavior of agents 
if the principal has more information about their actions. In fact, there is a certain amount of 
both self-interest and fairness on all different information levels. Most interestingly however, 
fairness decreases if the agent expects the principal to have more opportunities to monitor his 
decision. There are related findings in the literature, where people behave less fairly or 
cooperatively if their behavior is monitored, a phenomenon also known as “hidden costs of 
control” (Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Frey 1993): Agents reduce their performance because the 
principals’ monitoring is interpreted as a signal of distrust or as a limitation of their choice 
autonomy. My experiment shows that this monitoring does not even have to occur in reality. The 
mere possibility is enough to induce hidden costs of control. 
Paper 2 captures a similar discourse. It contrasts three approaches that explain elite actions and 
attitudes by self-interest with one that concentrates on (political) socialization. The first of the 
former approaches is the political interpretation of the principal-agent model (Ferejohn 1986; 
Miller 2005). It argues that politicians might engage in moral hazard behavior if citizens do not 
have full information about their actions. Second, more generally, advocates of the literature on 
changing institutions (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2002; Riker 1980; Shepsle and Weingast 1981) 
point to politicians’ self-interest by suggesting that elites who lose under the current institutional 
arrangement will support institutional changes while those in power will refuse changes in order 
to maintain the status quo. Third, the literature of coalition formation and party competition is 
included, which uses the concept of ‘office-seeking’ for party behavior that maximizes the 
chances to control government (Strøm 1990).  
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The socialization approach is most prominently represented by advocates of democratic elitism 
(Bachrach 1962; McClosky and Brill 1983; McClosky 1964; Stouffer 1955). They argue that elites’ 
socialization is characterized by high levels of motivation, education, openness, participation in 
the political system, responsibility, contact with ideological diversity, and the belief in the 
necessity to find compromise (Sullivan et al. 1993). This specific socialization is expected to lead 
to a higher appreciation of democratic rights and civil liberties than that of ordinary citizens. 
However, some researchers interject that elite attitudes might not be as homogeneous and in fact 
rather dependent on ideology (Fletcher 1989; Gibson and Duch 1991; Sniderman et al. 1991). 
One achievement of paper 2 is to compare and to contrast these different approaches that all too 
often live on their own. Furthermore, the different motivations are applied to the issue of 
governmental transparency for the first time. The results show a high variance in attitudes among 
German elites. There is empirical evidence for aspects of socialization as well as self-interest. The 
strongest predictor for attitudes on transparency policies is party membership. While party 
membership can also cover self-interest aspects, the control variables in the analysis imply that it 
is the party’s socialization that is a highly influential characteristic. The conclusion is that most 
political elites have to prioritize between conflicting motivations that have different degrees of 
influence on their preferences and actions. 
Paper 3 captures the discourse on the causal direction of the link between media usage and 
individual preferences. As I have already argued above, media effects theory argues that 
individuals’ attitudes are strongly influences by the values and worldviews that are dominant in 
the consumed media content (Bandura 2009; Gerbner 1969; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). 
These theories focus on the supply side of media and ask, “what do the media do to people?” 
(Katz 1959). This view tends to see peoples’ media usage as exogenously determined. The 
recipient is assigned a very passive, almost ‘inert’ (Klapper 1963:527) role that in undergoing the 
media exposure.  
In contrast, the Uses and Gratifications (U&G) approach (Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch 1973) 
focuses on the supply side of media usage and asserts that in the first place, it is the individual 
who chooses whether to use the media and which media content is consumed. Conversely to 
media effects theory, U&G asks, “what do people do with the media?”. It argues that people 
choose the kind of media and the specific content that give them the most gratifications. This 
behavior of selective exposure (Klapper 1960; Stroud 2008; Zaller 1992) is in line with the theory 
of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). It states that individuals select (political) information 
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that is consistent with their attitudes and beliefs and neglect information that is discrepant to 
avoid cognitive dissonance. 
In paper 3 I take a media effects perspective in that I expect internet usage to have a positive 
impact on the degree of people’s liberalism. However, I admit that more liberal people are more 
likely to prefer the internet over traditional media like television or newspaper and are more likely 
to choose liberal content in the first place. To take this selection effect into account, my cross-
country analysis controls for many variables that could affect internet usage as well as liberalism. 
The panel data analysis with fixed effects models can further exclude the possibility of a mere 
selection effect. While the Uses and Gratification approach thus certainly provides valuable 
insights into people’s motivation for using the internet, paper 3 shows that internet usage has an 
effect on values and attitudes that goes beyond the initial differences that determine the media 
choice. 
One final overarching discourse in the literature revolves around the question whether the 
internet has more positive or more negative effects on society and politics. This debate will be 
taken up in the conclusion in the next section. 
5. Conclusions from this Dissertation 
This dissertation shows that information communication technology has the potential to 
empower people in several ways. First, paper 1 demonstrates that the internet can increase 
political accountability via the so-called Fire-Alarm Accountability Mechanism. Although citizens’ 
motivations to inform themselves about politics remains stable, politicians anticipate that citizens 
might potentially become better informed. In consequence, they avoid inadequate decisions and 
actions more often because of the fear of electoral sanctions. These findings are in line with 
research that shows that internet diffusion is an effective way to fight corruption (Andersen et al. 
2011; Bertot et al. 2010). 
Second, paper 2 shows that a substantial part of political elites is supportive of transparency 
policies because of socialized convictions or for instrumental reasons. Pure self-interested 
motivations, however, play only a minor role. Future developments in ICT will further push 
transparency issues onto the political agenda and chances are high that elites become more 
supportive for two reasons: First, if the demand for transparent governmental work rises among 
citizens, the anticipation of voters’ preferences will lead to higher support among political elites. 
Second, since younger cohorts of elites are more supportive of transparency, proponents of 
transparency will slowly replace older and more skeptical colleagues. 
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Third, paper 3 points out that people who use the internet become more open-minded. Open-
mindedness can already be considered a goal in itself. But having more positive attitudes towards 
minorities and emancipating from backward societal rules can also increase people’s social capital, 
which is presumably beneficial for social and political participation in a globally connected world. 
This assumption is in line with findings that internet usage increases participation (Boulianne 
2009; Garrett 2006; Norris 2002; Shah et al. 2005; Tolbert and Mcneal 2003; Xenos and Moy 
2007). Furthermore, these effects are likely to become more conspicuous, because even in highly 
developed countries, high internet penetration rates are a comparably recent phenomenon and 
the intensity of internet usage is still increasing.  
So does the internet empower people? The answer to this question is not straightforward because 
this dissertation also points to obstacles for beneficial internet effects, and even to adverse 
consequences. Paper 1 shows that politicians can interpret the higher monitoring opportunities of 
citizens as distrust in their competence and benevolence and as limitation of their choice 
autonomy. As a result, politicians’ intrinsic aspirations to represent citizens’ interests are partly 
crowded out by self-interest. Paper 2 demonstrates that besides substantial support, there are also 
many reservations against too much transparency, especially among conservative political elites. 
And about 48% of all candidates oppose the idea that parliamentary committees should be 
broadcasted live via electronic media and are concerned about media frenzy occurring. Paper 3 
shows that the liberalizing effect of internet usage is weakest or even not existent in the most 
conservative societies. 
Furthermore, existing research shows that in many countries, access to internet is hampered and 
certain kinds of content or services are blocked (Deibert 2009; King et al. 2013). Malesky, 
Schuler, and Tran (2012) show that in authoritarian countries, transparency might have adverse 
consequences: Vietnamese delegates of provinces with higher internet subscription rates curtail 
their activity on query sessions, asking significantly fewer questions and refraining from direct 
criticisms. This is because without electoral sanctions, transparency does not make delegates 
more accountable to citizens, but to regime leaders. A very important point is made by (Morozov 
2009, 2011) who points out that internet technology can actually be used by governments against 
citizens. Social media certainly fostered the coordination and sharing of information during the 
protests in Iran in 2009. However, the data collected automatically helped Iran’s secret service to 
gather data about future uprisings and to identify and repress dissidents. “Once regimes used 
torture to get this kind of data; now they are freely available on Facebook” (Morozov 2009:12). 
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While Morozov’s argument is mainly related to authoritarian regimes, recent insights about the 
extraordinary extent of digital surveillance activities of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) 
imply that ICT pose a potential threat to politics and society in democratic countries as well. In 
2013, the documents leaked by Edward Snowden revealed that the NSA can and does collect 
data about basically every kind of digital information flow 3 . But if a government has the 
opportunity to investigate every piece of (political) communication, it is hard to preserve a 
perspective of the internet as a tool that can foster political participation, coordinate movements, 
and allow anonymous criticisms. Instead, by enabling the manifold violation of privacy, the 
internet might even be considered as a potential threat to freedom and democracy.  
In summary, the internet, despite some drawbacks and limitations, is a very powerful technology 
that has the potential to create a “culture of transparency” (Bertot et al. 2010) or work as a “great 
equalizer” that reduces existing privileges concerning information and communication capacities 
(Rheingold 1991). Still, recent events have strikingly shown that the very same technology can be 
used for a massive violation of basic rights as well. The political and social outcomes of an ever 
increasing diffusion of ICT therefore heavily depend on the way technology is designed, 
regulated, and used. From this several implications arise for different groups of people. 
To politicians and policy makers, paper 1 demonstrates that citizens have more opportunities to hold 
them accountable. Politicians should not misunderstand these opportunities as distrust in their 
competence or goodwill, but rather as an increasing demand of (parts of) the citizenry for 
transparency and participation. People who articulate their opinion on social media or public e-
governance platforms should be considered as a possibility to increase the political dialogue and 
to reduce political frustration. Paper 3 also shows the social benefits of internet usage. To reap 
these desirable effects, politicians should thus actively enforce the expansion of ICT 
infrastructure. At the same time they have to establish legal regulations that protect the internet 
from abusive practices such as mass surveillance. 
To accomplish these challenging goals, researchers have the crucial task to advise politicians and 
policy makers about the potential benefits as well as possible dangers of ICT. In this introduction 
I pointed out that researchers should not be overoptimistic about ICT just because of its 
increased information and communication capacities. However, the papers demonstrate that 
despite certain obstacles, the internet can lead to desirable social and political outcomes. 
                                                          
3  For an overview of 314 references regarding the global surveillance disclosures from 2013 until present see 
Wikipedia (2014a).  
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Researchers have to clearly identify causal links between technology use and such outcomes and 
take up clear positions on technical, regulatory, and ethical issues.  
The fast pace of technological progress gives developers of ICT a strong impact on society and 
political life. The diffusion of ICT does not only change the daily life of many people, but also 
raises many ethical questions for instance concerning privacy, intellectual property, or 
discriminating and criminal content (e.g. racism, child pornography). Oftentimes, technical 
possibilities establish standards long before all consequences can be judged and legal regulation 
can be adjusted accordingly. Developers of ICT products and services are certainly profit-
oriented companies and not obligated to act in any public interest. However, it is desirable that 
they will recognize their power, think about ethical dilemmas that might arise from technological 
innovation and design ICT in accordance. 
This dissertation has asked whether the internet can empower people. The three papers show 
that first, ICT can increase political accountability. Second, politicians have mixed feelings about 
governmental transparency. And third, internet usage, contrary to television consumption, 
increases open-mindedness. However, the papers have also shown that the internet is no 
panacea: There are a lot of limitations and sometimes adverse effects. Taken together, there are 
still many unanswered questions concerning the relationship between internet and society. This 
introduction has shown how such questions can be systematically approached and which causal 
links have to be established. In my opinion, designing and testing an accountability mechanism 
that is equally simple as the one presented in paper 1, but has no adverse motivational effects, is 
an especially promising approach for further research. While the recent disclosures about global 
surveillance have cast a shadow on ICT, after cautious consideration of the results of the papers, 
I conclude that the internet can still empower people.  
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Paper 1 
 
Can the Internet Promote Political Accountability?  
Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment 
Christian Weyand  
 
Abstract. We ask whether technical progress in information communication technology (ICT) 
can increase political accountability via a ‘Fire-Alarm Mechanism’: Despite ordinary citizens’ 
cognitive and motivational limitations to inform themselves about politics, ICT substantially 
increase the monitoring capability of those who act as watchdogs. Because of the resulting higher 
transparency, politicians anticipate that citizens at large might get more informed about their 
wrongdoings. To avoid electoral sanctions, they will act more representatively ex ante. Therefore, 
citizens do not need to be well-informed in actuality, it suffices that there is the potential to 
become well-informed through the watchdogs. We test this mechanism in a laboratory 
experiment that reflects the accountability relationship between a voter and a politician in 
information environments with increasing progress in ICT. In line with the predictions, subjects 
anticipate higher monitoring and justify their decision with the fear of being sanctioned more 
often. However, as an unexpected second effect, we find that they also justify their decision less 
frequently with fairness considerations. Overall, the two opposing effects do not lead to an 
increase in accountability. Our results imply that progress in ICT has the potential to increase 
accountability, but policy designers have to take negative side effects of higher control into 
consideration. 
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“If you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place” 
Eric Schmidt, executive chairman of Google 
1. Introduction 
On February 16th, 2011, German newspapers presented first evidence that the German Minister 
of Defense at the time, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, had violated academic standards in his 
doctoral thesis from 2007 by not citing several copied passages. Only one day later, an 
anonymous doctoral student established “Guttenplag” 1 , a Wiki-based internet platform for 
collaborative work that enabled volunteers to document plagiarism in Guttenberg’s thesis. Within 
a short time, contributors of Guttenplag found plagiarized material in 65% of all lines of the 
dissertation. The frequency and unambiguousness of plagiarism found by Guttenplag led to the 
revocation of the Minister’s doctoral degree only one week later. Because the public mostly 
agreed that Guttenberg deliberately plagiarized to bolster his career and reputation with the 
prestigious doctoral degree in an illicit way, he eventually had to step down from all political 
offices in March. Afterwards, Guttenplag and similar platforms continued to investigate doctoral 
theses of further German politicians. Until today, this has led to the revocation of at least nine 
more doctoral degrees.  
The Guttenberg scandal provides anecdotal evidence for the way technical progress in 
information communication technology (ICT) can increase political accountability. Key features 
in the story are that the internet enabled laymen to investigate the incident, that only a small 
number of collaborators who analyzed the thesis sufficed to inform a large number of people 
about the misconduct, and that there were harsh consequences which may have a deterring effect 
on other politicians. With these features in mind, the goal of this article is to propose a 
mechanism that establishes a general link between progress in ICT and accountability. To test the 
efficacy of this mechanism, we conduct a laboratory experiment. 
Existing mechanisms that link progress in ICT and political accountability often make bold 
assumptions about citizens’ behavior (Bimber, 1998; Karakaya Polat, 2005). It is assumed that 
technical progress that increases information availability automatically leads to a well-informed 
electorate which in turn restores the balance of power between citizens and politicians 
(Rheingold, 1991). However, these mechanisms ignore long-standing objections that the capacity 
of media to recreate politics is limited by humans’ cognitive abilities and motivation to inform 
themselves about politics and not by technical properties of the media itself (Lippmann, 1934). In 
                                                          
1 The name “Guttenplag” is a combination of Guttenberg’s name and the German word for plagiarism – “Plagiat”.  
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comparison, our approach demands less from citizens and does not require a better-informed 
society. The idea is based on the following two major considerations.  
First, political accountability was shown to be dependent on the degree of transparency of 
politician behavior (Besley & Burgess, 2002; Cuillier, 2008; Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Ferraz 
& Finan, 2008; Olken, 2007; Reinikka & Svensson, 2005; Serra, 2011). Technical progress 
decreases transaction costs to acquire and share political information and thus increases 
transparency of politician behavior (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010). If politicians anticipate this 
relation, they are aware that their action is more open to scrutiny and that wrongdoing is more 
likely to be detected and sanctioned. Thus, with technical progress in ICT they should act more 
representative from the outset. Indeed, it seems unlikely that after the Guttenberg scandal any 
German politician will fake a doctoral thesis again because she anticipates that the potential of 
being revealed is too high. The possibility of citizens getting informed about wrongdoing thus 
has a deterrent effect. Serra (2011) shows that such “Bottom-Up” approaches might successfully 
complement more traditional “Top-Down” accountability approaches. When Eric Schmidt, 
chairman of Google, stated in the above cited quote that people should worry more about the 
things that they do instead of whether their actions could be detected, he was replying to 
concerns about privacy in the digital sphere. But the new opportunities to monitor politician 
behavior make the same logic applicable: If a politician has something that she does not want the 
electorate to know, maybe she should not be doing it in the first place.  
Second, ordinary citizens’ limitations in information processing do not reduce the efficacy of the 
proposed mechanism because a widely informed society is not a prerequisite for it to work. For 
the fear of electoral sanctions for wrongdoings to be justified, it is merely necessary that someone is 
potentially able to observe a politician’s actions. This role is assumed by information intermediaries 
who act as watchdogs and ring the ‘fire alarm’ when they detect any wrongdoing (McCubbins & 
Schwartz, 1984). Thus, for our purposes Fire-Alarm Accountability means that citizens do not 
actively have to watch out for political mischief, but that they are in the less demanding position 
of merely having to wait for the watchdogs to report wrongdoing. Compared to ordinary citizens, 
these watchdogs’ opportunity costs of information acquisition are much lower because they have 
an intrinsic or financial interest in it. Therefore, other than ordinary citizens, they can profit from 
the increased information availability which means that the Fire-Alarm-Mechanism is 
strengthened by new ICT. As a result, citizens at large do not need to be actually well-informed; it 
is sufficient that politicians anticipate that citizens potentially get informed by the watchdogs 
(Snider, 1996). 
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Based on a trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), we design a simple experiment that 
reflects the accountability relationship between a citizen and a politician in a laboratory setting. 
Subjects play a one-round bargaining game anonymously in groups of two. The citizen has to 
transfer an amount of money to the politician. During the transfer, the money is multiplied by a 
factor x that is either two or four. The politician now has to divide the money between her and 
the citizen but only she knows whether the figurative cake to divide is small (x = 2) or big (x = 
4). The representative decision would be an equal split. However, because information is 
asymmetric, the citizen does not know the actual size of the cake. When she receives an amount 
equal to the size of half of the small cake, she therefore cannot distinguish whether she actually 
receives half of a small cake (representative decision) or only a quarter of the big cake 
(unrepresentative decision) (Güth, Huck, & Ockenfels, 1996). The politician can exploit this lack 
of knowledge. However, the citizen has the opportunity to acquire information that reveals the 
size of the multiplier with a certain probability. If she successfully reveals unfair behavior, the 
politician is sanctioned and outcomes are swapped. The game reflects a situation where a 
politician can hide unrepresentative behavior behind external contextual factors unknown to the 
citizen. With three treatment conditions that vary the degree of information that the citizen can 
receive, we test whether the politician anticipates the citizen’s increased access to information and 
acts more representatively. 
In line with our assumptions, the results show that if progress in ICT is high, politicians (falsely) 
anticipate higher monitoring of their actions. They furthermore increasingly justify fair decisions 
with the fear of being sanctioned. However, against the expectations, this does not lead to an 
increase in representative decisions. The reason for this might be that beside this expected main 
channel, our experiment reveals an unexpected second channel. Intrinsic fairness partly seems to 
be replaced by self-interests if monitoring opportunities are high. External control might be 
perceived as distrust or as limitation of the choice autonomy. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize how 
developments in ICT are often supposed to increase political accountability and explain why 
these expectations are not viable. In section 3 we argue that ICT might still have an impact via 
the often neglected Fire-Alarm Mechanism. In section 4 we explain our experimental design. 
Section 5 shows the results, section 6 concludes. 
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2. Internet Diffusion, Information Availability, and Political Accountability 
One way to define political accountability is the ability to ensure that political elites act 
representatively – that is, in the best interest of citizens (Fearon, 1999). Periodical elections are 
regarded as the primary mechanism for citizens to sanction politicians they are dissatisfied with. 
However, the main difficulty in holding politicians accountable is that voters lack information to 
instruct the government what to do and in judging what it has done (Manin, Przeworski, & 
Stokes, 1999). From a principal-agent perspective, this information asymmetry inherent in the 
policy process allows politicians to deviate from representative behavior and engage in moral 
hazard (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986). Moral hazard is a behavioral change caused by an insurance 
against a risk. Here the insurance is the information asymmetry that leads to a reduced risk of 
being sanctioned. In representative democracies2, moral hazard includes (1) policy divergence, the 
deviation from the citizens’ preferred policy; (2) rent extraction, the exploitation of political 
authority for private benefits; (3) fraud, for instance, scamming a prestigious academic title to 
bolster one’s political career and to fake expertise; (4) corruption; and (5) leisure shirking, bad 
policy outcomes as a consequence of politicians’ low effort (Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2003). If 
politicians anticipate that such wrongdoings will be sanctioned if observed, a better-informed 
society should lead to greater political accountability and decrease moral hazard. 
Technical progress in ICT such as the internet and mobile devices substantially increases the 
availability of political information. In a digital environment, recording, storing, searching for, 
and accessing political information has become much faster, cheaper, and independent of time 
and place. In short, the transaction costs of information acquisition are much lower. A distinct 
feature of the internet is that users are not limited to being consumers of information. Instead, 
they can easily share news with a large network or even become information broadcasters with a 
huge audience (Weare, 2002), e.g. through social media. As a result, the internet does not only 
offer new outlets for traditional news media, but also for an increasing number of political blogs, 
discussion boards, online campaigns or completely new kinds of platforms like Wikileaks (Brian, 
McDermott, & Weins, 2011) or Guttenplag. Besides different forms of media, institutions like 
open government and e-governance (McDermott, 2010) are a further mechanism through which 
technical progress creates a direct information exchange between government and citizens.  
Considering the increase in political information and the observability of political action, there 
are “popular claims” (Bimber, 1998) that the extensive diffusion of ICT can increase political 
                                                          
2 The arguments made in this paper apply only to democratic countries with elections as accountability mechanism. 
Research has shown that transparency can in fact have negative effects on politicians’ performance in countries 
without electoral sanctioning (Malesky, Schuler, & Tran, 2012). 
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accountability (Castells, 2009; Dahl, 1989; Rheingold, 1991). In summary, their authors formulate 
the expectation that citizens are enabled to inform themselves more extensively and more 
independently from traditional information intermediaries like news organizations, interest 
groups, unions or other elites. Further, citizens are expected to become more participative and 
communicate more directly with delegates. While there is little doubt that new ICT indeed 
increase the availability of information, there are qualified objections that the sheer availability 
will actually lead to a better informed society (Bimber, 1998; Karakaya Polat, 2005).  
First, the most important objection are the limitations of human motivation and cognition to 
accessing and processing political information. In times of modern ICT, the scarce good is the 
attention that citizens can spend to ubiquitous information rather than the information itself. 
Despite decreasing transaction costs of information acquisition, citizens still face its opportunity 
costs, the lost benefits of a forgone alternative activity. Hence, only pieces of information that 
win the attention of individuals over other information or activities have the chance to get 
processed to become knowledge and contribute to a more informed society (Noveck, 2000, p. 
23). The concept of “attention economy” (Davenport & Beck, 2001) describes the same 
phenomenon. Consequentially, overall consumption of political information across the different 
media has only increased marginally, if at all (Prior, 2005). The argument is best summarized by 
Walker (1991, p. 19): “Most people, most of the time, are able to find better things to do than 
participate in politics”.  
Second, if people actually decide to inform themselves about politics online, outlets of traditional 
media like popular newspapers or newscasts are the most frequented sources (Norris, 1999, p. 
89). Those outlets mainly mirror the offline content and are subject to the same gatekeeper 
filtering (Tewksbury & Rittenberg, 2009). Only a much smaller audience follows “new media” 
like niche sites, private blogs, publicly accessible governmental data or watchblogs that cover 
different or more specific topics, represent an ideology different from the mainstream, or allow a 
direct investigation of politicians’ actions (Webster & Lin, 2002). While new media offer valuable 
information for accountability, they do not play a big role, as most of the public at best receives 
the same kind of information as before via different channels. 
The third and last objection is the possibility of information fragmentation. Due to its pluralist 
structure, the internet offers a multitude of sources of information for every taste and on every 
(trivial) issue (Karakaya Polat, 2005, p. 440). This can lead to a very selective consumption limited 
to a narrow field of information or to a biased perception from consuming only information that 
is in line with one’s own preferences. This effect is possibly enhanced by algorithmic search 
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filters – used for instance in Google Search or Facebook’s News Feed – that try to anticipate 
users’ information preferences (Pariser, 2011). As a result, instead of being broadly informed, 
people’s information consumption might inadvertently become restricted to a few specific issues. 
Furthermore, the greater media choice also widens the gaps in political knowledge (Prior, 2005). 
While those with an interest in politics will likely make use of the opportunity to inform 
themselves better, others more interested in entertainment will take the chance to tune out 
politics completely and become less knowledgeable.  
Altogether, these limitations suggest that most likely it is the relatively rare enthusiasts who make 
use of the new information environment, get more informed, involve themselves deeper, 
broadcast their own information and get in direct contact with politicians. For the majority of 
citizens, however, ICT does not alter the fact that they have only a basic interest in politics. 
Regarding the merely moderate changes in the overall information level to be expected based on 
these arguments, an increase in accountability seems unlikely at first glance. In the next section, 
we will, however, propose a mechanism unaffected by these limitations that still links 
developments in ICT with higher accountability. 
3. Fire-Alarm Accountability Mechanism 
The objections above implicitly assume that only a large audience that informs itself directly 
about politics is able to hold politicians accountable. The starting point of our argumentation, 
however, is that accountability emerges out of fear of electoral sanctions and create this fear, it 
suffices that there is a chance that citizens actually get informed (Snider, 1996). In this section, we 
first elaborate on a “less demanding” mechanism that, in accordance with McCubbins & 
Schwartz (1984), Prior (2007), Snider (1996), and Zaller (2003), we call “Fire-Alarm 
Accountability”. We then continue with how developments in ICT can strengthen this 
mechanism. 
Citizens rarely monitor politicians’ actions directly but usually rely on information delivered by 
intermediaries. Traditionally, these intermediaries are journalists, interest groups or opposition 
candidates. They are supposed to act as “watchdogs” who inform fellow citizens if they observe 
any wrongdoing by politicians. The accountability mechanism works if politicians have to fear 
that wrongdoing will be sanctioned. To justify this anticipation, someone has to monitor politicians’ 
actions and decisions and a sufficient number of voters have to find out about the misdemeanor. 
It does not require that everyone informs herself directly and in detail. Instead, according to 
Arnold (2004, p. 13) it is “much more important that information regularly flows to those who 
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act as watchdogs, that these watchdogs reflect the diversity of interests in a constituency, and that 
they have easy ways to communicate with other citizens when they discover representatives doing 
disagreeable things.” For this mechanism, the existence of a few well-informed watchdogs is 
more important than a broadly informed mass. Conversely, a high number of badly-informed 
citizens does not necessarily decrease accountability (Prior, 2007). 
As a matter of fact, the intermediation of information is a classic form of division of labor and 
can minimize voters’ costs of information seeking (Downs, 1957). While information 
intermediaries face similar transaction costs of information acquisition, they have much lower 
opportunity costs because information seeking is their profession and they receive an income for 
this activity. Some might also have some other specific interest in doing this task. This leads to 
much higher monitoring capacities among intermediaries.  
Referring to the oversight functions of the American Congress, McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) 
illustrate the superiority of intermediated information with the analogy of a fire alarm as opposed 
to police patrols. Pointing out the less centralized, less active, and less direct oversight of a fire 
alarm, they state: “Instead of sniffing for fires, Congress places fire-alarm boxes on street corners, 
builds neighborhood fire houses, and sometimes dispatches its own hook-and-ladder in response 
to an alarm”. For our purposes, Fire-Alarm Accountability means that citizens do not actively 
watch out for political mischief but are in the less demanding position of merely having to wait 
for the watchdogs to report wrongdoing.  
To go one step further, it is not even necessary that the watchdogs actually observe every action 
politicians take. It is enough that politicians believe that their actions might be observed and thus 
change their behavior in anticipation. In this way, more representative behavior occurs not only 
because of an actual information flow to citizens but simply because there is a sufficiently high 
chance citizens could potentially get informed. Politicians cannot know with certainty whether an 
action has been monitored or whether a record exists that might be subject to scrutiny now or at 
a later point. It is the fear of detection, immediately or at some point in the future, that prevents 
the wrongdoing ex ante. This fear does not even have to be rational: People tend to be risk-
averse and to overestimate small probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). We therefore 
propose that the mechanism works even if the probability of detection is low. Assuming an 
extreme case, the media could have zero impact on citizens’ actual level of political knowledge 
and still increase political accountability significantly (Snider, 1996).  
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P1: Politicians, to a certain extent, overestimate the risk of being monitored in every kind of 
information environment. 
As proposition 1 implies, the Fire-Alarm Accountability mechanism should not be 
misunderstood as a result of developments in ICT. Information intermediaries, monitoring of 
politician behavior, and anticipated reactions have all existed for a long time. What the internet 
rather does is decrease the transaction costs of information acquisition and diffusion. Ordinary 
citizens likely only benefit slightly from this development directly because they are still limited by 
their high opportunity costs of information acquisition. However it enables watchdogs that have 
low opportunity costs, to substantially enhance their information acquisition and helps them to 
monitor political behavior. It is also the watchdogs who can, according to their interests and 
profession, inform fellow citizens about the information through specific niche media and 
subsidiary sources. While this function is recognized as a fundamental principle of professional 
journalism, it is frequently neglected in regard to the new media, citing their often small and 
fragmented audiences. 
Snider (1996) illustrates the impact of new media on accountability with the example of 
“Government Access TV”, public political meetings broadcasted via cable TV. He shows that 
recording local public affairs meetings and archiving them on videotape in public libraries led to 
more representative behavior among local politicians. This happened although only few people – 
mostly professional journalists – attended the meetings or ever requested the tapes. If VHS 
recording and physical storing can already have an impact on accountability, the impact of 
modern ICT should be even more significant. 
In actuality, the internet meets the requirements outlined by Arnold (2004) above. It improves 
the information flow to and from those who act as watchdogs. Most obviously, modern ICT 
simplify journalistic routine investigations tremendously. The required information can often be 
found in a search engine, making costly and time-consuming searches in physical archives 
obsolete. New ICT furthermore allow for an increased monitoring of political behavior and are 
assumed to create an “culture of transparency” (Bertot et al., 2010). By enabling people to 
broadcast information independently of traditional media, it enlarges the circle of people who can 
act as watchdog. Also, new phenomena like open data, online campaigns or Wikileaks provide 
new kinds of information and allow for in-depth investigations. In addition, information can 
easily be published or forwarded. This speedy and extensive information diffusion is especially 
useful for fast and spontaneous campaigns. Ultimately, everyone who is ‘armed’ with a mobile 
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phone is ready to take a snapshot or a video at any time and share this immediately with 
potentially the whole world, if she witnesses wrongdoing. Therefore, we further propose that: 
P2: Politicians anticipate that citizens are potentially better informed in an environment with 
higher diffusion of modern ICT. 
And, as an immediate consequence of proposition 2 and the fear of electoral sanctions outlined 
above: 
P3: In an information environment with higher diffusion of modern ICT, politicians act more 
representatively. 
In summary, the Fire Alarm Accountability approach is effective despite high opportunity costs 
of information gathering for citizens, small audiences of new media, and information 
fragmentation. Ordinary citizens do not have to change their behavior to become “well-informed 
citizens” (Schütz, 1964) who follow all relevant political issues, judge candidates on the basis of 
profound knowledge and vote rationally. We rather see “monitorial citizens” who “are keeping an 
eye on the scene. They look inactive but they are poised for action if action is required. The 
monitorial citizen is not an absentee citizen but watchful, even while he or she is doing 
something else” (Schudson, 1998, p. 311). Hence, to some extent, ICT reverse the logic of 
information acquisition. For a long time, people actively had to look for information. Nowadays 
it is the information that has to search its audience more actively. The idea is maybe best 
described by a college student in a focus group interview among young voters who plainly stated: 
“If the information is that important, it will find me” (New York Times 2008). The last 
proposition thus is: 
P4: Actual information levels among citizens do not differ between environments with and 
without modern ICT. 
4. Methodology 
We design an experiment where subjects play a trust game with incomplete information in pairs, 
taking either the role of a citizen or a politician. The citizen has to trust the politician to make a 
representative decision, but has the possibility to acquire information to decrease her 
informational disadvantage and to sanction wrongdoing. To test our hypothesis that technical 
progress in ICT increases accountability, we compare three treatments that differ in the number 
of watchdogs. Before we describe the game in detail, we first give a rationale for using a 
laboratory experiment and describe the organizational procedure. Subsequently, the game is 
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related to our theory and to existing experimental research. Finally, the treatment design is 
introduced and predictions are made. 
4.1. Rationale for a Laboratory Experiment 
For our purposes, a laboratory experiment has several advantages. Information levels of different 
actors and information flows between persons are hard to measure in an uncontrolled 
environment. Particularly potential information flows are virtually impossible to measure exactly 
because by definition they do not exist (Snider, 1996, p. 27). In a laboratory experiment, different 
levels of information can explicitly be induced. It is then possible to elicit beliefs and identify how 
players’ behavior changes. The randomization mechanism of the experiment guarantees that 
different beliefs or behaviors can only be caused by varying information levels without any 
uncontrolled confounding factors.  
Alternative approaches cannot provide information that is precise enough. The main problem 
with a survey among actual politicians to capture behavior under different conditions of 
(expected) public awareness is social desirability. It is hard to imagine that a politician would 
admit that she would act towards her own benefit rather than that of the citizens if she was sure 
that her behavior is not recorded or sanctioned. And even if answers were honest, a politician 
might also unconsciously change her behavior because of monitoring activities. Another 
approach could be a between-case design in which countries, constituencies, etc. differ in the 
amount of information that is accessible to the public or a longitudinal design where the amount 
of accessible information is changing over time. For example, Besley & Burgess (2002) show that 
the Indian government acts more responsive in areas where newspaper circulation is high. 
However, data that are both precisely measured and exhibits enough variance in information 
availability is rare.  
4.2. Organization 
The experiment was conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER), 
University of Cologne, Germany.3 All subjects of the laboratory’s subject pool of approximately 
4,000 persons were invited to participate in the experiment via email, using the recruitment 
software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Invited subjects could sign up on a first-come, first-serve basis. 
A total of 112 subjects, mostly undergraduate students from the University of Cologne, 
participated in the experiment. The invitation email did not state the content of the experiment. 
                                                          
3 www.lab.uni-koeln.de 
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We conducted three treatments in four sessions 4 , each lasting for about one hour. Each 
participant could take part in one session only. Subjects were randomly assigned to computer 
booths separated by privacy shields by drawing an ID number when entering the lab. Decisions 
and payments were linked to this ID and experimenters were not able to relate this information 
to subjects’ names. Furthermore, subjects were not allowed to communicate during the sessions. 
This procedure guaranteed absolute anonymity. At the end of a session, earnings were paid in 
cash. Subjects earned an average of 8.94 euros that were paid in addition to a 2.50 euros show-up 
fee. The experiment was programmed with z‐Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Subjects received instructions (see appendix A1) on a paper when they entered the lab. They were 
allowed as much time as they needed to familiarize themselves with the instructions and the 
procedure of the experiment. Instructions were neutrally worded (e.g. ‘Person B’ instead of 
‘politician’) to avoid any framing effects. Afterwards, they had to answer some simple questions 
to guarantee that they understood the game. Experimenters checked these answers and there was 
an opportunity to clarify misunderstandings and to ask any further questions. After the game, 
participants received a short survey in which they should explain their decision and answer some 
demographic questions. 
4.3. The Game 
In our game, subjects are randomly matched in groups of two. In each group, one subject takes 
the role of a citizen and the other the role of a politician. The game is played for only one round. 
Figure 1 depicts the game stages and payoffs. 
1. At the beginning, the citizen has 300 points that she has to transfer to the politician.5 
2. During this transfer, the points are multiplied with a factor x. The multiplier x has either a 
value of 2 (probability = 0.2) or 4 (probability = 0.8). The actual value of the multiplier is 
only revealed to the politician. 
3. The politician now has to divide the multiplied amount of points and transfer a certain 
share back to the citizen. In case of the small multiplier x = 2, the politician has no other 
option but to divide the total amount of 600 points into two equal shares. In case of the 
large multiplier x = 4, the politician has the choice to either divide the 1200 points in two 
                                                          
4 Treatment 1 was conducted in two separate sessions with 24 participants each. Treatment 2 and 3 were conducted 
in single sessions with 32 participants each. 
5 Since the citizen has no other choice than transferring her complete endowment, strictly speaking we do not face a 
trust game but a dictator game where the citizen does not know the size of the cake to distribute. However, we 
designed this element of a trust game to create an endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990), which 
describes the psychological effect that a good is valued higher if it is possessed and has to be given up. At the same 
time, this was intended to induce a feeling that the citizen “has a right” to an equal share. 
58 
 
equal shares (fair decision) or to transfer back 300 of the 1200 points and keep 900 for 
herself (unfair decision/“hiding behind small cake”). To increase the number of relevant 
observations (the occurrence of the big multiplier where the politician actually has a 
choice between the fair and unfair split), we use the strategy method (Selten, 1967). This 
means that before the actual multiplier is shown to the politician, she has to state her 
choice conditional on the small and the big multiplier coming up. The decision of the 
actual multiplier is then realized.  
Figure 1: Design of the experiment 
 
4. The citizen now receives her share dependent on the multiplier x and the politician’s 
decision. Now, she has the opportunity to acquire information which will reveal the 
actual value of the multiplier to her with a certain probability. Each piece of acquired 
information will increase this probability by 0.05. Costs for acquiring information increase 
exponentially.6 The citizen cannot spend more points for information acquisition than 
she has minimally available, that is 300. Thus, a 100% chance to reveal the multiplier is 
not possible. The exact costs and revealing probabilities can be found in Table 1. Again 
we use the strategy method to obtain more relevant observations: Before the citizen finds 
out the size of the actual transferred amount, she has to state how much information she 
wants to acquire in case of receiving 300 or 600 points, respectively. Buying information 
in the latter case is not rational because the citizen can conclude unfair behavior without 
the additional information and will only decrease her payoff by buying it. 
                                                          
6 The exact function is: 3×n² - 5×n + 30 for n>0 with n=number of acquired information. The exponential function 
reflects convex opportunity costs: Spending more time on information investigation disproportionally increases the 
costs of abstaining from other productive activities.  
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5. The payoffs are calculated with an exchange rate of 60 points = 1 euro7. If the citizen (1) 
did not buy any information, (2) failed to reveal the true multiplier, or (3) revealed unfair 
behavior by the politician, the outcomes depend on the politician’s division. If the citizen 
reveals wrongdoing by the politician, the outcomes are swapped. This means that the 
citizen receives 900 points and the politician 300 points. The swapping can be interpreted 
as a sanction for disclosed wrongdoing. In each case, the citizen bears the costs for 
information acquisition.  
Table 1: Costs and revealing probability for information acquisition 
Note: Decisions never available in the game are shaded in grey. 
In addition to these decisions, we asked for the participants’ beliefs about their partner’s 
decisions. Politicians had to estimate the number of information pieces their matched citizen 
would acquire. This allows us to measure anticipations about information levels. Citizens had to 
guess whether their partner would divide the share representatively or not (before they received 
their share). While we incentivized the politicians’ guesses with an additional 50 points in case it 
was correct to obtain their true belief, citizens’ guesses could not be incentivized because this 
would reveal the politician’s decision ex post (which we guaranteed to keep secret if it was not 
revealed by information acquisition). However, citizens had no incentive to misreport their true 
belief. 
4.4. Relation to Theory and Existing Experimental Research 
Our design has the basic structure of a trust game (Berg et al., 1995). The trust game with 
incomplete information reflects the real-life situation of a representative democracy. Citizens 
have to hand over decision-making competences but also financial resources in the form of taxes 
to elected representatives. The multiplier reflects the idea that everyone will be better off if 
resources are invested in public or social goods like national defense, fresh air, education or social 
                                                          
7 This exchange rate leads to a large variance in politicians’ payoffs – 5 euros for revealed wrongdoing, 10 euros for a 
fair split, and 15 euros for an unrevealed unfair split. We therefore consider this one-shot decision as non-trivial for 
subjects. 
Pieces of  
information 
acquired
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Revealing 
prob.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Costs for 
citizens
(in points)Costs for 
watchdogs
(in points)
0 6 22 38 54 70 86 102 118 134 150 166 182 198 214 230 246 262 278 294 310
3380 28 32 42 58 80 108 142 182 228 280 912 1018 1130402 472 548 630 718 812
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welfare. Citizens have to trust that representatives will act in their best interest. At the same time, 
citizens do not have full information about the policy process and can only partly distinguish 
between the politicians’ performance (here: the fairness of the distribution) and contextual 
factors (here: the random choice of the multiplier). Thus politicians have the possibility to line 
their own pockets while blaming contextual factors for the bad outcome, a behavior called 
“hiding behind a small cake” in the experimental literature (Güth et al., 1996; Mitzkewitz & 
Nagel, 1993; Ockenfels & Werner, 2012). We furthermore add an audit mechanism known from 
the tax compliance game (Alm, Jackson, & McKee, 1992; Graetz, Reinganum, & Wilde, 1986) to 
reflect the probability that wrongdoing by politicians is revealed by citizens.  
Our design substantially adds to bargaining games with incomplete information and opportunity 
for information acquisition. In existent designs, the revealing probability is either given 
exogenously (tax compliance games), or a player only has the choice between acquiring none or 
full information. If full information is acquired, the revealing probability is 1. In our design, 
information acquisition is instead continuous with an increasing revealing chance for higher 
information acquisition. From the politician’s perspective, this does not only imply a certain risk 
that her actions are revealed but also ambiguity8 about the detection probability. Not knowing 
how much information the partner will acquire, the proposer does not know the risk that his 
action is revealed. This ambiguity reflects the real life situation that a politician can anticipate that 
her action is potentially monitored, but there is high uncertainty whether there is actually any 
monitoring taking place, or whether the resulting monitoring record is actually subject to scrutiny.  
4.5. Treatments and Predictions 
We apply three treatments. The treatments reflect different informational environments for the 
Fire-Alarm Accountability mechanism caused by technical progress in ICT.  
The baseline treatment (T1) corresponds exactly to the design described in section 4.4. T1 
reflects an information environment in which information acquisition is relatively costly for 
citizens and in which their information levels are consequentially limited. Parameters of the 
exponential cost function are chosen accordingly (cf. Table 1). The watchdog treatments (T2) and 
(T3) resemble T1 with one difference each: In T2, three out of sixteen citizens (the watchdogs) 
have a flatter (linear) cost function9 for information acquisition. The other thirteen have the same 
                                                          
8  A risky event has known probabilities for certain outcomes. In contrast, an ambiguous event has unknown 
probabilities for certain outcomes. An ambiguous event thus is a risky event for which the risk is not quantifiable. 
For this reason, there is a higher degree of uncertainty (Ellsberg, 1961). 
9 The exact function is: 16×n - 10 for n>0 with n=number of acquired pieces of information. The linear function 
reflects increasing transaction costs with negligible opportunity costs. 
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cost function as those in T1. In T3, six citizens have the flatter cost function, while ten have the 
same as those in T1. The lower acquisition costs allow the watchdogs to buy up to nineteen 
pieces of information (95% revealing chance). While citizens know which of the two cost 
functions they have, politicians do not know with which kind of citizen they are matched with. 
T2 and T3 reflect information environments in which transaction costs are lower because of 
progress in modern ICT. However, only those few persons without substantial opportunity costs 
can make use of the technical developments. 
To predict differences between treatments, one has to distinguish between classical game theory 
and empirical findings from experiments that systematically differ from the classical theory. 
Classical game theory assumes rational actions that maximize utility and neglects factors like 
fairness, reciprocity or risk aversion. If a citizen believes that the politician will choose the unfair 
split, she has the highest expected utility by buying five pieces of information.10 This corresponds 
to a revealing chance of 0.25. In T1, given this revealing chance, it is still rational for the 
politician to choose the unrepresentative action.11 A citizen could also believe that the politician 
will choose the fair split, which implies not to buy any information. In this case, the politician has 
an even higher incentive to choose the unfair split. Hence, a rational politician will always choose 
the unfair split in T1. As a result, there is a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) – a situation in which 
no actor has an incentive to change her strategy unilaterally – where the citizen always buys five 
piece information and the politicians always chooses the unrepresentative action. 
The analogue procedure shows that T2 has the same Nash equilibrium12. Indeed, a rational 
watchdog will buy the maximum possible nineteen pieces of information. For a politician 
matched with a watchdog it is thus rational to act representatively. However, the probability to be 
matched with a watchdog is only 0.19 (3/16). Hence, considering the probability to be matched 
with a watchdog, wrongdoing is still the rational decision. 
In T3, the situation is different. Since the probability to be matched with a watchdog is 0.38 
(6/16), it is not rational for the politician to choose the unfair split anymore.13 However, if the 
citizen anticipates this, expects a fair decision, and therefore does not buy any information, it is 
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again rational for the politician to betray. Again, the citizen could react to the politician’s 
anticipation and increase information acquisition. There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies 
in T3. The choice of strategy depends on the beliefs about the other player’s strategy. 
As already hinted to in the theoretical part, we argue here that politicians will not act purely 
rational as proposed by standard game theory. This argument is supported by the fact that non-
rational behavior has also been observed in economic experiments frequently.  
First, many decisions are driven at least to a certain kind by fairness and reciprocity (Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Even in dictator games with unilateral decision-making, 
no possibility to sanction, and absolute anonymity, one can find fair behavior (Forsythe, 
Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994). Therefore, in each treatment, we should find some share of 
politicians that choose the representative decision not because of any accountability mechanism 
but because of fairness. This reflects the fact that in representative democracies, politicians are 
not solely motivated by self-interest but by other factors like ideology, socialization, altruism, etc.  
Second, people tend to be risk-averse (Arrow, 1971; Pratt, 1964): Up to a certain degree, they 
prefer a lower risk-free outcome over a higher risky outcome in expectation. Furthermore, they 
tend to substantially overestimate small probabilities of risks (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In our 
game, if citizens acquire the rational amount of information, the disclosure risk is relatively small. 
However, we expect politicians to overestimate the risk of their action being disclosed.  
Third, the information acquisition decision is not rational either (Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, & 
Weinberg, 2006; Rötheli, 2001). This insecurity about the partner’s rationality leads to an ambiguity 
problem (Ellsberg, 1961) for politicians: Politicians are not confronted with a certain risk, but 
with an unknown risk of disclosure. Both risk aversion and ambiguity aversion should lead 
politicians to overestimate the risk of disclosure and result in more representative behavior.  
Because of these rationality biases, contrary to standard theory, we expect to see representative 
behavior in every treatment. Although we expect citizens’ actual information acquisition not to 
vary substantially between the treatments, we expect politicians to act more representatively in T2 
and T3 than in T1. This is because of increased ambiguity: Not knowing which kind of citizen 
they are matched with, the range of revealing probabilities that is limited by citizens’ endowment 
varies between 0 to 0.95 in T2 and T3 and 0 to 0.5 in T1. However, in contrast to standard 
theory, we do not expect to see substantial differences between T2 and T3: First, we expect that 
the probability to be matched with a watchdog is overestimated in any case, and second, 
ambiguity is increased to the same level in both treatments. The slightly higher probability of 
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being matched with a watchdog should not substantially change politicians’ behavior. If these 
expectations are correct and T2 and T3 do not differ significantly, both treatments could be 
merged in the analysis. 
The treatment conditions reflect the Fire-Alarm Accountability Mechanism that should lead to 
more representative behavior without increasing information levels among ordinary citizens. The 
testable implications of the four supposed propositions are the following hypotheses: 
H1: In all three treatments, politicians overestimate the amount of acquired information.  
H2: Politicians’ anticipated level of citizens’ information acquisition: T3 ~ T2 > T1 
H3: Representative decisions: T3 ~ T2 > T1 > 0 
H4: The actual information acquisition among citizens does not differ across treatments. 
5. Results 
In this chapter, each hypothesis is tested and illustrated by a figure. To evaluate the efficacy of 
the mechanism, we further analyze the motivation for subjects’ decisions in the experiment using 
an open-survey question. Since there are only 56 observations 14  for each hypothesis, the 
normality assumption as the prerequisite for parametric tests such as the t-test is hard to justify. 
Therefore, we use two-sided non-parametric tests, namely the Mann-Whitney-U test 15  for 
continuous variables and the Fisher-Exact test 16  for dichotomous variables. Besides the 
hypotheses tests, we control for a number of demographic covariates like sex, age, and 
experience with game theory. Because none of them changes the treatment effects, we report 
these regression estimates only in appendix A2. 
Because predictions of the hypotheses do not differ between the two watchdog treatments T2 
and T3, we first of all test whether the two treatments can be merged. 17  Since there is no 
significant difference in the variables of interest – fairness, actual information acquisition, and 
beliefs about information acquisition – T2 and T3 can be merged to a single watchdog treatment 
                                                          
14 Hypotheses always refer to either citizens or politicians. Therefore we can draw on only half of all 112 subjects for 
the hypotheses tests. 
15  The Mann-Whitney-U test, also known as Wilcoxon rank sum test, tests whether values in one sample of 
independent observations are significantly larger than those in another sample (Mann & Whitney, 1947; Wilcoxon, 
1945). The test is non-parametric and commonly used in experiments to compare different treatments. 
16 Fisher’s exact test is a significance test used for contingency tables (Fisher, 1922). It is the exact version of the chi-
squared test and is particularly strong for categorical variables with a low number of cases.  
17 The test results are not included in this paper but can be requested from the author. 
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which we name TW. Merging the two treatments creates the dual benefits of parsimony and a 
higher statistical power because of an increased number of observations  
Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Subjects by Treatments 
 
T1 TW 
Variable mean sd mean sd 
Age (19-65) 24.42 3.76 25.50 6.16 
Female (0-1) 0.56 0.50 0.58 0.50 
Semester (1-20) 6.50 3.97 7.32 4.64 
Exp. game theory (0-1) 0.33 0.48 0.41 0.50 
Lab exp. (0-3) 1.42 1.11 1.64 1.13 
Ideology (0=left - 9=right) 4.54 1.74 4.48 1.64 
N 48 64 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the demographic characteristics of participants separated by 
treatments. Participants have an average age of about 25 years and 75% of participants are 
between 22 and 27. On average they have been studying for seven semesters and a substantial 
part has experience with game theory and laboratory experiments. There are slightly more female 
subjects. Political ideology on the left-right continuum is close to be normally distributed. None 
of the differences between treatments is statistically significant. This is in line with the 
randomized allocation of participants. 
Figure 2: H1 – Overestimation of Information Acquisition by Politicians 
 
Regarding hypothesis H1, Figure 2 shows the amount of overestimation – that is the difference 
between politicians’ belief of citizens’ information acquisition and the actual acquisition. In 
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hypothesis H1, we expected politicians to overestimate the amount of information acquired by 
citizens in each treatment. There is indeed a slight overestimation in the watchdog treatments 
(about 0.25 pieces of information). However, in T1 we actually observe underestimation of 
information acquisition. Because of these mixed findings and the marginal size of overestimation 
in TW, hypothesis H1 has to be rejected. In any case, the difference between the two treatments 
is not statistically significant (U-Test: p = 0.83).  
For hypothesis H2, we analyze politicians’ beliefs about information acquisition. The average 
belief over both treatments is 3.8. Given that it is rational for citizens to buy 5 pieces of 
information, this is further evidence that there is no overestimation of information acquisition 
among politicians. Within the TW treatment, on average politicians believed that citizens would 
buy 4.5 pieces of information, which is significantly more than the amount of 2.9 expected on 
average by the politicians in T1 (U-Test: p = 0.094). These findings are in line with hypothesis 
H2: Politicians anticipate the probability to be matched with a watchdog and expect higher 
information acquisition in TW.  
Figure 3: H2 – Politicians’ Belief about Information Acquisition by Decision Representativeness and 
Treatment 
 
An interesting pattern appears when beliefs of politicians that choose the fair split are compared 
with those who choose the unfair split (Figure 3). There is no significant difference between 
treatments among those who choose to act representatively. On the other hand, among the 
subjects acting unrepresentatively, the estimation of information acquisition is more than twice as 
high in the watchdog treatments (U-Test: p = 0.038). There are two possible explanations: First, 
politicians play unfair and because they play unfair the possibility that watchdogs will buy 
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information to reveal their decision is more salient to them. Second, politicians play unfair as a 
consequence of the expectation that their partner will acquire more information. The research 
design is not able to evaluate those explanations. Still, the subsequent analysis of subjects’ 
decision motivation that follows below is more in line with the second option. 
Figure 4: H3 – Average Share of Representative Splits 
 
Hypothesis H3 assumes that the anticipation of higher information acquisition will translate into 
more representative behavior. As Figure 4 illustrates, the empirical results do not confirm this. 
On the contrary, in the watchdog treatments there are even fewer representative decisions than in 
the T1 treatment without watchdogs. Although the difference is not significant (Fisher’s exact: 
p = 0.28), the existence of watchdogs does not increase fairness among politicians. If at all, the 
opposite is the case.  
There are related findings in the literature, where people behave less fairly or cooperatively if 
their behavior is monitored, a phenomenon also known as “hidden costs of control” (Falk & 
Kosfeld, 2006; Frey, 1993): Agents reduce their performance because the principals’ monitoring 
is interpreted as a signal of distrust or as a limitation of their choice autonomy. In our watchdog 
treatments the situation is slightly different since there is no increase in control per se. There is 
merely the possibility that a matched partner gets cheaper access to control which she can, but 
does not have to exert to a greater extent. However, the phenomenon might be related. As seen 
in Figure 3, subjects expect actually higher control in an environment where higher control is 
possible. Therefore, the mere possibility of higher control might have the same effect as an actual 
increase in control. We will take this possibility up again when discussing subjects’ decision-
making motivations. 
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Figure 5: H4 – Amount of Acquired Information among Non-Watchdog-Citizens 
 
Hypothesis H4 states that information acquisition among ordinary citizens (all non-watchdogs) 
should be equal in all treatments. Figure 5 depicts the related results. With an average of 3.3 in T1 
and 2.9 in TW, there is indeed no significant difference in information acquisition. Even if 
watchdogs – who buy 7.7 pieces of information on average and therefore significantly more than 
ordinary citizens (U-Test: p = 0.054) – are included in TW, information acquisition does not 
significantly differ between treatments. These findings are in line with hypothesis H4. Regarding 
citizens’ beliefs (not depicted), we find that citizens who expect the politician’s decision to be 
unfair buy significantly more information than those who expect fairness (U-Test: p = 0.096). 
However, the share of citizens who believe in fairness is 0.375 in both treatments. This shows 
that although citizens exploit the information mechanism when they expect an unfair decision, 
they do not seem to believe in the efficacy of watchdogs. 
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Figure 6: Motivations for Politicians’ Decision 
 
In an open question in the survey that followed the experiment, participants were asked to 
elucidate their decision-making in the game. We code answers in three distinctive rationales 
(multiple classifications possible). For subjects in the role of politicians these objectives are (1) 
rational maximization of profits, (2) fairness considerations, and (3) risk aversion regarding the 
risk of being observed by citizens and losing money.18 Figure 6 shows how subjects justify their 
decision. In both treatments, no other motivation than profit maximization is stated among those 
who choose the unfair split. Though this is also the only logical rationale for the unrepresentative 
choice, it indicates that participants answer the question honestly and consistently with their 
decision. In T1, fair decisions are motivated about equally by fairness (63%) and risk aversion 
(55%). In TW, however, we find a substantial difference. Only 22% of fair decisions are 
motivated by fairness but 89% by risk aversion. This decline in fairness over treatments is 
statistically significant (Fisher’s exact: p = 0.09), the rise in risk aversion is close to significance 
(Fisher’s exact: p = 0.12). 
                                                          
18 Examples for the coding of answers for each rationale, with author comments in parentheses, are: (1) rational 
maximization: „I decided according to the highest possible payoff. As person B [politician], I expected the 
probability to receive only 300 points [that is getting an unfair split revealed] to be very low.” (2) Fairness: “Above 
all, I thought about fairness.” (3) Risk aversion: “As B [politician], only in case of a multiplier of 4 and a transfer of 
300, I would be affected by A’s [the citizen’s] information acquisition. However, then I would be subject to the risk 
of receiving only 300. For this reason I decided to transfer 600 because it guaranteed 600 points for me as well.” 
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Increased aversion of the detection risk is exactly what we predicted for the watchdog treatment. 
However, as illustrated by Figure 4, this does not lead to an increase in fair behavior. This could 
be explained by the assumption that intrinsic fairness is crowded out by the existence of 
watchdogs: In this case, the increase in risk aversion could be overcompensated by the decrease 
in intrinsic fairness.  
Figure 7: Motivations for Citizens’ Decision 
 
Analogously, we code citizens’ answers to the open question into three distinctive rationales: (1) 
the conviction that information is too expensive; in other words, aversion for the risk that 
information acquisition will not lead to successful detection and might only cost further money, 
(2) the belief that the politician will transfer a fair split and (3) the belief that the politician will 
transfer an unfair split.19 Figure 7 shows how subjects in the role of the citizen justify their 
decision. In both treatments, slightly more than half of the subjects think that information is too 
expensive, i.e. that for the risk of losing money the detection probability is not high enough. In 
T1, about a third of citizens expect politicians to be fair while another third expects unfairness. In 
TW, expected fairness is decreasing and expected unfairness is increasing. Although both changes 
                                                          
19 (1) Too expensive: „Since information acquisition always bears the risk to lose money, I disregarded that option 
and did not gamble with my minimum payoff.” (2) Expected fairness: “I was confident that the other player is good 
and fair.” (3) Expected unfairness: “When I learned I was person A [citizen], it was all or nothing. 80% [revealing 
chance, the subject was a watchdog] is a high probability and the most probable choice of person B [politician] is to 
transfer 300. That is why I decided for buying such high ‘I’ [amount of information].” 
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are insignificant, they are noteworthy because they are in line with the actual changes in fairness 
and politicians’ rationales between treatments. 
In summary, there is mixed evidence for the proposed mechanism. While politicians indeed 
anticipate higher information acquisition (which actually, as proposed, remains stable) in an 
information environment with watchdogs, this does not lead to more representative behavior. 
One possible explanation for this phenomenon might be that the existence of watchdogs leads to 
crowding-out effects. However, the design of the experiment cannot clearly distinguish the two 
effects and the low number of observations does not allow for drawing conclusions about which 
explanation is stronger. Furthermore, caution is generally warranted when drawing conclusions 
because of the inductive nature of experiments: For example, the unexpected crowding-out effect 
was not theorized about in advance, but derived from the specific observations in the laboratory 
experiment. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose that technical progress in ICT can increase political accountability via a 
Fire-Alarm Accountability Mechanism. We further argue that for this mechanism to work, it 
suffices that politicians anticipate citizens to be potentially instead of actually informed because 
someone might observe their actions. To test these propositions, we designed an experiment that 
reflects the accountability relationship between a voter and a politician in different information 
environments. The results suggest that, in line with the propositions, politicians in the watchdog 
treatments (1) falsely anticipate higher information acquisition (although actual acquisition 
remains stable), and (2) more politicians justify their fair decision with the fear of being 
sanctioned. However, contrary to the prediction, subjects act less fairly. They justify their 
distribution decision less frequently with fairness considerations, although – or precisely because 
– subjects are aware of higher monitoring possibilities. 
The contribution of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we show that ICT can actually 
increase political accountability, despite objections concerning citizens’ motivational and 
cognitive limits to informing themselves about politics and the small and fragmented audiences 
of new media. On the other hand, besides this expected primary impact channel, our experiment 
reveals an unexpected second channel: Higher monitoring possibilities lead to a crowding-out 
effect of politicians’ intrinsic aspiration for representative actions. This is partly replaced by self-
interests, a phenomenon known as “hidden costs of control” in the economic literature. 
Apparently, politicians who are supposed to act in the best interest of citizens also interpret 
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higher external control as distrust in their competence and benevolence and as limitation of their 
choice autonomy. In response, their motivation and performance might decrease or they might 
fall prey to moral hazard. 
This paper highlights that developments in ICT have an impact on political accountability. It 
does, however, also show that new monitoring opportunities and transparency policies are a 
double-edged sword. When designing such policies and for evaluating their impact, the opposing 
directions of the positive disciplining effect and the negative effect of distrust of increased 
controlling possibilities have to be kept in mind. Which of the two effects is more dominant 
depends on a variety of factors like monitoring probability, strength of sanction, opportunism of 
the politician, who is the one that monitors, etc. Further research on the exact relationship 
between monitoring and accountability is necessary to successfully leverage the great potential of 
new ICT to increase political accountability. 
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Appendix 
A1: Example of Instructions (Translated from German) 
 
- INSTRUCTIONS - 
 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation. From now on up to 
the end of the experiment, please stop all communication with other participants. In case of a 
violation of this rule we have to exclude you from the experiment.  
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Please read these instructions carefully. If you have any questions, now or during the experiment, 
please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to you and answer your questions. 
Before we begin with the experiment, a short test will be conducted to ensure that you 
completely understand the instructions. 
 
Payoff and Anonymity 
In this experiment you can earn money. How much you earn depends on your decisions as well 
as on the decisions of the other participants. During this experiment your payoff will be 
calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total points you earned will be converted 
to euros with the following exchange rate: 
60 points = 1 euro 
For your appearance you will receive an additional payment of 2.50 euros. Your payoff and your 
decisions will be kept confidential. Neither during nor after the experiment will any participant 
learn with whom she interacted.  
 
Decision Situation 
All participants play in randomly allocated groups of two. In each group there are two types of 
persons, person A and person B. Which role you will be assigned to is also random. 
From the 16 persons A in the laboratory that participate in the experiment, six will be randomly 
assigned to the role of a person A+. A person A+ differs from a person A by lower costs that 
result from acquiring information (see below). Apart from that, the experimental procedure and 
the decision situation of person A+ and person A are the same. Only the six assigned persons 
A+ will find out about their special role. In particular, person B is not able to find out whether 
she is matched with a person A or a person A+ before she takes her decision. For that reason, in 
the following instructions as well as within the experiment itself, person A and person A+ will be 
synonymously labeled as person A, unless there are explicit differences. 
The game is played for only one round, e.g. each decision is taken only once. Person A starts with 
300 points, person B with 0 points. 
The procedure of the game is as follows: 
1. Person A has to transfer all of her 300 points to person B. There is no other option for 
person A in this first step. 
2. During the transfer from person A to person B the points will be multiplied by a factor 
X. This multiplier X will either take a value of 2 with a probability of 20% or a value of 4 
with a probability of 80%. The determination of the actual multiplier can be illustrated as 
follows. A random number (displayed with two decimal places) between 0 and 100 is 
drawn. If the random number is smaller than 20, the multiplier is 2. If the random 
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number is bigger than 20, the multiplier is 4. Only person B gets to know whether the 
points are actually doubled to 600 or quadrupled to 1200.  
3. Now person B has all points at her command. Depending on the value of the multiplier 
that is 600 or 1200 points respectively. Before person B gets to know the actual amount 
of points, she has to take an allocation decision for both possible cases: 
 Case 1: If the points were doubled to 600, person B has to send back 300 points 
to person A. 
 Case 2: If the points were quadrupled to 1200, person B has the choice to send 
back either 300 or 600 points to person A. 
Furthermore, for both possible cases, person B has to estimate how much information 
player A will acquire in the next step (see below). After person B has taken both decision 
and both estimates, she will get to know the actual multiplier. The respective decision and 
estimate will be realized. The decision and the estimate for the non-occurring multiplier 
however are irrelevant now. If the estimate matches the actual amount of information 
acquired by person A exactly, person B receives an additional 50 points. 
While person B is taking her decisions, person A has to estimate whether person B will 
send back 300 or 600 points in case of a multiplier of 4 (and thus an amount to allocate of 
1200). 
4. Now, points are returned to person A dependent on the value of the multiplier and the 
decision of person B. Person A then has the possibility to acquire information that will 
reveal the true value of the multiplier to her with a certain probability. Each piece of 
acquired information will increase the probability to find out the actual value of the 
multiplier by 5 percentage points. The more information is bought, the more costs occur 
for person A. Person A cannot acquire more information than she has guaranteed points 
available, e.g. she can buy information for a maximum of 300 points. This means person 
A can at maximum acquire 10 pieces of information, whereas persons A+ can acquire up 
to 19 pieces of information. Thus, a revealing chance of 100% is never possible. At 
maximum, person A can reach a revealing chance of 50%, person A+ one of 95%. The 
progression of revealing chance and costs is illustrated in the following table: 
 
Number of 
acquired 
information 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Revealing  
chance 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 
Costs for 
person A 
(in points) 0 28 32 42 58 80 108 142 182 228 280 338 402 472 548 630 718 812 912 1018 1130 
Costs for 
person A+ 
(in points) 0 6 22 38 54 70 86 102 118 134 150 166 182 198 214 230 246 262 278 294 310 
Note: The costs for person A are calculated as follows: 3*information.² - 5*information + 30 (if 
information > 0) 
 The costs for person A+ are calculated as follows: 16*information -10 (if information > 0) 
 For the respective persons, non-available decisions are shaded grey and crossed out. 
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Whether the acquired information will reveal the actual multiplier can be illustrated as 
follows. A random number between 0 and 100 is drawn. If the revealing chance of person 
A is higher than this random number, the multiplier will be revealed to person A. If the 
revealing chance smaller than the random number, the multiplier remains unknown. If 
person A does not reveal the actual multiplier, she will not get to know it after the 
experiment either. 
Before person A gets to know how many points she actually received by person B, she 
has to decide how many points she wants to acquire for both possible cases (300 or 600 
points). After person A has taken both decisions, she gets to know how many points 
person B actually transferred. The respective decision about the acquisition of 
information will be realized, the other decision becomes irrelevant. 
 
Payoffs 
 If person A decided against the acquisition of any information, the experiment is completed 
and the payoffs are realized according to the current allocation of points. 
 If person A acquired information, but this did not reveal the actual multiplier (the revealing 
chance is smaller than the random number), the experiment is also completed and the 
payoffs are realized according to the current allocation of points. 
 If person A reveals the actual multiplier because of her information acquisition, there are 
two possibilities. 
a) If person A by this means reveals the information that the multiplier was 2 and 
person B transferred 300 of 600 points back to her, the experiment is completed and 
the payoffs are realized according to the current allocation of points. 
b) If person A by this means reveals the information that the multiplier was 4 and 
person B transferred 300 of 1200 points back to her, the payoffs will be switched. 
Person B receives 300 points and person A receives the remaining 900 points minus 
the costs for the information acquisition. 
The experimental procedure together with the respective payoffs is depicted in the following 
figure once again. 
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I = Information acquisition costs; (not) revealed = Person A gets to (does not get to) know the actual 
multiplier 
When you read these instructions, please answer the questions on the attached sheet that should 
familiarize you with the decision situation. The experiment begins when all participants have 
answered the questions correctly. 
After the experiment you will see a short survey on your screen which we kindly ask you to fill 
out while we prepare the payments. 
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A2: Regression Estimates 
 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
H1 H2(unfair) H2(fair) H3 H4
Overestimation
Belief about 
I. acquisition
Belief about 
I. acquisition Fairness
Acquired 
Information
Treatment Dummy -0.101 2.101* -0.194 -0.126 0.636
(-0.07) (2.17) (-0.14) (-0.94) (0.62)
Age 0.018 0.156 -0.261 -0.007 0.225
(19-65) (-0.09) (1.18) (-1.32) (-0.29) (1.18)
Female -0.366 -0.888 -1.604 -0.050 -1.63
 (0-1) (-0.31) (-0.93) (-1.13) (-0.33) (-1.17)
Semester 0.099 -0.003 -0.034 0.024 -0.1
 (1-20) (0.66) (-0.02) (-0.16) (1.10) (-0.45)
Exp. Game Theory 0.49 -0.932 2.014 -0.088 -1.573
(0-1) (0.31) (-0.94) (1.41) (-0.54) (-1.35)
Lab Exp. 0.348 -0.202 0.99 -0.088 0.334
(0-3) (0.53) (-0.55) (1.43) (-1.19) (0.61)
Ideology -0.911 -0.155 0.336 -0.069 0.242
(0=left-9=right) (-1.77) (-0.56) (0.8) (-1.15) (0.79)
Constant 2.145 0.384 8.319 1.051 -1.534
(0.37) (0.1) (1.64) (1.41) (-0.37)
N 54 29 25 54 54
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.066 0.123 0.011 -0.025
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Paper 2 
 
Why German Political Elites Support Governmental 
Transparency 
Self-Interest, Anticipation of Voters’ Preferences or Socialization?  
 
Christian Weyand 
 
Abstract. We compare three analytically distinctive motivations that could explain transparency 
support among German political elites: (1) Principal-agent theory suggests that elites have no 
incentive to reduce their informational advantage over voters. (2) From an office-seeking 
perspective, it is beneficial to support popular issues such as transparency. (3) Democratic-elitism 
suggests a specific elite-socialisation leads to high support of civil liberties like transparency. 
Analysing survey data of candidates for the German Bundestag 2009, we find high variance 
among elites and complementary influence of the motivations. Membership in left-leaning parties 
has the strongest positive effect. We find anticipation effects among candidates that are highly 
dependent on voters’ support and whose voters are in favour of transparency at the same time. 
Further, transparency support is higher among young candidates. The findings imply that more 
transparency policies might be implemented in the future if public support for transparency 
increases and older candidate cohorts are replaced. 
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‘Of the three sources of power the most important for sovereignty is the power over the thoughts that give trust. 
Violence can only be used negatively; money can only be used in two dimensions, giving and taking away. But 
knowledge and thoughts can transform things, move mountains and make ephemeral power appear permanent’ 
(Mulgan 2007: 27) 
1. Introduction 
Why do political elites support governmental transparency? To address this question, we draw on 
three established theories that can explain elite preferences: principal-agent theory, office-seeking 
and democratic elitism. From each theory we derive an analytically distinct, ideal-typical 
motivation to support transparency policies: self-interest, anticipation of voters’ preferences, and 
elite socialization. We combine these three motivations into an explanatory framework and 
suggest that their influence on elites’ preferences is complementary. For the empirical analysis we 
draw on data of the German Candidate Study 2009 (Rattinger et al. 2009) that surveys candidates 
for the German Bundestag 2009. The contribution of this work is twofold. 
First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the attitudes of political elites 
towards governmental transparency.1 We define governmental transparency as citizens’ ‘ability to 
find out what is going on inside a public sector organization (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007: 
308). It can be achieved by disclosing information such as politicians’ individual voting behaviour 
in parliament, perquisites of delegates, key figures of all kind of political and economic 
developments, ex ante expectations or ex post evaluations of policies, and details about placing 
and costs of public contracts. Recently, revolutionary movements during the Arab Spring, the 
publications of classified material by Wikileaks, the rise of Pirate Parties in Europe, and similar 
events made ‘citizens’ right to know’ a heavily debated issue not only in Germany. Political 
scientists underline the importance of governmental transparency as well. There is a bulk of 
empirical literature that shows how governmental transparency is beneficial for citizens: 
Transparency increases responsiveness (Besley and Burgess 2002), civic engagement (Capuno and 
Garcia 2010), trust in government (Grimmelikhuijsen 2009), and good governance (Islam 2006). 
Therefore, Robert Dahl (1989) might not exaggerate in his seminal work ‘Democracy and its 
Critics’ when he claims that inequality in information and knowledge is the most severe resource 
                                                          
1 The empirical investigation of public support for governmental transparency has started to become a matter of 
interest for some researchers in recent time. C.f.: Association of Government Accountants (2010); Cuillier and 
Piotrowski (2009); Cuillier (2008); Driscoll et al. (2000); Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007). In summary, this research 
shows high support for transparency among the public. In contrast, there is only one study (McDonagh 2010) which 
surveys elite attitudes towards the issue. However, this study is mainly concerned with the subsequent evaluation of 
benefits and problems of the introduction of a freedom of information law and only provides some descriptive 
statistics. 
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inequality that threatens democracy. He even considers it more substantial than those differences 
in resources that permit violent coercion or stem from wealth and economic position. 
Second, by focusing on the motivations of legislators to adopt policies, we add to the literature of 
policy representation. Most often, this literature focuses on the impact of public opinion on 
policies (Page and Shapiro 1983; Monroe 1998; Burstein 2003; Brooks and Manza 2006). The 
idea behind this kind of democratic representation is that public opinion affects elite preferences 
and that political elites will consequently create policy outcomes according to public opinion. In 
other words, this approach assumes the ideal democratic case that political elites solely execute 
the public will. It neglects the possibilities that the causality can also work vice versa, elite 
preferences affect public opinion, or that elites pursue their own interests and thus affect policy 
outcomes directly (Hill and Hinton-Anderson 1995; Rae and Taylor 1971). Although we will not 
participate in the debate about the causal direction of the public opinion-policy linkage, we 
acknowledge the importance of elite preferences. Chances for the implementation of a specific 
policy will be low, if there is prevailing resistance among legislators, even if public support for it 
is high. For this reason, we directly focus on explaining how preferences are motivated and thus 
ask under which circumstances political elites are willing to change policies. Empirical analyses of 
different elites’ motivations have often investigated institutional change, in particular changes of 
electoral institutions such as direct democracy (Bowler et al. 2006; Ziemann 2009). Like direct 
democracy, governmental transparency weakens elites’ control over the political agenda and thus 
has a ‘redistributive feature’ (Tsebelis 1990). For this reason, elites’ motivations to support 
transparency are less obvious than the citizens’. Therefore, support for governmental 
transparency does not only have important practical consequences. With three different 
underlying motivations, it also offers a unique possibility for a theoretical investigation of the 
formation of elite preferences using three different theories. 
The first one is principal-agent theory. It stresses the informational advantage in the policy 
process that politicians enjoy over citizens. Politicians can exploit this advantage to enforce their 
own interests which might differ from citizens’ interests (Stiglitz 2002). According to principal-
agent theory, there should be no rational2 reason for politicians to support transparency since it 
would lower the information asymmetry and consequentially decrease the possibilities to enforce 
their self-interest. The second theory we draw on is office-seeking: If one assumes that voters are 
highly in favour of transparency policies, anticipating these preferences might be considered as 
rational behaviour for political elites as well because supporting such transparency policies might 
                                                          
2 Rationality here is defined as choosing the one alternative out of a space of action that maximizes an agent’s utility. 
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lead to more electoral support from voters. From this broader perspective of rational behaviour, 
politicians do not gain utility by enforcing their self-interest, but by supporting popular policies to 
maximise their chances to win or to retain office. Third, elite theory emphasises the impact of 
elites’ socialization on their attitudes (Bachrach 1962; McClosky 1964; Stouffer 1955). According 
to the democratic elitism literature, political elites in general have a particularly high appreciation 
of democratic values and civil liberties – in any case higher than that of ordinary citizens. Since 
governmental transparency can certainly be considered a democratic value, elite theory would 
suggest that elites show strong support for transparency as a consequence of their specific elite 
socialization. 
The three approaches outlined above provide distinct (and partly conflicting) motivations for 
politicians to support or reject governmental transparency. However, for our analysis, we do not 
assume a single explaining motivation or homogenous preferences among political elites. All 
three motivations will rarely appear in their ideal typical form: the selfish homo oeconomicus 
who abuses her power and exploits her position at the expense of the citizenry; the unprincipled 
turncoat who tells the voters what they want to hear; and the benevolent upholder of democratic 
values. Instead we suggest that there are complementary motivations for political elites to support 
or reject transparency policies and assume that politicians are influenced by all impacts. 
For the empirical analysis, we draw on data of the German Candidate Study (Rattinger et al. 
2009) that surveyed candidates for the German Bundestag 2009, among other thing, about their 
opinion towards transparency of the German parliament to the public. Using data from Germany 
has several advantages. If differences between different groups of political elites exist in a 
consensus-oriented democracy such as Germany, they should be even more prominent in 
majoritarian democracies like the U.S. or the UK. Furthermore, the mixed-member proportional 
representation system with three kinds of candidacy modes – constituency candidacy, party-list 
candidacy and mixed mode – differ substantially in their dependency on voters’ favour. This 
provides the opportunity to disentangle the different impacts on support for transparency. In 
addition, the multi-party system of Germany makes it possible to control for a wide range of 
party socialization influences.  
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. In the theoretical section, we start the 
investigation with a brief introduction about the role of information in the policy process. We 
then present the three motivations that are drawn from the literature and apply them to the issue 
of transparency support. Finally, we show how the different approaches are related and can be 
considered complements. In section 3 we introduce the dataset used for this study, explain the 
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operationalisation of the variables and outline the methodological proceeding. Section 4 shows 
the empirical results. In section 5 we conclude. 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1. The Role of Information in the Policy Process 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
 
Note: The bold grey lines depict the policy process. The black lines depict motivations to support/reject 
transparency policies. While the dashed black lines illustrate the three analytical motivations, the bold 
black line is the overall support for governmental transparency as a complementary result of the three 
motivations. 
Figure 1 depicts the role of information in the policy process. In a representative democracy, 
citizens as sovereigns delegate power to politicians. Ordinary citizens simply lack the time as well 
as the ability for mass-coordination that is necessary to find binding rules for the whole society. 
The idea of representation is that politicians shape policies in the best interest3 of citizens (Pitkin 
1967). However, the actual policy outcome is not only formed through politicians’ actions and 
decisions but is also influenced by several contextual factors that are beyond the influence of the 
                                                          
3 The definition of one best interest is tricky for several reasons. First, there are various concepts of representation 
(Mansbridge 2003). Second, there are doubts that voters themselves know what is their best interest (Manin et al. 
1999). Third, electoral heterogeneity allows public officials to play off some voters against others to escape from the 
electoral control mechanism and undermine their accountability to anyone (Ferejohn 1986). 
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individual politician, such as budget constraints, veto powers, party strategy, economic 
development, etc.4 To hold politicians accountable, i.e. to ensure that they act in the citizens’ best 
interest, there are periodical elections. If citizens are dissatisfied with the politicians’ performance, 
they can replace them in the next legislative period. 
However, evaluating politicians’ performance is not a straightforward matter. Citizens can only 
evaluate their own well-being, i.e. the outcome they perceive (Ferejohn 1986). But they usually 
lack information about politicians’ actions and decisions (hidden action) as well as about the 
details of contextual influences (hidden information). This is why Easton (1965) calls the policy 
process a ‘black box’. This lack of information limits the possibility to hold politicians 
accountable, as citizens cannot distinguish between the politicians’ performance and the 
contextual factors. Thus they can only partly identify actions that are not in their interest. To 
remedy this problem, intermediaries have the crucial task to provide voters with informational 
feedback and to make the policy process as transparent as possible. Only a transparent 
information flow enables citizens to evaluate politicians’ performance on a basis different than 
the actual policy outcome. 
According to Piotrowski (2007: 91), there are five channels through which such informational 
feedback can flow: First, proactive dissemination by all kind of public agencies via press releases, 
provision of statistical figures, publications of historical documents or posting documents online. 
Second, through requested information that is not proactively provided by any agency but has to be 
specifically requested by journalists or citizens. The release of the information is often examined 
for each individual case and is based on legal rights such as a freedom of information act. The 
third and fourth are less formal channels: whistle-blowing – the publication of administrative 
misbehaviour, and leaks – the release of information to some media outlets that is not intended to 
become public. The fifth and last channel are open meetings where information is discussed publicly 
by both political elites and representatives of media or interested citizens. Notably, most 
information released via any of these channels reaches citizens through some kind of information 
intermediary such as journalists, broadcasting agencies, bloggers, etc. Ordinary citizens most 
often lack the time, the interest or the cognitive ability to acquire such information on their own. 
Information that reaches citizens via whistle-blowing or leaks is an import source for revealing 
and preventing wrongdoing. Nevertheless, these kinds of information flows are not intended by 
the government and thus cannot be considered in a study that asks for motivations why 
                                                          
4 For reasons of convenience we just consider such contextual factors as exogenous here, although we are aware that 
each of these influences is the result of complex processes that deserve their own fields of research. 
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politicians (purposely) support transparency. Contrary, information flowing through the other 
three channels can be actively controlled by politicians. Among all the binding decisions 
politicians come to, they also determine to which degree they reveal information about their own 
actions, decisions and performance to the public (Manin et al. 1999). So to some extent, by 
regulating governmental transparency they can determine the degree to which they can be held 
accountable. Besides the role of information in the policy process, figure 1 also includes the three 
motivations assumed to drive politicians’ transparency support and that will be elaborated on in 
the next sections. 
2.2. Self-Interest 
The policy process as described above corresponds to the typical characteristics of a principal-
agent relation (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Miller 2005): A principal (citizen) delegates a specific 
task to an agent (politician) and rewards the agent for acting in her interest. The principal-agent 
relationship is characterised both by at least partly different preferences between principal and 
agent and by asymmetric information. The agent has an informational advantage over the 
principal regarding the quality and commitment of her own actions because the principal cannot 
perfectly monitor her. Principal-agent theory suggests that in such a situation with hidden action 
and hidden information, the agent will maximise her utility by enforcing her self-interest, so-
called moral hazard. Moral hazard is a behavioral change caused by an insurance against a risk. 
Here the insurance is the information asymmetry that leads to a reduced risk of being sanctioned. 
In representative democracies, moral hazard includes policy divergence (the deviation from 
citizens’ preferred policy), rent extraction (the exploitation of political authority for private 
benefits), fraud, corruption, and leisure shirking (bad policy outcomes as a consequence of 
politicians’ low effort) (Strøm et al. 2003) 5. 
In a world of perfect information, i.e. with absolute transparency, as it is often assumed by 
neoclassic economic theory, citizens can perfectly observe politicians’ behaviour and precisely 
distinguish their performance from other impacts. Thus they can exactly detect when politicians 
try to enforce their own interest. With perfect transparency, politicians have no incentive to cheat 
on citizens in any way because any kind of fraud would immediately be sanctioned in the next 
elections. Vice versa, in a world with absolute non-transparency, i.e. without any information 
flow, once the voter delegates her power to the politician she has no further impact on the 
formation of the policy outcome. The principal-agent approach suggests that after the election, a 
                                                          
5 Since this kind of moral hazard behaviour has negative consequences for all voters, we consider the assumption of 
homogeneous voter interests concerning transparency justifiable. The above mentioned limitation of accountability 
as a result of heterogeneous voter preferences and ambiguity about a “best interest” thus carries less weight here. 
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politician has no incentive to stick to the voters’ interest. This is because politicians are aware that 
voters have no way to evaluate the formation of the outcome in any case. The consideration of 
these two extreme points illustrates that the amount of transparency determines the politicians’ 
ability to realise their self-interest against the voter’s interest. In its most canonical form, 
principal-agent theory thus suggests a homogenous disapproval of all information flow to 
citizens. There should not be any support for transparency policies at all. 
However, self-interest motivations can also explain heterogeneous preferences among elites. 
Based on considerations in the literature on changing institutions (Riker 1980; Shepsle and 
Weingast 1981; Tsebelis 1990), Bowler et al. (2002) propose that those elites who lose under the 
current institutional arrangement will support institutional changes while those in power will 
refuse changes in order to maintain the status quo. In line with this argument, the authors argue 
that expanding direct democracy gives new actors (‘outsiders’) access to the public policy agenda 
and thus weakens the power of the actual legislators. In fact, their empirical results show that 
candidates of the ruling party are much less in favour of direct democracy than those of the 
opposition. The same could be shown for incumbent members of parliament compared to their 
respective contenders. Analogous to the argument for direct democracy, governmental 
transparency opens political institutions and increases information levels of outsiders. Political 
elites who are not in government or in parliament could gain more control over policymaking by 
increased governmental transparency. From a self-interest perspective, a politician who is 
member of the parliament and thus has more control over the policy process, should less likely 
support governmental transparency. 
2.3. Anticipation of Voter Preferences 
From a self-interest perspective, politicians maximise their utility by engaging in moral hazard. 
But the utility notion can be regarded in a broader way. The main idea in this section is that 
voters evaluate politicians’ policy positions and that politicians can gain utility by attracting 
voters’ support for promoting specific policies (Wlezien 1996; Highton 2012; Pietryka and 
Boydstun 2011). This argument is in line with early theorists such as Downs (1957), who states 
that parties maximise electoral support to gain governmental control, or Schumpeter (1942), who 
claims that the whole democratic process is virtually defined by different political elites’ 
competition for citizens’ support. The literature of coalition formation and party competition 
uses the concept of ‘office-seeking’ for party behaviour that maximises the chances to control 
government (Strøm 1990). We borrow this term to describe individual elite behaviour. From this 
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perspective, politicians that seek office should support policies that are popular among the 
electorate to increase their chances to win or to retain office. 
Since voters highly appreciate governmental transparency (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007), elites 
might increase their utility by committing themselves to transparency policies. Contrary to the 
principal-agent approach above, politicians’ utility here stems from attracting electoral support 
and not from enforcing self-interest6. This idea is closely related to the argument that elections 
are a mechanism to select ‘good types’ of politicians (Fearon 1999). Those politicians who 
support a high level of transparency might qualify as such good types in the eyes of citizens and 
thus have a competitive advantage over political opponents that reject transparency. 
Consequently, from this office-seeking perspective, supporting transparency is generally 
beneficial for politicians. But how much utility a politician can gain from supporting transparency 
policies exactly depends on two factors: first, how much the specific politician depends on the 
voters’ support, and second, how much her specific voters value governmental transparency. 
Dependency on the voters’ support is strongly linked to the candidacy mode of the politician. 
Pure constituency candidates are highly dependent on the voters’ favour since they campaign as 
individuals for a single seat in their constituency. Their campaign is more constituency oriented, 
while list candidates’ campaign is more party oriented (Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Lancaster 
and Patterson 1990). Pure constituency candidates thus should be more responsive to voters’ 
interest for office-seeking reasons compared to list candidates that have only an indirect 
connection to the voters and stick to party interests. Empirical data show that candidates in 
Germany indeed differ substantially in demographic characteristics, campaigning, and in positions 
taken up according to the mode of candidacy (Wüst et al. 2006; Zittel and Gschwend 2008). 
The dependency on voters’ support could furthermore be influenced by politicians’ expectations 
about the closeness of the electoral race. If a specific candidate can expect a bold majority of the 
votes in her constituency or for her party list, attracting further voters’ support is much less 
crucial as if there is a close race between two or more candidates. Conversely, if the election 
outcomes are expected to be very narrow, support for governmental transparency might tip the 
scales.  
How much voters appreciate governmental transparency depends on the voters’ ideology. Left 
ideology is usually considered egalitarian, liberal and progressive. Civil liberties like transparency 
                                                          
6 Strictly speaking, reelection concerns are also central to principal-agent theory and therefore can be considered as 
self-interest as well. Our notation of self-interest that we derive from principal-agent theory however is limited to 
moral hazard behaviour.  
89 
 
and having a say a core issues. Actually, Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) can empirically show 
that left-leaning citizens are more concerned with governmental transparency than right-leaning 
ones. And left-leaning voters usually vote for left-leaning candidates and for left-leaning parties. 
Because politicians anticipate their respective voters’ preferences, office-seeking behaviour 
implies that both left-leaning candidates and candidates from left-leaning parties show stronger 
support for transparency than their right-leaning competitors. 
Furthermore, the voters’ appreciation of transparency might depend on the respective structure 
of their constituencies. Consequently, the candidate can anticipate a different popular demand for 
governmental transparency depending on the structure of the constituency. This assumption is 
based on the cleavage theory by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) who suggest that the electoral 
outcome is also a result of the conflicts arising from the structure of a society. For Germany, this 
approach is taken up by Magin et al. (2009) who analyse how the electoral outcome can be 
predicted from the composition of the regional social structure. The authors find that the church-
state cleavage and the materialism-postmaterialism cleavage significantly shape the regional 
electoral outcomes in Germany. Thus, issues that address one of these conflicts might be 
particularly relevant for the structural impact on voters’ support. Postmaterialist values include 
the desire for having a say, more control and more participation in politics (Inglehart 1977). Since 
transparency can be considered as an important means to these ends, the demand for 
transparency policies should be higher among voters with postmaterialist values. Irrespective of 
their own ideological preferences which will be discussed in the next section, candidates should 
anticipate this demand for transparency in their constituency. 
2.4. Elite Socialization 
While the two former approaches point out motivations to maximise two different kinds of 
utility – enforcing self-interest and attracting voters’ support – elite theorists explain politicians’ 
preferences with their socialization. This elite socialization is specific in two ways (Sullivan et al. 
1993): First, elites, to a large share, are selectively recruited from a strata that is higher educated, 
more affluent, more cosmopolitan, and thus more tolerant than average. Second, after choosing a 
political career, elites undergo a political socialization in an institutional environment with high 
levels of participation, great responsibility, much contact with ideological diversity, and the belief 
in the necessity to find compromise. In both socialization stages social learning (Bandura 1977) 
occurs: Politicians observe, adapt, and replicate behaviour and values of their specific 
environment. 
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According to democratic elitism in its most canonical form, this socialization makes political 
elites highly committed to democratic values and civil liberties, especially more than ordinary 
citizens (Stouffer 1955; Bachrach 1962; McClosky 1964; McClosky and Brill 1983). Elites are seen 
as the ‘carriers of the democratic creed’ (McClosky 1964) that defend democracy against a public 
that is often quite intolerant towards such values. If one agrees with Stiglitz (2002: 29) that ‘in 
democratic societies citizens have a basic right to know, to speak out, and to be informed about 
what the government is doing and why and to debate it’, one should consider governmental 
transparency as such a basic democratic value. Consequentially, democratic elitism would suggest 
that politicians support transparency and intentionally reduce the information asymmetry 
inherent in the policy process although this might be against their own interests.  
Democratic elitism assumes that the similar socialization process of elites leads to homogenous 
preferences. However, it neglects that much of the political socialization happens within political 
parties that are in competition and that vary a lot in ideological convictions. For this reason, the 
social learning experience differs substantially between parties and consequently might lead to 
more heterogeneous elite preferences. So, one could expect that – additional to preexisting 
individual preferences – socialization in liberal parties increases concerns about civil rights and 
liberties or social equality while socialization in conservative parties increases sensibility for 
economic or security issues. Indeed, empirical evidence exists that there is no consensus but 
rather a high heterogeneity among political elites concerning civil liberties (Sniderman et al. 1991; 
Gibson and Duch 1991; Fletcher 1989). Conservative elites are no more approving of civil 
liberties than are conservative citizens but less approving than left-leaning elites and also left-
leaning citizens (Sniderman et al. 1991; Guth and Green 1991). 
In a less canonical form that considers heterogeneity among politicians, elite theory would 
therefore suggest that left-leaning candidates and candidates from left-leaning parties support 
governmental transparency more than their more right-leaning counterparts. Notably, these 
differences stem from strong convictions that are a result of different socialization. As opposed 
to the two former approaches, rational calculus does not play any role here. This motivation 
could thus be analogous to the concept of ‘policy-seeking’ used in the party-competition 
literature (Strøm 1990). 
Recently, governmental transparency is often mentioned in connection to concepts like e-
governance or open government. These terms broadly describe measures that use new 
technologies to increase public participation and collaboration and therewith create a ‘culture of 
transparency’ (Bertot et al. 2010). This is because the concepts are based on basic principles of 
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the internet namely openness, equality, neutrality, knowledge exchange, and collaboration. Heavy 
users of information technologies should be more socialized to these principles and more 
convinced about its potential benefits. As a result they do higher appreciate governmental 
transparency. Indeed, among ordinary citizens, frequent online information seeking increases the 
support for access to public records (Cuillier and Piotrowski 2009). If the occupation with 
information technology and the exposure to its values has a similar effect on political elites, 
politicians that use the internet extensively to interact with citizens should be more supportive to 
governmental transparency. 
2.5. The Complementation of Motivations  
In the previous sections we presented three different theoretical approaches that can potentially 
explain political elites’ preferences: enforcement of self-interest, anticipation of voter preferences, 
and elite socialization. While principal-agent theory suggests low support for transparency 
policies, elite theory and office-seeking provide motivations for high support. Although these 
perspectives are analytically distinct, they can be related to each other. 
First, principal-agent theory and democratic elitism (in their most canonical forms) both compare 
transparency preferences of political elites and citizens, but their predictions are contradictory: 
While principal-agent theory suggests higher transparency preferences among citizens, 
democratic elitism assumes higher support among politicians. The opposing predictions are a 
result of the assumed difference in the driving forces behind elite preferences: self-interest or 
socialization, respectively. Second, both self-interest and anticipation of voter preferences are 
based on rational considerations, i.e., politicians’ considerations on how to maximise their own 
utility. Since transparency preferences are contrary for these two motivations, there is a trade-off. 
A politician must deliberate about whether enforcing self-interest or attracting voters’ support 
will be more beneficial for her utility. Third, elite socialization and office-seeking motivations 
point in the same direction, but the respective reasons to support transparency are completely 
unrelated. Elite socialization points to a sincere intrinsic conviction – a ‘policy-seeking’ 
motivation – while anticipation of voters’ preferences emerges from utility-maximizing 
considerations. 
Instead of asking which of these three motivations is the one that explains politicians’ preferences, 
we consider these motivations to be complementary factors that shape politicians’ preferences 
together. A politician who is only trying to enforce her self-interest, or who is doing everything to 
gain her voters’ favour, or who is acting solely according to higher moral values will rarely appear 
in existing democracies and thus has to be considered as ideal-typical only. Instead, we suggest 
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that most political elites have to prioritise between conflicting motivations that have different 
degrees of influence on their preferences and actions. While self-interest might be a driving force 
for decisions, ideological convictions might limit its extent to a certain set of actions. While a 
politician might want to decide according to her ideological convictions, pragmatic considerations 
might make her deviate from own preferences and anticipate those of her voters. Because of the 
simultaneous occurrence of all three motivations, an absolutely unambiguous and minute 
disentanglement of impacts in the empirical part is impossible. This is especially true for the 
concept of ideology, because both the individual left/right classification and the party 
membership are assumed to have an impact via socialization and also via instrumental 
anticipation of voters’ preferences. We will instead analyse which of the three motivations do 
exist at all and under which conditions one can find them. 
3. Data and Methodology 
For the analysis we use data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), more 
specifically from one of its components, the German Candidate Study.7 The candidate study 
surveys all candidates from the six parties represented in the German Bundestag 2009. The 
population exists of 2,077 candidates. Questionnaires were sent to the candidates via mail starting 
from 4th of November 2009 (that is shortly after the elections), with two reminders after one 
month each. Candidates also had an option to participate online. Altogether 790 complete 
questionnaires could be realised which corresponds to 38% of the population. The realization 
rate varies with party affiliation between 30% for the CSU (Christlich-Soziale Union) and 47% 
for the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen). Furthermore the realization rate is lower for successful 
candidates (32%) than for those who failed to enter the parliament (41%). Taking the different 
number of candidates per party into account, the different realization rates lead to a considerable 
overrepresentation of FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei), Greens and The Left (Die Linke) in the 
sample. With the exception of the Bavarian-only CSU, all parties have a share of about 20%.  
A selection bias between different groups of respondents can often be found in social surveys. 
However, in an analysis of the issue of transparency, the occurrence of a selection bias might be 
especially relevant because the decision to reveal information in a social survey can be considered 
as transparent behaviour itself, although anonymity is guaranteed. Therefore, participation in this 
                                                          
7 C.f. Rattinger et al. (2009). There is similar data from 2005 available, c.f. Gschwend et al. (2005) However, we will 
not use it here for two reasons. First, there is no information about the constituency number, so survey data cannot 
be matched with contextual data. Second, various candidates were surveyed both in 2005 and 2009. For reasons of 
anonymity, however, the data have no panel structure and those candidates cannot be identified. Thus, the issue of 
autocorrelation cannot be addressed. 
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survey is likely to be correlated with the dependent variable, support for transparency policies. 
This means that our sample is probably more supportive for transparency policies than the 
general population of political elites in Germany. On the other hand, this might make the results 
more conservative: If there are any effects in this more homogenous and supportive sample with 
lower variance in transparency support, these effects should be even more prominent in a more 
heterogeneous and less supportive population with higher variance. To control for possible 
biases caused by selection bias, we validate all analyses with two different post-hoc weights: one 
adjusted for party differences among the whole population of candidates, the other adjusted to 
the party composition of the current German Bundestag. The weighted analyses do not differ 
considerably and can be found in table A1 in the online appendix. 
3.1. Dependent Variable: Support for Governmental Transparency 
The dependent variable is an index for support of governmental transparency. There is an item 
set asking for candidates’ attitudes towards several much discussed parliamentarian reforms. 
Three of these items concern transparency. Candidates are asked to indicate their position on a 7-
point scale with labelled extreme points that are: 
(1)  ‘Parliamentary committees should always be held publicly’ to ‘Parliaments have to offer 
the chance for confidential consultation and for coming to a compromise’ 
(2) ‘The negotiations of parliamentary committees should be broadcasted live via electronic 
media’ to ‘The parliamentarian process must not become a media frenzy’ 
(3)  ‘Members of parliament should have the right to unrestricted access to records of the 
ministerial bureaucracy’ to ‘Unrestricted access to records is superfluous or even harmful’ 
The first two items measure what we defined as governmental transparency, an information flow 
from politicians to citizens. Conversely, the third item measures an information flow from 
bureaucrats to politicians. Motivations to indicate support for item three thus might be reverse 
because approval here means increasing politicians’ information level, not reducing their 
informational advantage over citizens. For this reason item three is excluded from the 
transparency support index. 
We conduct a principle component analysis to see whether the two remaining items measure the 
same concept. According to the Kaiser Criterion both items score on a single factor, explaining 
82% of the variance. A reliability check provides a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.78. Both numbers are 
considerably higher than those of an index with all three items. The dependent variable 
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transparency is constructed by the factor scores using regression method.8 A high value on the 
index indicates strong support for governmental transparency. 
One objection to this operationalisation could be that the two items are very specific and might 
only relate to legislative transparency and the work of parliamentary committees. This objection 
is justified, as a higher number and more diverse items would increase reliability. Nevertheless, 
we believe that a general inclination for transparency exists and that candidates that support 
legislative transparency also support transparency in different governmental fields. At least for 
citizens this claim appears to be true, as they show consistent preferences among a wide range of 
transparency items (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007). Furthermore, if candidates for a legislative 
body support legislative transparency, which means they reduce their own informational 
advantage, they should be supportive of transparency of other public agencies that they are not 
related to all the more. Thus, despite the particular nature of the items, the index should allow for 
measuring a general preference for governmental transparency. 
Another problem that always exists in survey research is the social desirability bias. It might be 
especially strong for politicians since they are public persons and supposed to act as role models. 
Political elites will not answer surveys as ingenuously as citizens do, but will partially answer 
strategically according to role expectations. Since transparency can be considered as a democratic 
value, one could argue that there is an upward bias for support for transparency. However, we 
consider this objection as minor. First, absolute anonymity is guaranteed. Second, and more 
important, the items are coded in a way that both extremes can reflect desirable conditions. 
Whether transparency or offering ‘confidential consultation’ and avoiding ‘media frenzy’ are 
considered more desirable depends on individual preferences. For this reason, we consider the 
candidates’ answers to these items as a valid measurement of their real opinion and intention for 
decisions and actions. 
3.2. Independent Variables 
For analytical purposes, the independent variables are distinguished according to the three 
different theoretical approaches to elites’ support for transparency. 
To capture the potential effects of self-interest as suggested by principal-agent theory, we use a 
dummy variable MdB that indicates whether the candidate was successfully elected into the 
                                                          
8 For comparison, we also applied principal factor analysis (instead of principal component analysis) and computed 
factor scores by the Bartlett method (instead of regression method). All possible scores correlate by 1.0. 
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German Bundestag 2009. Furthermore, we will compare transparency preferences among 
candidates with comparable data of citizens. 
To measure the anticipation of voters’ preferences, we create dummies for the type of candidacy9: 
The constituency candidate who only runs for a constituency; the mixed type who runs for a 
constituency but is backed up via party list; and the list candidate who only runs via party list. On 
the contextual level we create an index indicating the existence of postmaterialism values in each 
constituency. Adopting the procedure from Magin, Freitag and Vatter (2009) we use an additive 
index combining a) the z-standardised shares of work force with higher educational degree and b) 
1,000 inhabitants per km². Furthermore the variable closeness is a proxy for the closeness of the 
electoral race in a constituency. It measures the gap in first votes in per cent between the winner 
of a constituency and the closest opponent. 
Socialization effects are measured with dummy variables for each party10 and a variable right that 
indicates candidates’ self-reported assessment of individual ideology on a scale from 1 = very left 
to 10 = very right. Furthermore, a dummy internet indicates when candidates used the internet five 
hours and more for discussing and informing voters about issues during their campaign. 
As controls, we include several demographic variables. There is a dummy for female candidates, a 
variable for age and two dummies for education: Considering the generally high level of education 
among candidates, only politicians with a university degree are considered as having high education, 
those with high school degree (Abitur) have medium education, below is the reference group of low 
education. The dummy GDR indicates socialization in East Germany, defined as being born there 
and being 15 years or older before 1989. Finally, we include a dummy East that relates to the 
location of the current constituency of a candidate. All variables of interest are summarised 
together with the respective expectations in table 1. 
                                                          
9 The type of candidacy is correlated with several other characteristics that might have an impact on candidates’ 
preferences. Wüst et al. (2006) show that candidate types differ e.g. in age, experience, party affiliation, incumbency 
status, succeeding chance, and expected closeness of the race in their constituency. However, we argue that most of 
this confoundedness can be eliminated by the other covariates. 
10 Our design cannot clearly distinguish whether effects of party dummies are caused by political socialization within 
the party or by earlier socialization that might have influenced the selection into the candidate’s party. We alleviate 
this issue by controlling for individual ideology and for demographic characteristics. Furthermore, the effect of party 
dummies might be accounted to majority/minority status of the party. A brief comparison of our data from 2009 
with the earlier wave from 2005 (Gschwend et al. 2005) shows that actually members of the SPD increased their 
transparency support in 2009 when they became opposition party after four years in government. However, we do 
not find a respective decrease when the FDP became governing party in 2009. Furthermore we find strong increases 
among members of the Greens and The Left although their status did not change. This inconclusive pattern suggests 
that majority/minority status is not a dominant explanation. Eventually, we cannot rule out the possibility that part 
of the effect is caused by size of the party, with small parties (FDP, Greens, The Left) being more supportive of 
transparency. 
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Variable Explanation Expected Effect 
Self-Interest    
 MdB Member of German Bundestag (Ref.: Not member) - 
Anticipation of Voters' Preferences  
 Direct Candidate Constituency-only candidate (Ref.: List candidate) + 
 Mixed Type Constituency and list candidate (Ref.: List candidate) + 
 Closeness Gap between winner and runner-up candidate of a 
constituency (in per cent points of first votes; high values = 
small gap) 
+ 
 Postmaterialism Postmaterialism index (Pop. density + share of workforce with 
higher degree)  
+ 
Elite Socialization   
 Left/Right Ideology measurement (High values = right) - 
 Internet 5h or more communication with voters via internet (Ref.: No 
or less than 5h communication via internet) 
+ 
  Party Dummies (Ref.: CDU) + 
Note: The left/right measurement and the party dummies can be considered as measurement of 
anticipated voters’ preferences as well. 
The dependent variable as well as all continuous variables of the analysis are z-standardised for 
the regression models. Therefore, coefficient sizes are straightforward to interpret and easy to 
compare, as a one-unit change in the independent variable always corresponds with a change of 
one standard deviation of the dependent variable. The data of both levels are matched via the 
number of the respective constituency. For pure list-candidates which do not campaign via a 
constituency we determine the local party branch the candidate belongs to and match the 
respective constituency. Descriptive statistics of all variables can be found in table A2 in the 
online appendix. 
3.3. Analysis and Models 
The data in the analysis have a hierarchical structure: candidates nested in constituencies. 
Ignoring the fact that individual observations nested in one common unit on the higher level are 
in general not completely independent leads to an underestimation of standard errors (Snijders 
and Bosker 1999; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). For this reason, multilevel analysis is usually an 
appropriate way to address this kind of data. However, an empirical look at the variance 
components of the data reveals that a likelihood-ratio test and a Lagrange multiplier test both fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that the variance between constituencies is zero (Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2008). In this data, the variance on the candidate level i.e. within one constituency is 
much higher than the variance between different constituencies. The independency assumption 
for observations on the individual level seems not to be violated here. For reasons of parsimony, 
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we therefore decide to use ordinary least square estimation. 11 Nevertheless, to obtain robust 
variance estimates, we take possible effects into account and adjust standard errors for within-
cluster correlation, also known as Huber-White-Sandwich Estimators (Williams 2000). These 
standard errors are also robust against minor deviations from the OLS assumptions. 
The empirical approach consists of two steps. In the first step we estimate OLS regressions 
covering five different blocks of independent variables. The first block only consists of 
demographic variables serving as controls. The second model adds the variable that indicates self-
interest motivations. The third block adds the variables that measure anticipation of voter 
preferences. In model four we include variables that measure individual socialization effects. In 
the fifth model we include party dummies. Since all variables are z-standardised, effect sizes can 
easily be compared. 
After estimating the main model with all relevant variables, in a second step we include 
interaction terms12. This is necessary because effects of variables of individual ideology and party 
dummies might be caused by socialization motivations, or the instrumental anticipation of voter 
preferences, or both. To further examine the elusive effect of anticipation of voter preferences, 
we calculate all possible interaction effects between variables that measure dependency on voters’ 
support (candidate type, closeness of the race) and voters’ preferences for transparency policies 
(postmaterialism index, left/right measure, party membership). To check the robustness, we 
extend the final main model from the first step by each of these interactions individually and test 
if it can improve the model significantly via chi-squared test. For those interactions that improve 
the main model, we provide the marginal effects. 
  
                                                          
11 To validate the findings, we also estimate random intercept multilevel models. The results are basically the same 
and can be found in table A1 in the online appendix. We furthermore run a series of regression diagnostics 
considering outliers and influential cases, normal distribution of residuals, homogeneity of variance, multicollinearity 
and model specification. The assumptions of OLS regression are mostly met. 
12  Although there is no significant variance component between constituencies, cross-level-interactions can be 
included in the model if strong theoretical considerations indicate its existence (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 258). 
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4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Results 
Figure 2: Violin Plots of the Transparency Items 
 
Note: High values on the x-axis indicate high support for governmental transparency. The inner part 
displays an ordinary box plot. The outer part is a kernel density estimation with a bandwidth of 0.8, 
mirrored along the box plot. 
In this section we provide descriptive statistics of the dataset. Figure 2 displays violin plots 
(Hintze and Nelson 1998), a combination of box plot and kernel density function, of the three 
transparency-related items in the dataset. The first two constitute the dependent variable. Support 
for publicly held committees and broadcasting of committee work both receive a median support 
of 4, which is at the centre of the scale. Support for the latter one is slightly lower and has 
considerable density in the strongly rejecting range of the scale. Still, both items have a high 
variance and utilize the whole range of the scale. The high variance indicates that there is no 
consensus for support for transparency among German political elites. Opinions on this question 
differ considerably. On the other hand, support for members of parliament having access to 
records of the ministerial bureaucracy is substantially higher and the variance is distinctly lower. It 
seems that political elites are indeed much more in favour of transparency when they can gain an 
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informational advantage themselves, as opposed to revealing their own information to the public. 
This can be considered as first evidence for the existence of self-interest motivations. 
Furthermore, it underlines the decision to exclude this item in the governmental transparency 
index because it seems to measure a different concept. 
Figure 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Transparency Support for Several Subgroups in the Sample 
 
Note: The dots represent the average transparency support for the specific group. The lines depict the 
mean ± one standard deviation. The number in brackets indicates the number of observations. Reading 
Example: 143 candidates from the CDU have a mean transparency support of about -0.7, the standard 
deviation reaches from about -1.5 to 0.1. Continuous variables have been dichotomised at the median for 
this figure.  
In Figure 3 we show how support for governmental transparency is distributed among several 
subgroups of political elites. First of all, there are only small differences between different 
demographic groups. Younger and lower educated candidates show slightly higher transparency 
support, while there are basically no differences regarding gender, region of constituency, and 
place of socialization. A one-sample mean-comparison test shows that support among members 
of the German Bundestag is significantly lower than among unelected candidates (p<0.001). This 
finding supports the idea of self-interest motivations proposed by principal-agent theory. 
Concerning office-seeking effects, we find mixed evidence. There is significant higher support 
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among pure constituency candidates compared to both other types (p<0.001), whereas there is 
no significant difference between the two latter types. However, whether a constituency is 
materialistic or postmaterialistic and whether the electoral race is open or close has only a 
marginal impact on candidates’ transparency support. Concerning socialization effects, we find 
only slightly higher support among candidates that use the internet to be in contact with voters 
compared to those who do not (p=0.029). The effects of ideology are however especially strong. 
On the individual level, the left-leaning candidates in the sample score about 0.5 units higher on 
the transparency index than the right-leaning candidates (p<0.001). On the party level, we find 
the highest impact of all subgroups in the descriptive analysis. There is low support among 
candidates of the two conservative parties, slightly below average support among candidates of 
FDP and SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and high support among members of 
the Greens and The Left. Nevertheless, there is still substantial variance within each party. 
In summary, the descriptive statistics show that support for governmental transparency is at a 
medium level and that there is high heterogeneity among German political elites. A comparison 
with citizens’ level of support is difficult, as the data do not provide the same items for ordinary 
citizens and comparable data asking for transparency preferences are rarely available. However, 
according to a representative survey, 88% of the German population support the ‘disclosure of 
non-personal political data’ by public authorities (Forsa 2010). Among the U.S. citizenry, support 
for governmental transparency is also high (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007; Association of 
Government Accountants 2010). Although they are not perfectly comparable, these findings 
indicate that citizens might have higher preferences for transparency than elites. It also raises 
doubts about whether the democratic elitism’s claim that political elites show higher support for 
democratic values and civil liberties is valid concerning the issue of governmental transparency. 
Instead, the higher support among citizens supports the idea of self-interest motivations. In 
addition, the descriptive results underline the strong impact of ideology and thus the importance 
of socialization effects. They also support the idea of anticipation of voter preferences. Since the 
variables are highly intercorrelated, however, we have to draw on multivariate analyses to try to 
disentangle effects. 
4.2. Multiple Regression Results 
Figure 4 shows the results of the OLS regression in graphical form. In model 1 we include six 
demographic characteristics of the candidates as control variables.13 Age and high education have 
                                                          
13 In a trial run, we also included a variable “experience in politics” (candidate’s aggregated years of incumbency in 
different public offices) and dummies for occupational group. However we do not include these variables here 
because they do not have significant impact but reduce the number of observations substantially. 
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a significant negative effect on transparency support. While a change of one standard deviation 
(11.44 years) in age changes transparency support by only 0.1 standard deviations, the impact of 
high education is more than twice as strong. However, the impact of candidacy in the eastern part 
of Germany and socialization in the former GDR are neither significant nor of any substantial 
strength. 14  Considering adjusted R², the demographic variables together can only explain a 
modest share of the total variance.  
In model 2 we include a variable that should measure self-interest motivations. In line with our 
expectations, members of the German Bundestag support transparency policies significantly less 
than unelected candidates. This effect is stronger than that of any demographic control variable. 
Although adjusted R² triples, it remains on a rather low level. 
In model 3 we add four variables that measure motivations of anticipated voters’ preferences. 
Both the direct constituency candidate and the mixed type who runs for a constituency and on a 
party list show substantially more support for transparency than the reference group, the pure list 
candidate. In fact, direct candidates show over half a standard deviation more support for 
transparency than list candidates. This is the strongest impact of all variables so far and indicates 
that the degree of dependency on voters’ electoral support increases candidate’s support for 
transparency. The impact of the closeness of the electoral race and the degree of postmaterialist 
values in a candidates’ constituency, however, have only a marginal impact. Including the 
variables of anticipated voters’ preferences again triples the value of adjusted R². Although the 
postmaterialism index and the closeness of election measure are not significant individually, the 
four variables indicating this theoretical motivation are jointly significant (Chi²=10.65). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
14 Since the sample in this study is not representative, in a strict sense inference statistic is not valid here. For this 
reason significance values should not be overinterpreted and more attention should be paid to the strength of 
coefficients. 
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Figure 4: Regression Main Results 
Note: Although looking similar to figure 3, figure 4 provides inference statistical results. The dots represent the regression coefficient for the specific variable. The 
lines depict the 95% confidence interval (one-sided test) for the specific estimation. Thus, if the line does not intersect the zero-line, there is a significant effect at a 
5% level. Reading Example: In model 2, being member of the German Bundestag has a coefficient of about -0.3 with a confidence interval reaching from about -0.4 to 
-0.2. Since the confidence interval does not intersect the zero-line, the effect is significant at a 5% level. 
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To arrive at model 4, in the next step we add two variables that measure motivations stemming 
from individual socialization: a measure of ideology on a left/right dimension and a dummy 
whether the candidate uses the internet for contact with voters. Although internet usage had an 
impact in the descriptive part, after controlling for further variables, there is no substantial effect 
left. Quite on the contrary, the impact of individual ideology is particularly strong and highly 
significant. One standard deviation (2.29 units) towards a more right-leaning attitude decreases 
support for governmental transparency by about 0.35 units. After including the ideology measure 
the adjusted R² increases by about 0.1. But including this variable also decreases the impact of the 
candidacy mode and being member of the German Bundestag, which can be explained through 
the correlation of these variables with ideology. Many of the constituency candidates belong to 
the left-leaning parties, The Left and the Greens, while many members of the German Bundestag 
belong to the more conservative parties, CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) and SPD. 
Interestingly, however, the effects of age and being candidate in a constituency in the eastern part 
of Germany gain in strength after including the ideology measure. 
In model 5 we finally include party dummies to control for the impact of party socialization. In 
line with our expectations, membership in the left-leaning parties (The Left and the Greens) has 
the strongest positive effect on transparency support. Furthermore, the FDP, the liberal party, 
has a significantly positive effect. The FDP is usually considered more right-leaning than the 
SPD, but civil liberties are usually considered as a central issue of liberal parties. Thus, this result 
appears intuitive as well. Members of the SPD support transparency still considerably more than 
candidates of the CDU or CSU, but the effect is not significant. The impact of party membership 
on support for governmental transparency is extraordinarily strong. This becomes apparent in 
several ways: First, the coefficients, in particular those of the Greens and The Left, are the 
highest among all variables and all models. On average, support for transparency is one standard 
deviation higher for a member of The Left compared to a member of the CDU. Second, after 
including the party dummies, those variables that measure other motivations lose considerably in 
impact. Third, even though there are already many variables in the model, the party dummies are 
still able to increase adjusted R² to a value of 0.236. The (regular) R² value of 0.256 tells us that 
about 25% of the variance in transparency preferences can be explained by this final main model. 
In this model, apart from party membership only age has a significant (negative) impact on 
transparency preferences. The only other variable that has a similar (negative) effect – although it 
is statistically insignificant – is running for a constituency in the eastern part of Germany. All 
other variables that showed significant impact in previous steps become marginal after including 
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the party dummies. This is particularly true for the individual left/right ideology and the 
candidacy mode that appeared to have a substantial impact before. At least partially, this loss of 
impact can be explained by the high correlation between party membership and ideology and 
party composition of the different candidate types. 
However, the idea of other motivations than party socialization should not be abandoned that 
quickly. First, left-leaning parties’ candidates’ support for transparency might not only be 
motivated by party socialization, but also by anticipating that these parties’ voters have stronger 
preferences for transparency policies. Second, it might be the case that we observe anticipation 
motivations only in some specific constellations, for instance when a candidate is both highly 
dependent on voters’ support and these voters are strongly in favour of governmental 
transparency at the same time. For this reason, interaction effects are calculated as explained in 
the methodological section to check the robustness of the main model. 
Of all possible interactions, four specific ones improve the final main model significantly. The 
respective marginal effects are depicted in Figure 5. The upper left figure shows the difference in 
transparency support between a direct candidate and a list candidate conditioned on ten different 
levels of individual ideology. It becomes apparent that for left-leaning candidates, e.g. candidates 
scoring 1-3 on the left/right scale, there is a significant positive effect of direct candidacy on 
transparency support.15 On the other hand, there is no difference between candidacy modes for 
more right-leaning candidates (with the exception of two right-extreme candidates scoring on 10). 
These findings show that direct candidates, for instrumental reasons, consider their voters’ 
preferences more than list candidates. To (left-leaning) voters’ favourable transparency 
preferences, direct candidates respond stronger than list candidates. This difference is not 
existent for candidates whose (right-leaning) voters consider transparency as a comparably minor 
issue. 
                                                          
15 One could argue that these findings on the tails of the distribution are based on a low number of observations. 
However, inflated confidence intervals pay respect to the low n on the tails 
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Figure 5: Marginal Effects on Support for Transparency 
 
Note: The y-axis depicts the marginal change in transparency support for a change of one unit of the 
variable indicated by the particular headline conditional on different values of the moderating variable on 
the x-axis. The grey area illustrates a 95% confidence interval (one-sided test). Thus, if the shaded area 
does not intersect the zero-line, there is a significant effect at a 5% level. Reading example: Direct 
candidacy has a positive impact of almost 0.5 points on transparency support, significant at the 5% level. 
There is no significant impact of direct candidacy for moderate or right-leaning candidates. 
We find a similar pattern for the impact of postmaterialism and closeness of the electoral race. 
Both have a significant positive effect on transparency support for left-leaning candidates, but 
not for right-leaning ones. However, effect sizes are less substantial than those for direct 
candidacy. Surprisingly, for postmaterialism we find a significant negative effect for strongly 
right-leaning candidates. The bottom right figure shows how individual ideology affects 
transparency support within different parties. In the main model, individual ideology lost its 
significance once partisan membership is controlled for. Now the individual ideology has an 
effect in addition to party ideology, but only for the more left-leaning parties. Within the SPD, 
the Greens and The Left, left-leaning candidates show higher support for transparency than their 
more right-leaning party colleagues. Within the more right-leaning parties individual ideology has 
no further impact on transparency support. 
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After including party dummies in the main model, all variables that measure anticipation of 
voters’ preferences lose impact on transparency support. The analysis of interaction effects 
illustrates the more sophisticated interplay between the variables. While being more dependent 
on voters’ support (constituency candidate, close electoral race) alone does not affect candidates’ 
transparency support, there is an effect in combination with strong voter preferences for 
transparency (left-leaning candidates). Apparently, candidates are aware of heterogeneous voter 
preferences. The combination of two characteristics that measure high voter preferences for 
transparency (postmaterialism + left-leaning ideology; left-leaning ideology + left-leaning party) 
also increases transparency support. Although there are a number of non-significant interaction 
terms, both findings emphasise the existence of a motivation that is driven by the anticipation of 
voters’ preferences. 
5. Conclusion 
Our analysis reveals that neither principal-agent theory nor democratic elitism in its most 
canonical forms can explain politicians’ preferences. We find neither homogeneous support for 
transparency policies nor a uniform rejection among candidates for the German Bundestag. 
Instead, the high variance in preferences among elites suggests that governmental transparency 
policies are clearly not a trivial issue to decide on. 
By far the strongest predictor for differences in support for transparency policies is party 
membership. Since we control whether a candidate is member of the German Bundestag, we can 
eliminate the possibility that this party effect is only existent because each party has a different 
share of politicians in incumbent positions. Thus we can rule out that party differences are 
motivated by instrumental reasons only. Although we are not able to separate the amount of the 
party effect that is due to socialization from that which is due to the anticipation of voter 
preferences, we can still find evidence that both motivations exist. First, the impact of direct 
candidacy, postmaterialist values among the electorate, and closeness of the electoral race are 
existent for left-leaning candidates but not for right-leaning candidates, which speaks for the 
existence of anticipation of voters’ preferences. Second, the fact that transparency policies are not 
uniformly rejected, the nearly significant effect of left-leaning ideology on the individual level, 
and in particular the effect of individual ideology within the more left-leaning parties speaks for 
the existence of socialization effects. Furthermore, we find evidence for the existence of self-
interest motivations. The overall mediocre transparency support, the lower response rate among 
successful candidates and the higher support for a policy change that increases the information 
level of candidates themselves can be considered as such.  
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Our analysis further reveals that there are some variables that are often said to affect preferences 
but that do not have any impact on transparency support. Neither gender nor education or being 
socialised in the former GDR has any impact on transparency preferences. Although it is often 
associated with transparency, internet-usage has no impact. Additionally, we find only weak 
evidence for any structural impact of candidates’ constituencies. Postmaterialism and closeness of 
the electoral race show only weak impact in interaction with ideology. Also, there is no difference 
at all between candidates running for a constituency in the east or in the west. Apparently, with 
the exception of age, demographic characteristics and features of candidates’ constituencies can 
mostly be ignored. Party membership, individual ideology and candidacy mode are able to predict 
essential parts of elite preferences.  
What are the implications of these results? At the moment, there is no consensus about 
governmental transparency among political elites in Germany. So far, the issue was mainly 
pushed onto the agenda by left-leaning parties. The results imply, however, that governmental 
transparency has the potential to become a major issue in the future: First, if the demand for 
transparent governmental work rises among citizens, the anticipation of voters’ preferences will 
lead to higher support among political elites. Second, if the effect of age is interpreted as a cohort 
effect, with younger cohorts of elites being more supportive of transparency, proponents of 
transparency will slowly replace older and more sceptical colleagues. On the other hand, there 
might also be some obstacles on the way to transparent governments: There is (non-significant) 
indication that members of the parliament are less supportive of transparency than unsuccessful 
candidates. Furthermore, theoretical considerations by Bowler et al. (2006) (which would require 
longitudinal data to test) suggest that candidates of parties in government are less supportive of 
transparency than candidates of the opposition. Thus, those elites that have more power to adapt 
transparency policies are less likely to do so. Furthermore, one should bear in mind that under 
certain conditions higher transparency and accountability can also have adverse effects (Malesky 
et al. 2012; Cross 2013) 
The contribution of this work is twofold. First, it is the first to investigate the current topic of 
governmental transparency from the perspective of political elites. The analyses show that 
political elites in Germany are neither selfish homines oeconomici nor unprincipled turncoats or 
benevolent upholders of moral standards. Instead, we find a complex connection of different 
motivations. Second, the article contributes valuable new insights to the literature of policy 
representation. Instead of focusing on public opinion, we developed a framework to explain elite 
preferences. We believe that this theoretical framework of complementing motivations can be 
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useful for the analysis of further elite preferences as well. While there are some interesting and 
relevant findings, further research and better data are necessary to better understand politicians’ 
motivations to support governmental transparency and to disentangle those effects that remain 
ambiguous. Longitudinal data could be helpful for observing how preferences react to changes of 
the institutional position of political elites. Comparable survey data of citizens could allow for 
testing propositions of principal-agent theory and democratic elitism that are related to 
differences between elites’ and citizens’ preferences. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Comparison of Different Model Estimations 
  OLS Multi-Level 
Weight 
Bundestag 
Weight 
Population 
Age -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.142*** -0.137*** 
 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) 
     Female -0.040 -0.045 -0.056 -0.042 
 
(0.071) (0.074) (0.078) (0.071) 
     Med Education -0.098 -0.083 0.035 -0.065 
 
(0.118) (0.122) (0.122) (0.116) 
     High Education -0.085 -0.077 -0.037 -0.068 
 
(0.089) (0.103) (0.090) (0.088) 
     GDR 0.052 0.046 0.105 0.074 
 
(0.129) (0.130) (0.138) (0.129) 
     East -0.153 -0.146 -0.127 -0.147 
 
(0.100) (0.117) (0.107) (0.101) 
     MdB -0.101 -0.098 -0.059 -0.094 
 
(0.093) (0.092) (0.094) (0.092) 
     Direct Candidate 0.077 0.069 0.060 0.076 
 
(0.101) (0.111) (0.109) (0.101) 
     Mixed Type -0.004 -0.007 -0.027 -0.004 
 
(0.095) (0.097) (0.097) (0.095) 
     Closeness 0.022 0.024 -0.003 0.017 
 
(0.039) (0.037) (0.043) (0.039) 
     Postmaterialism 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.005 
 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) 
     Internet -0.005 -0.010 -0.013 -0.004 
 
(0.082) (0.080) (0.085) (0.082) 
     Left/Right -0.105 -0.107* -0.060 -0.095 
 
(0.072) (0.063) (0.073) (0.071) 
     CSU 0.055 0.090 0.021 0.052 
 
(0.164) (0.209) (0.167) (0.164) 
     FDP 0.313* 0.313** 0.339** 0.317* 
 
(0.127) (0.120) (0.126) (0.127) 
     SPD 0.235 0.240 0.310* 0.251 
 
(0.158) (0.149) (0.156) (0.156) 
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Greens 0.786*** 0.782*** 0.866*** 0.801*** 
 
(0.161) (0.152) (0.163) (0.161) 
     The Left 1.087*** 1.090*** 1.194*** 1.109*** 
 
(0.198) (0.189) (0.198) (0.196) 
     Constant -0.365** -0.366* -0.475*** -0.398** 
 
(0.140) (0.146) (0.136) (0.138) 
Observations 703 703 703 703 
Adjusted R² 0.236   0.224 0.237 
Note: All variables are z-standardised. Values in brackets are standard errors. 
 
Table A2: Summary Statistics of All Variables 
Variable N Mean Sd Min Max 
      Public Committees 770 4.11 2.01 1.00 7.00 
Broadcasting of Committees 769 3.69 2.03 1.00 7.00 
Access to Records 769 5.55 1.55 1.00 7.00 
      Age 762 46.36 11.44 19.00 76.00 
Female 773 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Edu_Low 772 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Edu_Medium 772 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Edu_High 772 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
GDR 790 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
East 790 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 
      MdB 790 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
      Constituency Candidacy 790 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
List Candidacy 790 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Mixed Mode 790 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Closeness 783 -0.13 0.10 -0.53 0.00 
Postmaterialism 790 0.00 1.00 -1.16 5.42 
      Internet 760 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Left/Right 760 4.71 2.29 1.00 10.00 
      CDU 790 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
CSU 790 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
FDP 790 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
SPD 790 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Greens 790 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
The Left 790 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
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Paper 3 
 
Online and Open-Minded  
Cross-Country and Panel Analyses of the Impact of Internet Usage on 
Liberal Attitudes 
Christian Weyand  
 
Abstract. Does internet usage promote liberal attitudes? From our theoretical perspective, 
internet effects differ from those of traditional media: Via different technical mechanisms the 
internet changes who can broadcast and control information and it connects people with very 
different backgrounds. This leads to a more liberal agenda and an atmosphere of higher openness 
and tolerance. Our claim is tested with data from 57 countries of the World Values Survey. Multi-
level analyses reveal that internet usage has a significant positive effect on liberal attitudes in 
many countries. The more liberal a country is, the stronger is the effect. In contrast, television 
viewing tends to have no effect in liberal countries and is even related with more conservative 
attitudes in conservative countries. Similar effects can be reproduced with fixed effects models 
and panel data from the Dutch LISS panel. Therefore, the effects are not caused by unobserved 
heterogeneity that would explain both internet usage and liberal attitudes. In conclusion, internet 
effects clearly differ from traditional media effects and the further diffusion of internet 
technology has the potential to increase open-mindedness. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we ask whether internet usage promotes liberal attitudes. In this context we use the 
term liberalism to describe a higher acceptance of individual rights and freedom, tolerance 
towards diversity and openness to change. The internet revolutionizes how people receive 
information: Access to digital information is comparatively easy and cheap, and it can be accessed 
independent of both broadcasting time and location of the information carrier and the 
information receiver. The mass media that create content and intermediate information are also 
subject to substantial changes: Information broadcasting is not restricted to big agencies 
anymore. In principle, the internet gives everyone the possibility to create own content and reach 
a huge audience. Especially in countries with low liberalism and authoritarian structures, the 
internet leads to a substantial increase in information availability and communication 
opportunities. As a result, the internet creates by far the closest approximation to a situation 
where everyone can instantly access all existing information and communicate with every existing 
individual. 
Scholars from different fields argue that people’s attitudes and their perception of the world is 
strongly influenced by the information and the symbolic environment they are presented with via 
media (Bandura 1986; Besley 2008; Entman 1989; Gerbner 1969; Inglehart and Baker 2000). 
Substantial changes in the media landscape and the way people process information should 
therefore somehow affect people’s attitudes. For example, one might expect that a girl from Iran 
who watches all seasons of ‘Sex and the City’ via foreign internet stream will have different 
opinions about marriage, sexuality, or gender roles than an otherwise similar girl from Iran who 
only watches content produced by the ‘Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting’1. Along the same 
lines, a person who watches a stereotypical portrayal of homosexuals in the mainstream media 
should have different attitudes than a person who informs herself using an internet platform of 
an association of homosexuals. 
Despite these intuitively reasonable expectations, surprisingly little research has been conducted 
on the internet’s impact on people’s attitudes towards political and social issues. There are some 
studies on the internet’s impact on political participation (Norris 2002; Shah et al. 2005; Xenos 
and Moy 2007), voting (Tolbert and Mcneal 2003) and democratic norms (Chu and Nevitte 2010; 
Nisbet, Stoycheff, and Pearce 2012). Closest to our analyses of the impact on liberal attitudes are 
                                                          
1 The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is the main governmental broadcasting agency. Freedom of 
expression and dissemination of ideas by the IRIB has to be in line with Islamic laws and national interests (Pahlavi 
2012). The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran furthermore prohibits the establishment of private 
broadcasting agencies. 
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Norris and Inglehart (2009) and Besley (2008). With the exception of the latter one, however, 
these studies do not differentiate between internet, television and newspaper, but assume a 
uniform positive impact of media usage on liberal attitudes. And while Besley does distinguish 
between different media, he merely analyzes their impact on the more abstract concept of values 
and furthermore restricts his analysis to European countries. 
In the theoretical part of this paper we argue that the choice and the intensity of different kinds 
of media consumption have an impact on social and moral attitudes. More specifically, internet 
usage should lead to more liberal attitudes because its technical features translate into social 
mechanisms that do not exist for traditional media: (1) The decentralized architecture of the 
internet changes the government’s ability to control information flows. In comparison to a 
system with traditional big broadcasting agencies, censorship is much more difficult to enforce. 
(2) The decreasing costs of information broadcasting lead to a) more (non-corporate) 
broadcasters and b) to less commercial pressure on professional media. (3) The possibility to 
state opinions anonymously can terminate a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann 1974). (4) The 
internet facilitates communication and exchange between very different people from diverse 
backgrounds. In the sense of the (parasocial) contact hypothesis (Allport 1954; Schiappa, Gregg, 
and Hewes 2005), this can reduce prejudices. Furthermore, it can create bridging social capital 
(Putnam 2000). (5) The required technical knowledge and innovation affinity for using the 
internet implies a younger and better educated audience. Taken together, this should lead to a 
more liberal agenda and a more liberal framing of content on the internet and create an 
atmosphere of higher openness and tolerance. 
To validate this claim empirically, two analyses with different datasets are conducted. The first 
analysis draws on data of 57 countries from the World Values Survey (WVS). This allows for 
testing the effect of internet usage on a large number of values and in very different country 
contexts. To address the hierarchical nature of the data, multi-level analyses are conducted. 
Controlling for socio-demographic variables excludes the possibility that a positive effect of 
internet usage on liberal attitudes exists because on average, internet users are younger, better 
educated and live in countries with high internet penetration, characteristics that are positively 
correlated with liberal attitudes as well. The second analysis draws on data of the Dutch 
Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS). Fixed effects models with panel data 
allow for overcoming some limitations of the cross-sectional data. In particular, they control for 
all unobserved characteristics that are constant over time, which substantially reduces the 
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probability of a mere selection effect. Although a survey approach cannot ensure a causal link, it 
is the only feasibly way to answer the research question. 
The results from the WVS show that internet usage has a positive effect on liberal attitudes in 
many countries. Conversely, there is hardly any effect for television, and where it exists, it is often 
negative. Interactions of media effects with the average liberalism of a country show a uniform 
pattern. In liberal countries, both internet and television consumption have a positive effect on 
liberal attitudes, but the effect of internet is much stronger. In conservative countries, the effect 
of internet is small and positive, but not significant. Television, however, has a significant 
negative effect on liberal attitudes. This might be because television in conservative societies is 
under pressure from public, religious, and commercial interests; pressure much less applicable to 
internet services. The panel analysis with the LISS data from the Netherlands mirrors the WVS 
findings. While there are significant positive internet effects in the fixed effects models, there are 
no significant effects for television.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The theoretical section is segmented into 
three subsections: Section 2.1 gives a short definition of the concept of liberalism. Section 2.2 
elaborates on how media effect theories explain the impact of traditional media. In section 2.3, 
we explain why the internet has a different impact than traditional media. In section 3, we briefly 
explain the research strategy. Section 4 presents the results from the World Values Survey data. 
Section 5 shows the results of the panel analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Argument 
2.1. The Concept of Liberalism 
The term liberalism is not an unambiguous one. In this paper we use it as a measure of degree of 
peoples’ acceptance of individual rights and freedom, their tolerance towards diversity and their 
openness to change. It stands in contrast to conservatism, the preference of retention of existing 
social institutions, and the compliance with traditional norms and values. This understanding of 
liberalism also corresponds to what can be labeled as progressive, ‘classical liberalism’ (Janda 
1980), or ‘libertarianism’ (Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi 1998). Regarding a two-dimensional ideology 
space with a socio-economic dimension and a social-moral one (Janda 1980; Lipset and Rokkan 
1967; Weisberg and Rusk 1970), our definition of liberalism corresponds with the latter 
dimension. Conversely, this means that peoples’ attitude towards economic equality and the 
degree of governmental interventions into the market will not be of any interest here.  
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Classical liberalism can be related to other scientific concepts such as basic social values 
(Schwartz 1992) and postmaterialism (Inglehart 1977). Actually, Barnea and Schwartz (1998) and 
Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione (2010) show that liberal issues like civil liberties and 
acceptance of immigrants can be explained well by the values universalism, self-direction, 
benevolence, and –to some lesser extent – stimulation. Also, Inglehart acknowledges that at the 
end of the day, postmaterialism, liberal attitudes, and related concepts are only different 
terminologies that all emphasize human choice and autonomy over conformity and discipline 
(Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann 2003:342). 
The subjects under scrutiny in the empirical analyses are attitudes towards such issues as same-
sex marriage, euthanasia, foreign people, religion, single parentship, or whether men make better 
politicians than women. Although these attitudes apply to a number of specific and diverse 
issues, we expect all of them to belong to the same underlying concept of liberalism. Thus, a 
person that supports same-sex marriage, for instance, should be much more likely to hold a 
positive attitude towards immigrants than a person that believes that only a man and a woman 
should be allowed to marry. This is because basic characteristics of liberalism like openness, 
willingness to change, tolerance, or acceptance of different lifestyles are all facilitated by the same 
character traits which are high self-esteem, low anxiety, and a positive attitude towards human 
nature (Barnea and Schwartz 1998). In consequence, for our theoretical argument this means that 
internet usage should have a similar effect on a diverse array of attitudes, because they are all 
based on the same underlying dimension of liberalism. 
2.2. Media Effects Theories: How Media Affect People 
Media effects theories are a class of related theories that ask, broadly speaking, how media usage 
affects peoples’ attitudes and behavior. Although originally associated with communication 
research, media effects theories have a large overlap with different social sciences because they 
study the impact on an array of issues as diverse as violent behavior, child development, political 
participation, purchasing decisions, or body image concerns.  
Given the ubiquity of media and their quasi-monopoly over the presentation of various kinds of 
information, a reasonable observer might conclude that media exposure has tremendous political 
and social consequences (Bartels 1993:267). However, for a long time, there was a broad 
consensus that media only have “minimal consequences” (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Klapper 
1960). The proposers of minimal effects mostly refer to the observation of relatively stable voter 
preferences during the election year despite heavy media campaigning (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). As they assume that audiences screen out 
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those pieces of information that are not in line with their own preferences and that media 
consumers furthermore have only little attention and understanding, the authors from this period 
conclude that media messages merely tend to reinforce existing political preferences (Entman 
1989). However, media effects regained scholarly attention some decades later when researchers 
began to explain underlying psychological mechanisms of media effects (Bandura 1986, 2009), 
developed specific models like agenda setting, framing and priming (Scheufele and Tewksbury 
2007) that explain how media affect the audience, and measured patterns of media images and 
messages and how this content is cultivated into certain values and worldviews (Gerbner 1969). 
The psychosocial foundation of media effects can be explained with the mechanisms of social 
cognitive theory (Bandura 1986). Traditional learning theories focus on learning from the 
feedback of one’s own actions. However, “virtually all behavioral, cognitive, and affective 
learning from direct experience can [also] be achieved vicariously by observing [other] people’s 
actions and its consequences for them” (Bandura 2009:98). This social learning can either occur 
from the immediate social environment but also from models of the symbolic environment of 
mass media (Bandura 2009:97-98). While individuals’ direct experience from their physical and 
social environment is very restricted to what they encounter during their daily routines, the 
expansion of information and communication technology makes the symbolic environment 
ubiquitous. Furthermore, symbolic models with information about human values, styles of 
thinking, and behavioral patterns can be transmitted simultaneously to countless people in widely 
dispersed locations. In consequence, the social construction of reality and public opinion might 
be influenced more by the media than by anything else. 
Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) outline three main mechanisms how media can affect peoples’ 
attitudes. First, Agenda Setting Theory (McCombs and Shaw 1972) argues that media can 
strongly influence the salience and the ‘felt importance’ of an issue on the public agenda by the 
frequency and positioning of the respective issues. Cohen (1963:13) encapsulates the idea: Media 
“may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about.” Second, priming can be considered as a 
temporal extension to the agenda setting model (Iyengar and Kinder 1987): By influencing the 
salience of issues, media also set benchmarks for evaluating and judging certain issues. Third, 
framing describes the idea that by emphasizing certain aspects or considerations, by the wording 
or mode of presentation and the way of characterization of a specific news, media have an impact 
of how an issue is understood and evaluated by the audience (Scheufele 1999). By embedding 
120 
 
news and information in a subjective framing, framing effects have an affective and normative 
component. 
Empirical Findings  
A large extent of empirical research on media content and media effects has been conducted 
along the lines of Cultivation Theory (Gerbner 1969). This theory argues that the consumption of 
mass media – most prominently television – leads to a subtle ‘cultivation’ of values and 
worldviews that are dominant in the media content. “Despite obvious surface-level differences 
across genres and program types, deeper analysis often shows that surprisingly similar and 
complementary images of society, consistent ideologies, and stable accounts of ‘facts’ of life cut 
across many different types of programs” (Morgan, Shanahan, and Signorielli 2009:36). This is 
because the high costs of production and distribution of content lead to a small number of 
broadcasters and to the commercial necessity to satisfy the needs of a large and thus necessarily 
heterogeneous audience. Therefore, TV messages have to be designed to disturb as few viewers 
as possible, confirm rather than challenge existing views, and steer a “middle course” (ibid.:40) to 
serve the mainstream. As a result, the mainstream is biased to the right on political issues 
(Gerbner et al. 1982). In particular, research shows that cultivation theory can explain television’s 
conservative impact on a number of social issues. 
In a meta-analysis, Smith and Granados (2009) find that existing research on gender-roles on 
television shows that women are often portrayed in traditional or oversexualized roles. Among 
the audience, this leads to higher agreement to sexual stereotypes and to sex typing, i.e. acting in 
accordance to the norms of one’s gender. In effect, a patriarchal worldview is conserved. 
Similarily, regarding traditional family values, Signorelli (1991) found that adolescents who watch 
more television are more likely to want to get married, to stay married with the same person for 
their whole life, and to have children. 
Concerning xenophobia, Mastro’s (2009) review shows that ethnic minorities are 
underrepresented in US television in most genres and are often portrayed as lower-status 
individuals or less successful persons. They are, however, overrepresented in crime content and 
as criminals. As a result, the majority group often cultivates these stereotypes from the symbol 
environment. It might even be the case that this media content has an impact on the self-concept 
of the minority group. Similarly, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2007) show that the more 
frequently newspapers report about immigration related topics, the higher is the electoral 
popularity of anti-immigrant parties.  
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Television consumption also has an impact on highly moral-driven and religion-related attitudes. 
Gerbner et al. (1982) show that stronger TV consumption leads to more conservative attitudes 
towards homosexuality, abortion and legalization of marihuana. The cultivation differential, the 
difference between light and heavy viewers, is especially strong for liberals. 
Finally, there are also media effects on issues related to the materialism-postmaterialism cleavage. 
In a literature review, Morgan et al. (2009) summarize that TV viewing, especially news and 
crime-related content, increases perceived criminality and fear of crime. It also leads to higher 
support for more severe punishments and to the perception that imprisonment is more effective 
than rehabilitation. Furthermore, television viewing leads to apathy about environmental 
concerns (Shanahan and McComas 1997; Shanahan, Morgan, and Stenbjerre 1997). Paek and 
Zhongdang (2004) show that heavy viewing of (western style) media leads to more consumerist 
attitudes among Chinese. In summary, there is much evidence that traditional media lead to more 
conservative attitudes on a large number of issues. However, one has to bear in mind that most 
of these findings are derived from populations of the US or Western European countries. As we 
will show in the next section, media effects might differ among countries. 
2.3. Why Internet Effects are Different 
Some researchers claim that the internet does not differ from traditional media in its cultivating 
effects (Morgan et al. 2009). They argue that the most frequented web services usually belong to 
the same big corporations that also maintain the most popular television services or at least 
depend in the same way on advertisements. Therefore, the cultivation process of television is not 
eliminated by internet usage but rather partly substituted and complemented in the same manner. 
However, we argue that the internet is indeed different. Initially, the internet was founded on the 
basic principles of openness, equality, change, sharing, and participation, principles that are 
underlying liberalism as well. The World Wide Web was developed for the global exchange of 
(scientific) information, but its founder Tim Berners-Lee also encouraged private and commercial 
contributors to participate. From the beginning on, all technical developments were made 
available without patents in order to facilitate technical progress and participation. These original 
principles are still very characteristic for the web today and are visible for example in the huge 
amount of open source software and other free content and services, collaborative wikis, 
communities and blogs where everyone can contribute and access information, and the principle 
of net neutrality, i.e. that every kind of service and data is treated equally.  
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Besides this very general liberal spirit, there are five specific technical features that facilitate 
respective social mechanisms that lead to more liberal attitudes. Four of these mechanisms 
operate on a meso/media level and have the potential to lead to a more liberal agenda and 
framing of internet content compared to that of traditional media, thus possibly having a 
substantial impact on the audience’s attitudes. The fifth mechanism, exposure to diversity, 
directly influences the users’ attitudes. The direct effect and the effects via the meso level 
together lead to an atmosphere of higher openness and tolerance on the macro level. Figure 1 
summarizes the relationships that are outlined in detail below.  
Figure 1: Summary of the Theoretical Mechanisms 
 
First, the internet’s decentralized architecture changes the ability to control information flows. 
The most extreme case are authoritarian regimes where traditional media can be forced to 
completely disregard certain issues or worldviews. An example is the content of the Iranian 
governmental broadcasting agency that has to be in line with Islamic laws and national interests 
(see footnote 2). Usually, blocked content advocates democratic principles or is critical towards 
the government, minority issues, sexual content, or religious principles. That means the blocked 
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content tends to be liberal. The censorship can be enforced effectively for television, radio and 
newspapers because the respective broadcasting companies and publishers are usually owned by 
the government itself or because their small number makes it easy to control them. To some 
extent, the internet can be controlled and censored as well (Deibert 2009; King, Pan, and Roberts 
2013)2. However, even for the most sophisticated censorship systems like the ‘Great Firewall of 
China’ it is not possible to control every single web page, reveal the anonymity of every 
broadcaster of critical information, block all content from foreign servers, or prevent users from 
establishing secure connections to proxy servers outside of China.  
Second, the internet decreases costs of information broadcasting. Even in democratic countries 
with free press, traditional media companies will not make use of the whole range of possible 
content because, as it is argued above, they have to serve a huge heterogeneous audience to cover 
the high costs of broadcasting. The result is a concentration towards the mainstream, which leads 
to a neglect of niche topics and to the assumption of a conservatively biased stance in order to 
prevent alienation of viewers and advertisement clients with too much openness towards 
controversial issues. With much lower costs of production and distribution of content via the 
internet, this commercial pressure is distinctly reduced. As Nie et al. (2010) argue, the internet 
saturates the whole space of political views. This means that more specific audiences who honor 
more progressive content can be served. While this certainly leads to more content that is 
conservative as well, for commercial reasons a positioning towards the left might be more 
promising since the mainstream media are already right of the center and the audience on the 
internet is younger and more educated (see argument 3).  
Furthermore, apart from professional media companies and commercial interests, the internet 
gives virtually everyone the possibility to become a (non-corporate) broadcaster of information 
(Weare 2002). To those who are portrayed in a stereotypical way in the traditional media, the 
internet offers the opportunity to present an own view of themselves. This idea is in line with 
Harwood and Roy (2005) who argue that the amount and the quality of stereotypical framing of 
gender roles or minorities is partly an issue of media control and ownership. Usually, in 
traditional media both, men and members of the majority group are overrepresented as owners 
and as on-air appearances in influential programs. This might lead to the respective stereotypical 
portrayal. 
                                                          
2 King et al.'s (2013) finding that pornography belongs to the most censored kinds of internet content in China 
illustrates that authoritarian governments’ censorship does not only aim to maintain the political order, but also to 
conserve a moral order. 
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Third, the usage of the internet requires some technical knowledge and some willingness to adopt 
innovations. For this reason, the average audience of the internet is disproportionally younger 
and better educated (Bonfadelli 2002; Norris 2001; Sahgal 2013) than the average population, and 
thus on average also more liberal. For commercial reasons, an orientation along the ‘internet 
mainstream’ will lead to more liberal content than an orientation along the ‘television 
mainstream’. Thus, independently of the preexisting attitudes, liberal and conservative users of 
the internet will both be exposed to more liberalism. 
Fourth, the internet gives the possibility to state opinions anonymously. Some people, out of fear 
of social isolation, tend to restrain to communicate their true opinions if they perceive the 
majority of the society not to be in favor of their opinion. If, in consequence, fewer people 
openly voice this specific attitude, the feeling of belonging to a minority increases even more. In 
this way, a certain opinion (usually the one that is most prominently featured in the mainstream 
media) becomes dominant. This process, first proposed and called ‘spiral of silence’ by Noelle-
Neumann (Glynn, Hayes, and Shanahan 1997; Noelle-Neumann 1974), especially occurs when it 
comes to highly morally charged issues and attitudes. The internet has the potential to resolve 
this spiral from two directions: First, the internet’s anonymity can dissolve the fear of social 
isolation, even if the own opinion is perceived to be unpopular. Second, as argued above, the 
internet offers a much broader range of opinions, including those of minority opinions and niche 
issues.  
Fifth, the internet facilitates communication and exchange between very different people from 
diverse backgrounds. Two established theories argue that this could lead to more openness and 
tolerance. First, the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954) argues that conflicting groups can mutually 
reduce prejudices by interpersonal exchange. The mechanism also works via parasocial contacts 
(Schiappa et al. 2005) in the media. Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna (2006) argue that the 
internet with its protected environment might especially increase the chances of positive contacts 
compared to the chances for such face-to-face contacts in the real word. Second, contact to 
individuals from different backgrounds in a shared context – as it is given in many internet 
communities and networks – produces bridging social capital (Putnam 2000). Bridging social 
capital are weak ties to members of different groups that lead to cooperation, social tolerance and 
social solidarity. For instance, Kobayashi (2010) and Cole and Griffiths (2007) show that online 
gaming communities are able to provide these benefits and that boundaries regarding appearance, 
gender, sexuality and age could be bridged.  
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Empirical Evidence 
There is empirical evidence that the internet might actually have a liberalizing impact. Closest to 
our argument is Besley (2008), who shows that internet usage is associated with liberal “openness 
to change values”, while entertainment television consumption is associated with conservative 
values. However, both internet and television enhance conservative “self-enhancement values”. 
Best and Krueger (2005) show that people who participate politically online show more liberal 
attitudes than those who participate offline, but the difference is very small. A recent survey by 
the Pew Research Center shows that in 25 countries Muslims who use the internet show more 
open attitudes towards Western popular culture and Christianity (Sahgal 2013). 
Also related are the findings of Zhu and He (2002), who categorize Chinese respondents into one 
of three groups: materialists, post-materialists, and communists. The authors show that internet 
users and users of foreign media are disproportionally more often represented in the post-
materialist group. An interesting observation is also made by Golbeck and Hansen (2011) who 
show that liberal media have much more followers on Twitter than their conservative 
counterparts. For instance, CNN Breaking News (@cnnbrk) has more than four times as many 
followers as Fox News (@FoxNews), although Fox News has more regular cable subscribers; the 
New York Times (@nytimes) has nearly three times as many followers as the Wall Street Journal 
(@WSJ), although the latter one has a distinctly higher print circulation. Concerning the spiral of 
silence, Ho and McLeod (2008) and Liu and Fahmy (2011) both find that people are more willing 
to express their opinion on same-sex marriage in a computer/internet setting than in a face-to-
face setting, and that they show less fear of isolation in the latter setting. 
While they are not directly related to social values, some more prominent findings exist in regard 
to democratic attitudes and participation. Citizens who use the internet have higher levels of 
political knowledge and engage more in political discussions which in turn increases political 
participation (Norris 2002; Shah et al. 2005; Xenos and Moy 2007). Tolbert and McNeal (2003) 
show that access to internet and online election news increased reported voting in the US 
presidential elections. Nisbet et al. (2012) show that internet use is associated with higher demand 
for democracy across 28 African and Asian countries. The effect is stronger in countries with 
greater democratization and higher internet penetration. Chu and Nevitte (2010) show that 
internet usage has a positive effect on support for democratic norms and for an open 
government. However, internet users show less confidence in the government and have a worse 
evaluation of the workings of democracy. The effects of broadcasts are exactly reversed: 
Television consumption has a negative effect on support of democratic norms and open 
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government, but leads to more positive evaluations of the government and the workings of 
democracy. 
Regarding the theoretical arguments and the related empirical findings we propose: 
H1a: Internet usage leads to more liberal attitudes towards social and moral issues. 
H1b: Television consumption leads to more conservative attitudes towards social and moral issues. 
National Differences in Internet Effects 
Some of the arguments for certain media effects we made above are dependent on who is in 
control of the information broadcasting as well as on characteristics of the audience. Therefore, 
we expect the media effects to differ between countries.  
For television consumption the argument is straightforward and one-directional. We outlined 
that the content of TV broadcasts is aligned to the mainstream because of commercial interests, 
because it might be completely controlled for political or religious reasons, or even because it is 
being used purposely for propaganda. As a consequence, in very conservative countries the ‘anti-
liberal effect’ of television is strongest. The more liberal a society becomes, the weaker the effect 
gets. In very liberal countries the television effect might not exist or be even slightly positive. We 
therefore propose: 
H2: The negative effect of television on liberalism is stronger in conservative countries. 
The effect of internet usage might be affected by the society’s liberalism in two directions. On the 
one hand, the disadvantages posed by the traditional media’s complete censorship and orientation 
towards the mainstream, combined with the benefits to be gained from internet use, i.e. the 
possibility of minorities to broadcast, the termination of a spiral of silence, and the exposure to 
diversity, make access to information from the internet more valuable in conservative countries. 
This would suggest a stronger liberalizing effect in more conservative societies. On the other 
hand, while all the arguments above remain valid, the internet cannot be considered as the single 
remedy against deep-seated conservatism: At least the domestic internet content is likely still 
heavily influenced by the dominant opinions in the respective society. Although in conservative 
countries the internet might broaden the agenda and offer more liberal content than traditional 
media, the prevailing attitude might remain mostly conservative. This would suggest a weaker 
liberalizing effect in more conservative societies. As a result, in more conservative societies the 
mechanisms that empower internet users are opposed by effects of domestic content that might 
weaken the internet effect. For this reason we abstain from formulating a directional hypothesis.  
127 
 
3. Research Strategy 
The ideal design to address the research question would be a natural experiment where part of a 
population is granted access to the internet while the rest is restricted from access but equal in 
every other characteristic. For a more realistic scenario, one could compare regions with different 
internet penetration. But for a reasonable comparison, these regions should not differ in any 
other aspect than internet penetration, which is a very unrealistic assumption in itself. The 
disadvantage of any controlled laboratory experiment is that one cannot measure the long-term 
impact of media usage. Therefore, a repeated survey among the same individuals is the best 
possible approach to the research question, although strictly speaking no causal link can be 
established.  
Our approach involves two separate analyses. In the first one we use cross-sectional data of 57 
countries from the World Values Survey (WVS) (World Values Survey Association 2009). This 
allows for testing the effect of internet usage on a large number of values and under very 
different country contexts. In the second analysis we draw on panel data of the Dutch 
Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) as a further analysis that addresses 
some problems of the cross-sectional data. 
The data of the WVS have a hierarchical order – individuals nested in countries. To address 
within-country dependencies and to avoid an underestimation of standard errors, multi-level 
analysis is used (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). 3 We proceed in 
three steps. First, a random intercept model provides the average effects of internet and 
television consumption over all countries. It considers country differences in the dependent 
variables, i.e. differences in average country liberalism. Controlling for these country differences 
as well as for the most important socio-demographic variables that determine internet usage (age, 
gender, and education) mostly precludes that the coefficient of internet usage is a mere selection 
effect4.  
                                                          
3 A possible alternative approach that is especially common in economics would be to use clustered standard errors 
(Williams 2000; Wooldridge 2002) that adjust the standard errors for intra-cluster correlation. For a theoretical and 
empirical comparison of multi-level analysis and clustered standard errors see Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo (2007). 
In our case, the differences of the results are close to zero. However, to estimate cross-level interactions and specific 
coefficients for each country, we use multi-level analysis. 
4 Such a selection effect corresponds to the theoretical perspective of the Uses and Gratifications Theory (Katz, 
Blumler, and Gurevitch 1973). Instead of asking “what do the media do to people?” (Katz 1959), it asks what people 
do with the media. It argues that people select those media that give them the most gratification, a behavior called 
selective exposure (Klapper 1960; Stroud 2008; Zaller 1992). From this perspective the correlation between internet 
usage and liberal attitudes does not exist because internet usage leads to more liberal attitudes, but because liberal 
128 
 
Second, since we assume that media effects depend on the country context, we want to obtain 
effects for each country individually. Random coefficient models allow the coefficients of 
internet and television to vary between countries. In fact, likelihood-ratio tests show that the 
random coefficient models can explain the data better than random intercept models (compare 
Table 1 in the next section). To assign values to each country’s random coefficients, empirical 
Bayes (EB) predictions are calculated as suggested by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008:109).5 
These coefficients can be interpreted as the difference in liberalism between a user and a non-
user of the same country and with the same socio-demographic characteristics. 
Third, we want to obtain a clear pattern how the liberalism of a country moderates the strength 
of effects of internet and television on individual’s liberalism. Therefore, a cross-level-interaction 
between average country liberalism and media usage is added to the random coefficient model. 
Since the random intercept in these models already controls for country differences in the 
dependent variable, including the average country liberalism would be redundant and lead to 
collinearity. For this reason, the average liberalism is only included in the interaction term, but 
not as a main effect itself.6 
With the data of the LISS panel we try to further address the issue of self-selection. There might 
be further characteristics that are correlated with liberalism and with internet usage that are 
omitted in the cross-sectional models. This omission might lead to an overestimation of the 
internet effect when liberal persons actually just use the internet more often. Therefore, we run a 
fixed effects model which measures how changes of media usage over time affect changes in 
liberalism. A fixed effects model controls for all unobserved characteristics that are constant over 
time which substantially reduces the probability of a mere selection effect. This does not mean 
that a significant coefficient in a fixed effects model is evidence for causality, but a selection 
effect can be only present if there is an omitted variable that is correlated with media use and 
changes over time. Furthermore, the LISS captures media consumption in much more detail than 
the WVS. Since we conduct two separate analyses, the operationalization of variables follows in 
the respective result sections. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
persons tend to use the internet more often than conservatives do because they expect to find more liberal content 
there. 
5 There are two predominant approaches to assign values to random coefficients: maximum likelihood estimation 
and empirical Bayes prediction (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008: 106). EB has the advantage that for inference 
statistics, uncertainty regarding the predictions can be estimated. Furthermore it has the smallest possible variance 
and therefore is the best linear unbiased predictor (BLUP). Because of the high number of observations on the 
individual level, the ML estimates and the EB predictions correlate about 0.99 in our analysis. 
6 Thus the effect of the interacting variables is included in a form of x1 + x1*x2 instead of x1 + x2 + x1*x2. For a 
very similar approach concerning cross-level-interactions in fixed effects models see Möhring (2012). 
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4. Cross-Country Evidence from the World Values Survey 
For the main analyses we use data of the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). The data 
were collected in 57 countries from all over the world between 2004 and 2008. Prior waves 
cannot be considered because they do not include items concerning media usage. The broad 
coverage of countries allows for analyzing the effects of internet under very different institutional 
backgrounds.  
Dependent Variables 
As dependent variables we borrow four7 attitudinal indices developed by Norris and Inglehart 
(2009). These are (1) liberal sexual and moral values, (2) religious values and practices, (3) 
egalitarian gender equality values, and (4) liberal family values. The indices result from a principal 
component analysis8 over 21 diverse items from the WVS that were chosen because they were 
surveyed in most participating countries. In the theoretical section we argue that there is one 
underlying concept of liberalism that can explain many different attitudes. However, in the 
literature, different social and moral issues are usually discussed separately. Drawing on four 
different indices allows us to demonstrate that the media indeed affect attitudes to numerous 
concepts similarly. In fact, the results below are robust across different operationalizations 
(compare footnote 7 and the consistent results in section 5 and 6).  
The first index, sexual and moral values, is constructed from an item battery that asks 
respondents how justifiable they consider the following six issues on a scale from 1 to 10: 
abortion, divorce, homosexuality, prostitution, euthanasia, and suicide. Justification of these 
issues is regarded as liberal. The second index, religious values, is constructed from five items: 
How important god is for the respondent; whether she regards herself as religious; whether she 
prays or meditates; how important religion is in her life; and how often she attends religious 
services. Since religiosity is correlated with many conservative attitudes, non-religiosity is 
regarded as an indicator for liberalism. The third index, gender equality, is constructed from three 
                                                          
7 Norris and Inglehart originally derive five indices in their analysis. However, we omit one index – tolerance of low 
ethical standards in public life – because it does not relate to the concept of liberalism. 
8  One could argue that structural equation modeling (SEM) is the more appropriate method for the index 
construction and the further analyses of media effects, as SEM can reveal the underlying correlation structure 
between single items and a latent variable like liberalism. However, the exact correlation structure of the items is only 
of minor interest for our purpose. To invalidate the possible criticism that our results stem from arbitrarily 
constructed indices, we further estimate the media effects on two opposite cases as dependent variables: a) a single 
‘liberalism’ index constructed from all included items, and b) some selected individual items (justification of 
homosexuality, justification of euthanasia, importance of god, men make better business executives than women, 
approval of women as single parent). The results mirror the pattern observed with the four indices and are available 
from the author on request. 
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items. Respondents are asked how much they agree with the statement that men make better 
business executives or political leaders than women, and whether university is more important 
for a boy than for a girl. Finally, for the fourth index, family values, respondents have to state 
whether they approve a woman as a single parent without stable relationship; how important the 
family is in their life; and whether marriage is an outdated institution. Approval of single 
parentship, disapproval of marriage and low importance of family are considered as liberal 
attitudes. 
All indices are coded in a way that they range from 0 to 10 with increasing values indicating more 
liberal attitudes. 
Independent Variables 
The WVS covers media usage with one item battery:  
“People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and the world. For each of the following 
sources, please indicate whether you used it last week or did not use it last week to obtain information” 
Someone is classified as a user or non-user of the particular medium depending on whether she 
indicated its usage in the last week. In this way, three dummy variables for the main channels of 
communication – internet, broadcasts, and newspapers – are created. Newspapers are included 
for comparison only and will be dropped later because of weak effects. We are aware that these 
items are prone to measurement error. People might have used the particular medium in the last 
week for the first time. Conversely, a regular user just might have abstained from the media use 
during the time range asked for in the interview. However, these deviations should be randomly 
distributed. In future surveys, additional questions that ask more precisely for the kind and 
purpose of the information obtained and for the duration of usage would still be preferable. 
As control variables on the individual level we include respondent’s age, gender, political interest, 
and education in three categories – low, medium, and high – recoded from the highest education 
level attained. On the country level the control variables are GDP per capita (The World Bank 
2013) and Press Freedom (Freedom House 2011) of the respective survey year, as well as an 
aggregated value of the respective dependent variable as a measure of a country’s liberalism. In 
the regression analyses below, all continuous independent variables will be z-standardized to 
allow for a better comparison of effect sizes. 
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Results 
Table 1 shows the mean values for each liberal attitude as well as penetration rates of internet, 
newspaper and television for each country. Table 2 shows the bivariate Pearson correlation 
coefficients of these key variables. Four conclusions can be drawn. 
Table 1: Summary of Key Variables 
 
Liberal Attitudes 
 
Media Penetration 
 
Sexual & 
Moral 
Values 
Religious 
Values 
Gender 
Equality 
Family 
Values 
 
Internet Newspaper Broadcasts 
Andorra 6.47 5.45 7.49 4.36   0.49 0.85 0.94 
Sweden 6.10 6.15 8.04 2.65 
 
0.71 0.92 0.98 
France 5.10 5.79 8.02 3.65 
 
0.38 0.62 0.95 
Norway 5.33 6.02 8.49 2.43 
 
0.75 0.92 0.99 
Spain 4.89 5.59 7.72 3.98 
 
0.27 0.63 0.91 
Netherlands 5.29 5.72 7.45 3.68 
 
0.67 0.75 0.97 
Germany 4.59 5.77 7.42 2.61 
 
0.40 0.82 0.96 
Switzerland 5.44 4.09 7.71 2.69 
 
0.62 0.91 0.95 
Slovenia 4.85 4.83 6.74 2.80 
 
0.35 0.63 0.90 
Great Britain 4.57 5.18 6.85 2.41 
 
0.49 0.72 0.93 
New Zealand 4.63 5.10 7.21 1.90 
 
. . . 
Uruguay 4.46 4.24 6.78 3.36 
 
0.19 0.30 0.90 
Finland 4.50 4.31 7.08 2.84 
 
0.57 0.89 0.97 
Australia 4.98 4.73 6.98 2.02 
 
0.54 0.85 0.98 
Bulgaria 3.97 5.21 6.37 2.84 
 
0.19 0.63 0.97 
Canada 4.05 3.32 7.40 2.57 
 
0.53 0.72 0.95 
Japan 3.87 5.89 5.64 1.85 
 
0.46 0.90 0.98 
Hong Kong 3.09 6.03 5.86 2.23 
 
. . . 
Argentina 3.87 3.13 6.71 3.39 
 
0.21 0.47 0.90 
Serbia 4.17 3.40 6.25 2.51 
 
0.29 0.73 0.89 
Chile 3.41 3.01 5.92 3.70 
 
0.34 0.64 0.93 
Russian Federation 2.93 4.77 4.90 2.89 
 
0.21 0.54 0.94 
United States 3.64 2.62 6.86 2.13 
 
0.69 0.68 0.90 
Taiwan 3.15 4.74 5.90 1.18 
 
0.34 0.56 0.90 
Peru . 2.10 6.56 2.38 
 
0.30 0.61 0.87 
South Korea 2.88 4.94 5.54 1.27 
 
0.65 0.75 0.94 
Ukraine 2.82 3.82 5.20 2.68 
 
0.11 0.61 0.92 
Mexico 3.25 1.86 6.19 3.15 
 
0.22 0.48 0.89 
Viet Nam 1.31 6.07 5.61 1.43 
 
0.10 0.39 0.95 
Italy 2.68 2.55 6.83 2.23 
 
0.40 0.71 0.95 
China 1.29 6.46 5.45 1.04 
 
0.11 0.23 0.75 
Cyprus 2.93 2.90 6.56 1.66 
 
0.36 0.76 0.90 
Brazil 2.70 1.55 6.43 2.65 
 
0.24 0.36 0.86 
Colombia 2.03 1.46 6.42 . 
 
0.17 0.31 0.89 
Moldova 2.33 2.66 5.54 2.27 
 
0.20 0.55 0.90 
Guatemala 2.25 1.03 6.60 2.71 
 
. . . 
Thailand 2.11 2.42 5.41 2.29 
 
0.14 0.50 0.91 
Poland 2.43 1.69 5.96 2.07 
 
0.28 0.56 0.97 
South Africa 2.29 1.61 5.99 2.05 
 
0.14 0.60 0.82 
Romania 1.90 1.57 5.93 2.44 
 
0.14 0.51 0.94 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.61 1.24 7.08 1.46 
 
0.21 0.81 0.93 
Ethiopia 1.12 1.13 7.21 1.83 
 
0.18 0.53 0.79 
Zambia 2.66 1.32 5.57 1.52 
 
0.18 0.43 0.72 
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India 2.68 2.39 4.43 1.30 
 
0.09 0.52 0.61 
Malaysia 2.36 1.28 4.43 1.42 
 
0.37 0.87 0.92 
Turkey 1.42 1.71 5.68 0.50 
 
0.22 0.60 . 
Georgia 1.09 1.99 4.78 1.11 
 
0.15 0.26 0.98 
Rwanda 0.97 0.75 5.12 1.89 
 
0.12 0.10 0.63 
Mali 2.88 0.86 3.24 1.27 
 
0.22 0.32 0.71 
Burkina Faso 1.71 1.04 4.39 0.78 
 
0.08 0.19 0.66 
Morocco 1.49 0.62 4.99 0.41 
 
0.27 0.31 0.87 
Iran 1.30 1.43 3.92 0.85 
 
0.19 0.51 0.85 
Indonesia 0.80 0.90 5.31 0.31 
 
0.21 0.53 0.91 
Ghana 1.40 0.68 4.53 0.71 
 
0.09 0.23 0.82 
Iraq 0.60 2.00 3.25 0.14 
 
. . . 
Egypt 1.63 1.12 2.96 0.13 
 
0.09 0.24 0.79 
Jordan 0.37 0.33 3.92 0.48   0.17 0.42 0.86 
Overall 3.01 3.1 5.99 2.14   0.31 0.57 0.89 
Max 6.47 6.46 8.49 4.36 
 
0.75 0.92 0.99 
Min 0.37 0.33 2.96 0.13 
 
0.08 0.10 0.61 
Median 2.85 2.66 5.99 2.18 
 
0.22 0.60 0.91 
S.d. 1.52 1.90 1.27 1.01   0.19 0.21 0.09 
Note: Country averages are composed by the mean values of all respondents of a country. For each 
category, the lowest third is shaded dark, the medium third is shaded light gray, and the highest third is 
white. Countries are ordered in descending order of average liberalism (the mean of all four indices). 
 
Table 2: Bivariate Correlations of Key Variables 
  
Sexual & 
Moral 
Values 
Religious 
Values 
Gender 
Equality 
Family 
Values Internet Newspaper Broadcasts 
Sexual Values 1.00             
Religious Values 0.72 1.00 
     Gender Equality 0.72 0.59 1.00 
    Family Values 0.57 0.37 0.61 1.00 
   Internet 0.73 0.53 0.64 0.25 1.00 
  Newspaper 0.68 0.53 0.62 0.26 0.78 1.00 
 
Broadcasts 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.37 0.56 0.65 1.00 
 
First, there are substantial differences in overall support for the four liberal attitudes. On average, 
attitudes towards gender equality are comparatively liberal (5.99), while sexual and moral values 
(3.01), religious values (3.1) and especially family values (2.14) are highly restricted. The same 
variance can be observed for media penetration rates. While information consumption via TV is 
common in all sampled countries (0.89), only a share of 0.31 seeks information via the internet. 
Newspapers have a penetration rate of 0.57. 
Second, there is high variance between countries concerning both liberal attitudes and media 
penetration. Between the lowest and the highest scoring countries, the gap is about 6 points on 
each attitude scale. Internet penetration ranges from 0.08 to 0.75, newspaper penetration even 
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from 0.10 to 0.92. Only the diversity of information via broadcasts is smaller, ranging from 0.61 
to 0.99, with most countries scoring higher than 0.90. 
Third, there is high consistency within countries both in regard to liberal attitudes and media 
penetration. Many countries show a similar extent of liberalism in each attitude, which means that 
there are high correlations between the four indices. Few countries score in the upper third on 
one attitude scale and in the bottom third on another one. One notable exception are some of 
the East Asian and former communist countries that are very liberal regarding religion, but very 
conservative on the other dimensions. For example, China is the least religious country, but it is 
not liberal concerning any other attitude. The same pattern exists for media penetration, with 
high correlations between the three kinds of media uses. 
Fourth, there are high bivariate correlations between liberal attitudes and media penetration. 
Broadly speaking, European and Anglo-American countries are the most liberal, former 
communist and Latin American countries are moderate, and African, Islamic and South-East 
Asian countries are the most conservative. The order of media consumption is the same. On the 
country level, this correlation can be explained by economic development (Inglehart and Baker 
2000)). However, analyses on the individual level that include control variables have to show 
whether media actually has an impact on liberalism. 
Table 3 shows random-intercept models which account for different country means in liberalism 
for each attitude. 
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Table 3: Random Intercept Estimations of Media Effects on Liberal Attitudes 
 
Note: Full maximum likelihood estimation. Dependent variables range from 0 to 10 with high values 
indicating liberal attitudes. All continuous independent variables are z-standardized for a better 
comparability of the effect strengths. All effects not indicated as ‘n.s.’ are significant at a 0.01 level. R² 
for separated levels are calculated as proposed in Snijders and Bosker (1999:99-105).  
First of all, in accordance with our hypothesis 1a, using the internet to inform oneself about what 
is going on in one’s country and in the world has a liberalizing effect on each issue. The effects 
are statistically significant, although we control for demographic variables like age, education and 
gender that are known to be correlated with both liberal attitudes and internet usage. The internet 
effect is strongest for sexual and moral values: Internet users are estimated to be 0.352 points 
more liberal on average than non-users. One could object that this is not a substantial difference 
on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. However, in comparison with the coefficients of the other 
covariates, the effect of internet is one of the strongest: It is stronger than the effects of gender, a 
standard deviation in age or political interest, or medium education compared to low education. 
With 0.21 to 0.24 the effect of internet is lower on the three other attitudes, but still substantially 
high. 
The second remarkable pattern is that – in accordance with the hypothesis 1b – information via 
broadcasts does not have the same substantial and consistent liberalizing effect as internet usage. 
coef. s .e. coef. s .e. coef. s .e. coef. s .e.
fixed part
Internet 0.352 0.021 0.214 0.022 0.244 0.022 0.216 0.022
Broadcasts -0.129 0.027 -0.264 0.027 0.231 0.027 -0.131 0.027
Newspaper 0.059 0.019 -0.005 0.019 n.s . 0.100 0.019 0.079 0.019
Female 0.023 0.016 n.s . -0.708 0.016 0.912 0.016 0.101 0.017
Age -0.241 0.009 -0.300 0.009 -0.082 0.009 -0.214 0.009
Education Medium 0.210 0.021 0.082 0.021 0.441 0.021 0.043 0.021 n.s .
Education High 0.565 0.026 0.074 0.026 0.787 0.026 0.172 0.027
Pol i tica l  Interest 0.085 0.009 -0.131 0.009 -0.028 0.009 -0.007 0.009 n.s .
GDP 0.486 0.157 0.995 0.274 0.550 0.154 0.141 0.199 n.s .
Press  Freedom 0.759 0.176 0.095 0.309 n.s . 0.237 0.174 n.s . 0.253 0.225 n.s .
Constant 2.622 0.131 3.508 0.224 4.772 0.128 2.040 0.164
random part
Sigma u (L2) 0.897 0.089 1.577 0.155 0.884 0.087 1.145 0.113
Sigma e (L1) 2.033 0.006 2.115 0.006 2.107 0.006 2.152 0.006
Unconditional  ICC
Conditional  ICC
R² (Level  1)
R² (Level  2)
Observations
Sexual & Moral 
Values Religious Values Gender Equality Family Values
69843
0.440.35 0.24
0.49
0.17
0.26 0.17
0.65
67614 69848 68985
0.24
0.16
0.31
0.03
0.08
0.31 0.14 0.21
135 
 
Actually, informing oneself via broadcast has a non-trivial negative effect on liberal sexual and 
moral values (-0.129) and on family values (-0.131). The effect is even stronger on religious values 
(-0.264). Only on gender equality attitudes, informing oneself via broadcasts has a liberalizing 
effect, which is almost as strong as the respective effect of internet usage.  
Third, informing oneself via newspaper has modest effects compared to broadcasts and internet. 
There are positive and statistically significant effects on sexual and moral values, gender equality 
and family values. However, for example for sexual and moral values, this effect is only half as 
strong as the negative effect of broadcasts and merely a sixth as strong as the positive effect of 
the internet. On religious values, the effect of newspapers is not significant at all. 
Most control variables show the expected effects. Higher age correlates with more conservative 
positions, higher education with more liberal ones. Political interest has an inconsistent pattern 
with a positive effect on sexual and moral values and a negative one on religious values and 
gender equality. Being a woman has a positive effect on family values and, not surprisingly, a 
remarkably strong one on gender equality. However, women tend to be more religious than men. 
On the macro level, a country’s GDP per capita has a strong impact on sexual and moral values, 
religious values and gender equality. Only for family values it is not significant. Freedom of the 
press has a significant impact on sexual and moral values only. However, one has to bear in mind 
that these two macro variables are highly correlated. The models are furthermore robust against 
different specifications of the independent variables.9  
The random part of the estimation shows that the unconditional intraclass correlation10 is 0.35 
for sexual and moral values, 0.44 for religious values, and 0.24 for gender equality and family 
values. This means that before controlling for any covariates, about 24 to 44 percent of the 
variance in liberal attitudes can be explained by country-specific factors. These values are 
statistically significant and substantial enough to justify multi-level modeling. The Snijders and 
Bosker R² on level 1 shows how much of the total variance can be explained by level 1 variables. 
Values range from 0.26 to 0.03. Family values can be explained much less than the other three 
attitudes. The variance on level 2 can be explained better and values range from 0.65 to 0.08. 
                                                          
9 We test the robustness of the model by using two small changes in the model specification. Adding income – a 
variable known to be positively correlated with internet usage – to the model slightly decreases the internet’s positive 
coefficient on sexual values. However, this change might merely be the result of excluding about 8,000 observations 
(including two complete countries, Argentina and Jordan). Excluding political interest – which might be correlated 
with the dependent variables – does not change any coefficient in a considerable way.  
10 The unconditional ICC refers to the empty model without covariates. The conditional ICC refers to the estimated 
models with all displayed covariates. 
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Again, family values are most difficult to explain by our model. Altogether, the findings suggest 
taking a look on country-specific differences of internet effects on liberal attitudes. 
In summary, the random intercept models show that internet usage has a statistically significant 
and substantial positive impact on different liberal attitudes. With the exception of gender 
equality, watching television has a significant and also substantial negative effect on liberal 
attitudes. In comparison, reading newspapers seems to have no relevant impact on attitude 
formation (or positive and negative effects of different kinds of newspaper content cancel each 
other out). As has often been observed in previous studies, the country context can explain a 
huge part of individual attitudes on social and moral issues. 
To derive media effects for each country individually, random slope models are computed. They 
correspond to the random intercept models above, but allow individual coefficients of internet 
and broadcasts. The likelihood-ratio tests in Table 4 (first row) show that the random coefficient 
models have a better fit than fixed effects. The individual coefficients for each country that are 
obtained by empirical Bayes prediction can be found in Tables A1 (internet) and A2 (broadcasts) 
in the appendix. In most countries there is a positive effect of internet usage and many of these 
effects are statistically significant. There are few countries with negative internet effect and none 
is significant. Conversely, there are numerous countries with negative effects of broadcasts. Only 
few significant positive effects exist and most of them are on gender equality. For both internet 
and broadcasts, there is a high variance in the size of effects. From the tables alone it is difficult 
to obtain a clear pattern about which of the 57 countries have stronger effects than others. 
Table 4: Likelihood-Ratio Tests for Model Comparison 
Null Hypothesis 
 
Sexual & 
Moral  
Values 
Religious 
Values 
Gender 
Equality 
Family 
Values 
FE = RE LR chi2(2) 463.75 331.6 128.67 214.36 
 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      RE with = RE without interaction LR chi2(2) 154.11 253.15 153.96 173.4 
  Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: The null hypotheses states that there is no difference in model fit between the two models. 
To find such a pattern in the country-specific media effects, cross-level interactions of internet 
and broadcasts with the country mean of the respective attitude are included in the models. 
Table 4 (row 2) provides evidence that the interaction effects improve the model fit. Figure 2 
shows that there is a consistent pattern across all four attitudes with minor exceptions regarding 
gender equality values. 
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Figure 2: Cross-Level Interaction of Media Effects and Country-Aggregated Liberalism 
 
Note: The y-axis depicts the marginal effects of internet and broadcasts on the respective attitude 
conditional on different values of the country average of the same attitude on the x-axis. The grey area 
illustrates a 95% confidence interval (one-sided test). Thus, if the shaded area does not intersect the zero 
line, there is a significant effect at a 5% level. Reading example: Internet usage has a non-significant effect 
of less than 0.1 on sexual and moral values in a country with a respective aggregated value of -1.5. However, 
in a country with an aggregated value of 2.5, the effect of internet is about 0.65 and statistically significant. 
The figure is based on Table A3 in the appendix. 
First, in countries with the most conservative values, information via broadcasts has a significant 
negative impact on individual liberalism. This effect is particularly strong for religious values. 
Internet usage does not have a similarly negative effect on liberal values, but it also does not have 
a significant positive effect in those countries.  
Second, when the country level of liberalism increases, the effects of both kinds of media usage 
become more positive. For internet usage this means that its effect is positive and statistically 
significant in all but the most conservative countries. For broadcasts this means that the negative 
effect firstly becomes weaker, then non-significant, and in very liberal countries it is eventually 
also significantly positive. This interaction effect of watching broadcasts and country liberalism is 
in line with hypothesis 2. 
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Third, in conservative countries, the differences between the effects of broadcasts and the effects 
of internet are statistically significant from each other (the shaded confidence intervals do not 
overlap). While the liberalizing effect of internet is stronger than that of broadcasts across all 
levels of country liberalism, the difference becomes weaker (and insignificant in the cases of 
religious values, gender equality, and family values) in more liberal countries.  
5. Panel Analyses with the LISS Data 
To check the robustness of our cross-sectional findings and overcome the limitations of the 
cross-sectional data, we conduct a second analysis with data of the LISS panel (Longitudinal 
Internet Studies for the Social Sciences). The panel consists of 5000 Dutch households, 
encompassing 8000 individuals. The panel is based on a true probability sample of households 
drawn from the population register by Statistics Netherlands. Households that cannot participate 
otherwise are provided with a computer and internet access. Panel members are paid to complete 
online questionnaires every month. The LISS data is the panel with the highest data quality that 
we are aware of that includes repeated measurements of both media usage and a range of social 
and moral attitudes. For our purpose we can draw on five waves from 2008 to 2012. 
Although they are not perfectly comparable to the WVS data, we are able to construct four 
dependent variables that capture the concept of liberal attitudes in a similar way.  
For the gender equality index, respondents have to state their agreement with the following eight 
items: (1) Both father and mother should contribute to the family income; (2) The father should 
earn money, while the mother takes care of the household and the family; (3) Fathers ought to do 
more in terms of household work than they do at present; (4) Fathers ought to do more in terms 
of childcare than they do at present; (5) A woman is more suited to rearing young children than a 
man; (6) It is actually less important for a girl than for a boy to get a good education; 
(7) Generally speaking, boys can be reared more liberally than girls; (8) It is unnatural for women 
in firms to have control over men. These items are similar to those used for the gender equality 
index of the WVS data. Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.73. 
To address the sexual and moral values dimension, there is unfortunately only one item to draw 
on. Respondents have to state on a 5-point scale whether euthanasia should be legally permitted 
or forbidden. A similar item is also included in the respective index of the WVS, but the LISS 
index necessarily omits all other aspects captured in the WVS index. 
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The third index asks for respondents’ attitudes towards foreigners. As it is argued in the 
theoretical section, the acceptance of minority groups is a frequently used indicator of liberalism. 
Respondents had to state their agreement with the following six items: (1) It is good if society 
consists of people from different cultures; (2) It should be made easier to obtain asylum in the 
Netherlands; (3) Legally residing foreigners should be entitled to the same social security as 
Dutch citizens; (4) There are too many people of foreign origin or descent in the Netherlands; 
(5) Some sectors of the economy can only continue to function because people of foreign origin 
or descent work there; (6) It does not help a neighborhood if many people of foreign origin or 
descent move in. Two items concerning immigrants were not included in the index because they 
asked for respondents’ evaluation of the situation of immigrants in the Netherlands. Cronbach’s 
Alpha is 0.77. 
As a final measurement of liberalism a simple self-assessment of political ideology on an 11-point 
left-right scale is included. While we mentioned above that there are discussions about multiple 
dimensions of ideology, in the broadest sense, a left ideology corresponds to liberal attitudes on 
social and moral issues. 
Again, all indices are coded in a way that they range from 0 to 10 with increasing values indicating 
more liberal attitudes. 
The LISS panel captures internet usage for different kinds of activities and at different places. For 
a better comparison with the WVS data, we only consider the overall usage at home which is 
measured in hours per week. From this item four different user groups are composed – non-
users, moderate users, strong users, and heavy users. Television consumption is reported in hours 
per day and is analogously categorized into four groups. The summary statistics of the dependent 
and independent variables are depicted in Table 5. Key findings are: First, on average an 
individual stays within the panel for about 2.8 waves. Second, half of the participants are 
moderate internet users, another quarter are strong users. Third, about a quarter of participants 
are classified as strong television viewers, another third as moderate viewers. Fourth, the Dutch 
have very liberal views on euthanasia and gender equality. Left ideology and xenophobia are 
closer to the center of the scale. Fifth, the within-individual variance is comparably low and 
always smaller than the variance between subjects. 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics LISS Panel 
 
Variable 
 
Share/Mean S.D. Min Max 
  
Observations 
Internet               
 
 
Non-User (0 - 1h/week) overall 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 
N 25982 
  
between 
 
0.32 0 1 
 
n 9221 
  
within 
 
0.25 -0.63 0.97 
 
T-bar 2.81 
          
 
Moderate User (1 - 7h/week) overall 0.52 0.50 0 1 
 
N 25982 
  
between 
 
0.40 0 1 
 
n 9221 
  
within 
 
0.35 -0.28 1.32 
 
T-bar 2.81 
          
 
Strong User (7 - 21h/week) overall 0.25 0.44 0 1 
 
N 25982 
  
between 
 
0.36 0 1 
 
n 9221 
  
within 
 
0.29 -0.55 1.05 
 
T-bar 2.81 
          
 
Heavy User (>21h/week) overall 0.05 0.21 0 1 
 
N 25982 
  
between 
 
0.18 0 1 
 
n 9221 
  
within 
 
0.14 -0.75 0.85 
 
T-bar 2.81 
Television 
        
 
Non-User (0 - 1h/day) overall 0.12 0.32 0 1 
 
N 25339 
  
between 
 
0.28 0 1 
 
n 9045 
  
within 
 
0.19 -0.68 0.92 
 
T-bar 2.8 
          
 
Moderate User (1 - 2h/day) overall 0.30 0.46 0 1 
 
N 25339 
  
between 
 
0.38 0 1 
 
n 9045 
  
within 
 
0.30 -0.50 1.10 
 
T-bar 2.8 
          
 
Strong User (2 - 5h/day) overall 0.49 0.50 0 1 
 
N 25339 
  
between 
 
0.42 0 1 
 
n 9045 
  
within 
 
0.31 -0.31 1.29 
 
T-bar 2.8 
          
 
Heavy User (>5h/day) overall 0.10 0.30 0 1 
 
N 25339 
  
between 
 
0.26 0 1 
 
n 9045 
  
within 
 
0.18 -0.70 0.90 
 
T-bar 2.8 
Liberal Attitudes 
        
 
Xenophobia overall 4.78 1.63 0 10 
 
N 25959 
  
between 
 
1.55 0 10 
 
n 9220 
  
within 
 
0.59 -0.14 8.53 
 
T-bar 2.82 
          
 
Euthanasia overall 8.37 2.54 0 10 
 
N 24952 
  
between 
 
2.43 0 10 
 
n 9024 
  
within 
 
0.99 0.37 15.37 
 
T-bar 2.77 
          
 
Gender Equality overall 6.92 1.31 0 10 
 
N 25963 
  
between 
 
1.22 1.56 10 
 
n 9220 
  
within 
 
0.56 2.80 10.20 
 
T-bar 2.82 
          
 
Left Ideology overall 4.78 2.16 0 10 
 
N 22431 
  
between 
 
2.03 0 10 
 
n 8442 
    within   0.82 -2.22 10.45   T-bar 2.66 
Note: The table distinguishes between overall, between (different individuals), and within (the same 
individual) statistics. 
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Table 6: Fixed Effects Estimates of Media Effects 
Note: *** = p<0.001, ** = p<0.01, * = p<0.05; one-sided tests for internet and TV dummies. 
Table 6 shows the results of the fixed effects models. The internet user-type dummies indicate 
how the political attitudes of moderate, strong and heavy users differ from those of the reference 
group, the non-users. Although not all coefficients are statistically significant, the pattern shows 
that the longer people use the internet, the more liberal their attitudes are. For instance, moderate 
users score about 0.05 points higher on justification of euthanasia, which is not yet significantly 
different from non-users. For strong users, however, the difference is about 0.08 and for heavy 
users it is about 0.12, both statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The pattern is similar for 
xenophobia (where the effect of heavy usage is strongest, but slightly below significance) and for 
left-wing orientation (where the difference between heavy-users and non-users is even about 
0.18). Only for gender equality values we cannot observe any internet effects. Conversely, we 
cannot find any differences between the different groups of TV consumption. None of the 
effects is even close to being statistically significant. 
The results of the LISS data might be conservative and underestimate the true effects for several 
reasons. First, it is not possible to compare internet users with a reference group of complete 
non-users, because by design of the LISS study, every respondent is provided with permanent 
access to the internet in order to be able to participate in the survey. However, the comparison 
with absolute internet abstinent persons should have the highest effects. Second, the time 
between two waves is only one year and the total interval of observation is merely five years. As 
coef. s .e. coef. s .e. coef. s .e. coef. s .e.
Internet Moderate User 0.036 0.019 * 0.053 0.033 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.029
Internet Strong User 0.045 0.023 * 0.082 0.041 * 0.016 0.022 0.060 0.037
Internet Heavy User 0.063 0.039 0.117 0.069 * 0.048 0.037 0.185 0.062 **
TV Moderate User -0.004 0.025 -0.020 0.043 0.016 0.024 0.035 0.038
TV Strong User -0.001 0.028 0.019 0.049 0.001 0.027 0.040 0.043
TV Heavy User -0.040 0.037 -0.004 0.066 -0.032 0.035 0.024 0.059
Wave 2 0.068 0.036 0.049 0.062 -0.047 0.034 0.093 0.052
Wave 3 -0.032 0.067 -0.002 0.114 -0.100 0.064 0.048 0.096
Wave 4 0.018 0.098 0.086 0.169 -0.133 0.094 -0.131 0.141
Wave 5 0.119 0.130 0.146 0.224 -0.081 0.124 0.018 0.187
Age -0.023 0.032 0.013 0.055 -0.003 0.031 -0.012 0.046
Education -0.014 0.017 0.047 0.030 -0.012 0.016 -0.063 0.027 *
Pol i tica l  Interest 0.028 0.017 0.010 0.029 0.056 0.016 *** 0.004 0.026
Constant 5.868 1.500 *** 7.547 2.592 *** 7.138 1.430 *** 5.559 2.182 ***
Observations 25246 24283 25250 21821
Xenophobia Euthanasia Gender Equality Left
142 
 
can be seen in Table 5, we do not observe that many changes over time in both dependent and 
independent variables. This leads to weaker effects in a fixed effects model, which only regards 
changes. Third, with the WVS data, the Netherlands had no significant internet effect and only 
one significant effect of broadcastings (appendix A1 and A2). Hence, if we conclude that media 
effects are not that strong in the Netherlands (for instance because it is already one of the most 
liberal countries), and the fixed effects of the Dutch LISS data are nevertheless significant, fixed 
effects might be even more substantial in other countries.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose that internet usage can lead to more liberal attitudes. We argue that the 
internet’s technical features translate into social mechanisms that do not exist within traditional 
media. To test the proposition, we draw on cross-sectional data of the World Values Survey as 
well as on panel data from the Dutch LISS Panel. The results from both studies consistently 
show a positive impact of internet usage on liberalism. The effect is moderated by the respective 
society’s average liberalism. In conservative countries the effect is not existent or only weak, but 
it becomes stronger the more liberal the country is. Conversely, for television consumption there 
is only a weak positive effect on liberal attitudes in liberal countries. In conservative societies, 
watching television actually has a substantial negative effect on liberalism. The design of our 
analyses can nearly exclude that these effects only exist because of audience selection or 
demographic composition of countries. 
This paper contributes to the literature of media effects in two ways. First, it clearly demonstrates 
that different kinds of media can have different kinds of impact. In this way it disagrees with 
traditional cultivation theory that postulates a uniform negative effect on liberalism. Although our 
research design cannot answer why the internet has the demonstrated positive effect, we provide a 
theoretical argument that can explain differences between the internet and traditional media. 
Further research has to validate these mechanisms. Second, the paper shows that internet usage is 
not only beneficial to the political sphere by increasing political participation and acceptance of 
democratic norms. It rather points out that the internet is beneficial to a much broader social 
sphere and can increase people’s general open-mindedness.  
What are the implications of these findings? We are probably just at the beginning of observing 
substantial internet effects. Even in highly developed countries, high internet penetration is a 
comparably recent phenomenon and the intensity of internet usage is still increasing. Since these 
countries are on average also the most liberal societies, the positive effects on liberal attitudes 
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should be strongest here. In more conservative societies, internet effects are weaker or even not 
existent, and furthermore the penetration rates are distinctively lower. However, it is reasonable 
to assume that internet diffusion will increase in such countries and that increasing internet usage 
time will partly substitute television consumption. In this way, even if internet usage itself has no 
direct positive effect on liberal attitudes in conservative societies, the substitution of negative 
television effects on liberalism can be considered an indirect positive effect of the internet. 
Certainly the internet is not a panacea that alone will end discrimination, intolerance and 
inequality. However, the diffusion of internet technology can be considered one of various 
processes that can make people more open-minded. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Empirical Bayes Predictions for Internet Effects 
Country 
Sexual & 
Moral  
Values 
 
Religious 
Values 
 
Gender 
Equality 
 
Family 
Values 
 Andorra 0.46 * 0.82 * 0.24   0.20   
Argentina 1.00 * 0.69 * 0.22 
 
0.35 
 Australia 0.62 * 0.41 * 0.30 * 0.18 
 Brazil 0.16 
 
0.20 
 
0.58 * 0.00 
 Bulgaria 0.88 * -0.04 
 
0.28 
 
0.64 * 
Burkina Faso -0.10 
 
0.02 
 
0.36 
 
0.06 
 Canada 0.29 
 
0.43 * 0.03 
 
0.11 
 Chile 0.61 * 0.42 * 0.64 * 0.13 
 China 0.45 * -0.05 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.08 
 Colombia 0.85 * 0.21 
 
0.34 * 1.03 * 
Cyprus 0.22 
 
0.33 
 
0.05 
 
0.61 * 
Egypt -0.25 
 
-0.30 
 
0.40 * -0.08 
 Ethiopia 0.67 * 0.29 
 
-0.05 
 
0.55 * 
Finland 0.45 * 0.27 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.09 
 France 0.25 
 
0.27 
 
0.17 
 
0.03 
 Georgia -0.13 
 
-1.01 * 0.14 
 
0.23 
 Germany 0.74 * 0.06 
 
0.42 * 0.30 * 
Ghana 0.21 
 
-0.29 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.06 
 Great Britain 0.36 
 
-0.20 
 
0.09 
 
0.20 
 Guatemala . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 Hong Kong . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 India -0.63 * 0.25 
 
0.06 
 
0.11 
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Indonesia -0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.05 
 Iran 0.10 
 
0.43 * 0.22 
 
0.55 * 
Iraq . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 Italy 0.77 * 0.29 
 
0.24 
 
0.25 
 Japan 0.53 * 0.21 
 
0.53 * 0.12 
 Jordan -0.09 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.07 
 
0.08 
 Malaysia -0.28 
 
0.20 
 
0.13 
 
0.38 * 
Mali 0.18 
 
-0.13 
 
0.24 
 
0.24 
 Mexico 0.60 * 0.53 * 0.33 * 0.16 
 Moldova 0.25 
 
0.29 
 
0.44 * 0.35 * 
Morocco -0.15 
 
0.34 
 
0.76 * -0.10 
 Netherlands 0.20 
 
0.30 
 
0.21 
 
0.18 
 New Zealand . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 Norway 0.62 * 0.46 * 0.36 * 0.30 
 Peru . 
 
0.36 * 0.11 
 
0.14 
 Poland 0.70 * 0.34 
 
0.40 * -0.08 
 Romania 0.79 * 0.29 
 
0.38 * 0.22 
 Russia 0.37 * 0.09 
 
0.08 
 
-0.02 
 Rwanda 0.12 
 
-0.06 
 
0.25 
 
0.02 
 Serbia -0.74 * -0.30 
 
0.42 * 0.53 * 
Slovenia 1.40 * 1.15 * 0.34 * 0.30 
 South Africa 0.07 
 
-0.18 
 
0.29 * 0.00 
 South Korea 0.45 * 0.08 
 
0.52 * 0.33 * 
Spain 0.54 * 1.05 * 0.16 
 
0.48 * 
Sweden 0.27 
 
0.14 
 
0.28 
 
0.04 
 Switzerland 0.84 * 0.58 * 0.68 * 0.28 
 Taiwan 0.71 * 0.34 
 
0.38 * 0.32 * 
Thailand -0.15 
 
-0.22 
 
-0.16 
 
0.05 
 Trinidad and Tobago 0.08 
 
0.00 
 
0.16 
 
0.14 
 Turkey . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 Ukraine 0.45 
 
-0.12 
 
0.35 
 
0.18 
 United States 0.43 * -0.04 
 
0.11 
 
-0.01 
 Uruguay 0.57 * 0.49 * -0.12 
 
0.23 
 Vietnam 0.27 
 
0.20 
 
0.24 
 
0.07 
 Zambia -0.18   -0.04   -0.10   0.25   
Note: * = p<0.05 
 
Table A2: Empirical Bayes Predictions for Broadcasting Effects 
Country 
Sexual & 
Moral  
Values 
 
Religious 
Values 
 
Gender 
Equality 
 
Family 
Values 
 Andorra 0.09   -0.06   0.11   -0.16   
Argentina -0.06 
 
-0.48 * 0.47 * -0.40 
 Australia 0.24 
 
0.20 
 
0.11 
 
-0.13 
 Brazil 0.08 
 
-0.12 
 
0.36 * -0.07 
 Bulgaria 0.07 
 
0.07 
 
0.14 
 
0.03 
 Burkina Faso -0.59 * -0.39 * 0.53 * -0.35 
 Canada 0.24 
 
-0.53 * 0.25 
 
0.06 
 Chile -0.18 
 
-0.44 * 0.23 
 
-0.28 
 China 0.09 
 
0.57 * -0.07 
 
-0.24 
 Colombia 0.15 
 
-0.28 
 
0.21 
 
0.91 * 
Cyprus 0.08 
 
-0.14 
 
0.35 
 
-0.76 * 
Egypt 0.00 
 
-0.38 * 0.36 * -0.06 
 Ethiopia 0.24 
 
-0.35 
 
-0.25 
 
0.54 * 
Finland 0.23 
 
0.01 
 
0.25 
 
0.26 
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France 0.16 
 
0.05 
 
0.28 
 
-0.09 
 Georgia 0.02 
 
-0.24 
 
0.29 
 
-0.08 
 Germany -0.13 
 
0.21 
 
0.18 
 
-0.32 
 Ghana -0.36 
 
-0.55 * 0.48 * -0.05 
 Great Britain 0.44 
 
0.02 
 
0.10 
 
-0.60 * 
Guatemala . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 Hong Kong . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 India -0.79 * -0.39 * -0.04 
 
-0.18 
 Indonesia -0.37 
 
-0.44 * 0.24 
 
-0.26 
 Iran -0.15 
 
-0.49 * -0.14 
 
-0.29 
 Iraq . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 Italy 0.09 
 
-0.41 
 
0.22 
 
0.09 
 Japan 0.06 
 
-0.01 
 
0.30 
 
-0.29 
 Jordan -0.03 
 
-0.35 
 
0.66 * -0.27 
 Malaysia -0.14 
 
-0.20 
 
0.00 
 
-0.37 
 Mali -0.74 * -0.50 * 0.60 * 0.06 
 Mexico -0.40 
 
-0.37 * 0.38 
 
-0.21 
 Moldova -0.47 * 0.02 
 
0.22 
 
-0.16 
 Morocco -0.52 * -0.15 
 
0.37 
 
-0.04 
 Netherlands 0.75 * 0.04 
 
0.15 
 
0.49 
 New Zealand . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 Norway -0.11 
 
-0.33 
 
0.34 
 
-0.22 
 Peru . 
 
-0.40 * 0.19 
 
-0.08 
 Poland 0.08 
 
-0.36 
 
0.23 
 
-0.24 
 Romania 0.08 
 
-0.31 
 
0.45 * -0.14 
 Russian Federation -0.36 
 
0.15 
 
0.37 
 
-0.11 
 Rwanda -0.49 * -0.15 
 
0.27 
 
-0.77 * 
Serbia 0.03 
 
-0.02 
 
0.30 
 
-0.17 
 Slovenia 0.12 
 
-0.14 
 
0.04 
 
0.15 
 South Africa 0.05 
 
-0.54 * 0.31 * -0.30 
 South Korea -0.38 
 
-0.06 
 
0.06 
 
-0.29 
 Spain 0.18 
 
0.19 
 
0.78 * -0.48 * 
Sweden -0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
0.12 
 
-0.14 
 Switzerland 0.15 
 
-0.17 
 
0.23 
 
-0.08 
 Taiwan 0.32 
 
-0.11 
 
0.28 
 
-0.13 
 Thailand -0.06 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.18 
 Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.04 
 
-0.51 * 0.01 
 
-0.18 
 Turkey . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 Ukraine -0.17 
 
-0.08 
 
0.22 
 
0.15 
 United States -0.22 
 
-0.57 * -0.03 
 
-0.53 * 
Uruguay 0.28 
 
0.14 
 
-0.07 
 
0.04 
 Viet Nam -0.01 
 
0.27 
 
0.31 
 
-0.27 
 Zambia -0.29   -0.70 * 0.40 * -0.07   
Note: * = p<0.05 
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Table A3: Random Intercept Estimations of Media Effects on Liberal Attitudes with Interaction Effects 
 
Note: Full maximum likelihood estimation. Dependent variables range from 0 to 10 with high values 
indicating liberal attitudes. All continuous independent variables are z-standardized for a better 
comparability of the effect strengths. All effects not indicated as ‘n.s.’ are significant at a 0.01 level. 
 
 
coef. s .e. coef. s .e. coef. s .e. coef. s .e.
fixed part
Internet 0.297 0.059 0.174 0.052 0.229 0.040 0.191 0.037
Internet x Agg.Value 0.155 0.022 0.105 0.027 0.030 0.013 n.s . 0.108 0.020
Broadcasts -0.087 0.039 -0.187 0.035 0.214 0.037 -0.116 0.030
Broadcasts  x Agg.Value 0.136 0.041 0.205 0.035 -0.028 0.039 n.s . 0.143 0.029
Newspaper 0.073 0.019 0.003 0.019 n.s . 0.102 0.019 0.073 0.019
Female 0.024 0.016 n.s . -0.704 0.016 0.912 0.016 0.101 0.017
Age -0.234 0.009 -0.294 0.009 -0.082 0.009 -0.211 0.009
Education Medium 0.213 0.020 0.088 0.021 0.428 0.021 0.046 0.021 n.s .
Education High 0.567 0.026 0.084 0.026 0.774 0.026 0.162 0.027
Pol i tica l  Interest 0.082 0.009 -0.134 0.009 -0.026 0.009 -0.005 0.009 n.s .
GDP -0.168 0.046 -0.045 0.031 n.s . -0.093 0.044 n.s . -0.007 0.027 n.s .
Press  Freedom 0.040 0.047 n.s . 0.049 0.026 n.s . -0.063 0.039 n.s . 0.031 0.028 n.s .
Constant 2.455 0.038 3.328 0.031 4.686 0.037 1.963 0.033
random part
Sigma (Internet) 0.380 0.043 0.332 0.039 0.229 0.032 0.203 0.030
Sigma (Broadcasts ) 0.182 0.031 0.142 0.022 0.165 0.028 0.072 0.032
Sigma u (L2) 0.162 0.028 0.068 0.031 0.148 0.026 0.108 0.023
Sigma e (L1) 2.024 0.006 2.108 0.006 2.103 0.006 2.148 0.006
Observations 67614 69848 68985 69843
Sexual & Moral 
Values Religious Values Gender Equality Family Values
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